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FOREWORD
The work which follows is by no means a thorough or complete
history of the Twenty First Infantry Regiment in World War II. To
my knowledge no such history has yet been written. I have, however,
a number of official accounts of some of our actions. These I have
edited and put together with whatever other information available in
order to have at least •me form of published-.. record. I am publish-:
ing this work in responae to numerous requests from members and former
members of the 21st Infantry as a chronicle of our days together in
combat.
Most of the description concerning the Hollandia Operation was submitted by Lieut. Colonel Roy W. Marcy. The sketches after Page 37 and
Page 52 were dra1m by Mr. Lawrence E. Hickman another former 21st Infantryman. Grea.t thanks are due to Lieut. Colonel Judson Maeivor Smith for
-t he mat.e rial on Pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 which were taken from his book "The
Story of .a Regiment" - a history of the 21st Infantry. Thanks are also
due to Mr. Arthur Amos, Jr. for the cover, Miss Ruth Middleton for typing
the manuscript and to Mr. T•· L. Tuggle for supervising the multilith operations of reproduction.
I would be glad to receive information from anyone who can furnish
more complete data for inclusion in a future, more complete work. Also
any corrections or suggested changes will be very welcome.

· /f(/~91~

WILLIAM J. ~~;d K
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding Officer of Troops
U.S.M.A., West Point, N•Y•

1

The narrative accounts of the 'work are, for the most part, taken
from official records. The events narrated, although of some interest,
lack color and descriptive effect. Ruman interest is prac~ically lacking. In order to tell the story with a proper background it would be
necessary to obtain personal experience narratives from hundreds of enlisted men and officer~ to cover the actual combat description of each
small unit on each battlefield. In order to more vividly describe the
true picture existing during the various actions, certain citations for
awards and decorations are inserted. The citations inserted are in a
smaller ty'pe and written on separate pages so as not to interrupt the
continuity of the basic narrative. The citations inserted are but a
small percentage of those awarded for each phase of a battle. Unfortuilately they are tb.e only ones available to the writer. They will,
however, serve to describe the intensity of the combat and to insert
human intere&t into the reading.

(From "The Story of a Regiment 11 by Judson llacivor Smith)
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Until comparatively recent years no effort has been made systematically
to continue in unbroken service the regul.8.r regiments of the army. Thus
at the close of most of our wars reg~ents have been disbanded and th~ir
existence brought to an untimely end, and a unit which fought in the War
of 1812 and the Civil War, for example, under the same regimental designation, need not necessarily be in any sense whatever the same organization.
Thus, the story of the present 21st Infantry properly begins with G.O.
#33, WD, dated June 18, 1861, which provides for the creation of the 12th
Regiment of U. S. Infantry. Through the accident of common practice during the war, wherein battalions frequently served as separate and distinct
units, our lineage is properly traced through the actions of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, until the promulgation of G.O. 1150 WD, dated August
1, 1866 ani G.O. 1192 dated November 23, 1866, which changed the name of the
2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, to the 21st Regiment of Infantry.
The 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which had not been organized during the
Civil War, was organized and recruited to strength in the fall of' 1865 and
t~ansferred to the Pacific Coast for service in Arizona.
Pursuant to the
same orders which changed the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, to the 21st Infantry, this 3d Battalior., 14th Infantry, became the 32d Regiment, am,
finally in 1869, pursuant to WD G.O. #16 and #17, the 32d was consolidated
with the 21st, the consoli_dated regiment retaining the designation of the
21st U. s. Infantry.
G.O. #33 WD, dated June 28, 1921, transferred all personnel of the 21st
Infantry to other regiments and transferred the regiment, by means of its
colors and records, to the Hawaiian Department.
G.O. #35, HD, dated August 19, 1921, directed that: "Upon arrival in
the Department the Colors and Records will be sent to Schofield Barracks,
T. H., and there turned over to the Commanding General of that post. Effec~
tive upon receipt, the entire personnel of the 44th Infantry is transferred
to the 21st Infantry. The 44th Infantry is placed on the inactive list,
with the 21st Infantry as its active associate.

3
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REGIMENTAL COAT OF ARMS
HEADQUARTERS, 21st INFANTRY
Office Of The Regimental Commander,
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
· General Orders)
No. 1
)
Subject:

February 15, 1924.

REGIMENTAL INSIGNIA.
Extract

1.- General Orders No. 7, these head~uarters, dated April 9, 1923,
is revoked and the following regulations contaii~ed in a fetter· from
the Adjutant General of the Ar~ will hereafter govern the wearing
of the 21st Infantry Regiment Distinctive· Insignia by members of the
command:
•

•

•

•

•

•

1. The Secretary of War approves the following Coat-of-Arms for the
21st Regiment of Infantry for wear as part of the uniform of the Regi~
ment.
Arms: Party per fess azure ana argent, in chief a sun in splendor
or charged with a five-bastioned fort of the first, in base a cedar
tree eradicated proper.
Crest: On a wreath of the colors four ·arrows sable, armed and
feathered gules, tied with a rattlesnake skin proper.
Motto: Duty.
Description: This regiment was originally organized in 1861 as the
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, and as such was in the Army of the Potomac,
taking part in numerous engagements, the baptism of fire being at Cedar
Mountain, Augu~ 9, ·1862, where it performed its mission with such success
as to bring forth special aention from General Prince, the Brigade Commander. This incident is shown b,y the cedar tree. In 1866 it was enlarged
and the name changed to 21st Infantry. It was in four Indian Campaigns,
shown by the four arrows of the crest, the rattlesnake was the Indian
emblem of War. At Santiago, the regiment was in the 5th Corps, the badge
of which. was a five-bastioned fort, and its Philippine service is shown
by the Katipunan sun. The colors of the shield, blue and white, have been
the Infantry colors during the existence of the Regiment.
By order of COLONEL PERRY:
(Signed)

w.. c. · DeWare,
Adjutant.

4

GIMLETS HAVE FOUGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE

.~..r·

Between 1815 and 1861 there was no Twenty-first Infantry
Regiment. Our predecessors during the W&r of 1812, however,
e,stablished a foundation for the elan which -we1 bear now and
always. Here is an account of the gimlets of one hundred and
thi~y-two years ago.

THE 21st INF.ANTRY'S TROPHY OF NIAGARA
Battle of Niagara, fought within sight of
T HENiagara
Falls, is perhaps better known to the
student of history as the battle of Lundy's Lane.
This latter name arises from the fact that the
bitterest part of the struggle occurred in Lundy's
Lane during the attack by the American Infantry on the British battery
which was in position there. The following account of the battle is taken
from a history of the 21st Infantry,
published by Capt. C. E. Hampton,
21st Infantry, in 1909:
At sunset, on the evening of July
25th, 1814, General Winfield Scott's
brigade, advancing down the Niagara
River, on the Canadian side, found
itself confronted by the British Army drawn up on rising ground a sport
distance below the Falls. Although
greatly outnumbered and overmatched in artillery, Sc.ott unhe~itatingly engaged
the enemy and sent word to General Brown, at
Chippewa, of the perilous situation. The latter
ordered General Ripley forward and hastened to
the battlefield. At nine o'clock, p. m., Ripley's
brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first and Twenty-third Infantry regiments, with a detachrr.~nt of
the First, arrived upon the scene. Scott's troops
were exhausted and scattered by the continuous
fighting, and Ripley's were at once pushed forward to form a new line.
A British battery of seven guns posted 8fl a
hill in the center of their line, near a road called
Lundy's Lane, was seen to be the key to their position. Turning to Colonel James Miller, who
commanded the Twenty-first Infantry, General
Brown said: "Colonel, take your regiment, storm
that work, and take it." Colonel Miller's prompt
reply, "I'll try, sir," is one of the few sentient
speeches of the battlefield that our history has
delighted to transmit from gene:.:ation to generation.
In the dim moonlight the Twenty-first climbed
the hill until it reached a rail fence near the bat-

tery. Resting their muskets on this fence, our
men poured in a volley that killed or wounded
every one of the gunners, then rushed the battery
and took possession of their guns. A British line,
lying in support, fired with deadly effect and then
chargerl, with intent to retake the
guns with the bayonet but were driven back. Three times they made desperate efforts to recapture the battery, but the Twenty-first doggedly
held its ground. The combatants
were so close that the fire from their
muskets crossed and it is said that
the buttons on the enemies' uniforms
could be plainly distbguished by its
light.
The Twenty-first suffered
fearful losses and must inevitably
have been expelled from its hard won
position had not Ripley, with the First
and Twenty-htird, come to its aid.
The enemy, having also been heavily re-enforced,
made three more unsuccessful assaults, and then
retired from the field.
General Brown co111plimented the regiment
and its commander in the highest terms and presented to it one of the captured guns, a beautiful
bronze six-pounder, "in testimony of -its distinguished gallantry." In addressing Colonel Miller
he said, "You have immortalized yourself"; and
passing years have proved his prophecy correct.
In this desperate struggle the Twenty-first
lost one hundred and twenty-six killed and wounded, or forty-five per cent. of its entirP- stren~ :h,
the regiment having entered with less than three
hundred men.
The battle was won against odds of almost
two to one, and from a foe that numbered in his
ranks many of Wellington's veterans, trained on
the battlefields of the Spanish Peninsula. As example of calculating courage, of tenacious persistence, and of headlong bravery, our history contains none more brilliant, nor is it likely to show,
in the future, one more glorious. · Time cannot
dim .the luster of such deeds.
·

~
~

21st INFANTRY ANTHEM

our
1ded
tery
line,
then
the
lrivdesbatedly
ants
.heir
that
•rms
r

its

ered
ably
won
i'irst
aid.
~ced,

then
nent
pretiful
stin[Iller
and
~ct.

-first
undtb:h,
hree

nost
his
d on
; ex·sistconhow,
nnot

1

In 1916-1917, while the Regiment was engaged on ,Kexican Border
duty, with headquarters in San Diego, ' California, it acquired an ·
~admiring friend in. C.a rrie Jacobs Bond, famous American composer.
The Blue Flag, a musical selectio~ f'or band, was oOpyrighted by
her in 1917. She published. this selection and dedicat'd it to the
21st Illf8J}try.. T-he End of' a P~r!ect Day, the author's best known
composition, const-itutes .a part of' The Blue Flag, and was dedicated
as the Regimental, Anthem at ·a meeting of the entire Regiment on
September 16, 19:37. The words of' the anthem are by lla.rgaret B.
Woodward, wife. of Second Lieutenant. La.ma.r F. Woodward, 21st Infantry.
To the glor.y of' men w~o haTe. gone before,
~d the glory of . sons yet unborn;
The Twenty•first ever we · consecrate,
118¥ her crest long with honor be .worn;
United
sta'nd whene 1 er duty calls,
To a man, till the viet 'ry is won,
And the . f'ame and the st~ength of the Twenty-first
Shall be pride in the task wel~ done.

we'll

BAmE HONORS
21st Infantry

CIVIL WAR
Gettysburg
Virginia 1863
WUderness
Spottsrlvania
Cold Harbor
Petersburg

Peninsula
Virginia 1862
Manassas
Antietam
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville

INDIAN WARS
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona

Arizona 1870
Modoc
Nez Percea ·
'Bannocks

1866
1867
1868
1869

SPANISH AMERICAN W1R
Santiago
PHILIPPINES INSUaRECTION

Luzon 1901
Luzon 1902

Zapote River
Luzon 1899
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~RLD

7/AR II.

Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941
Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea, 22 April 1944
Hollandia, New Guinea, 23-28 April 1944
Philippine Islands

-.

Panaon Island, 20 October 1944
Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, 5-18 November 1944
Hill 1525, 8-9 November 1944 (1st Bn.)
Daro - Mt. Lao - Yt. Mamban, 20 November - 10 December 1944
Carigara Defensive, 10-27 December 1944
~sa n Jose, Mindoro,
22-29 December 1944 (3rd Bn.)
San Jose, 29 December -~January 1945 (Remainder of Rgt.)
.Boa}(, Maranduque, January 1945 (KCo.)
?inamalay&n, Mindoro, 7-11 January 1945 (I Co.)
Bongabong, 6-14 January 1945 (3rd -Bn.)
Gusay, 20 January 1945
Calipan - Najuan, 20-24 January 1945
Nasugbu - Wawa - Lian - Tagaytay - Imus - Paranaque - Zapote Las Pinas - Nichols Field ~ Ft. Wm. McKinley - Alabang - Los Banos
31 January - 3 March 1945 (Cannon Company)
Lubang Island, 28 February - 7 March 1945 (1st Bn.)
Dipolog, Mindanao, March 1945 (2nd Bn.)
Malabang- Parang, . Mindanao, 17 April 1945
Cotobato, 18 April 1945 (2nd Bn.)
Tamontako - Lamopog, 18-19 April 1945 (2nd Bn.)
Toril - Bago, 2 May 1945
Mintal, 2-9 May 1945
_
Libby Drome, 3-13 May 1945
Talamo Heights, 10-13 May 1945 (1st Bn.)
Tugbok, 9-19 May 1945 (2nd Bn.)
Mintal - Ula Roads, 9-25 May 1945
Bayabas, 30-31 M&y 1945 (1st Bn.)
Mulig, 2 June 1945
Alhambre, 3 June 1945
Sh&nkee,· 3 June 1945
Monterey -Naming - Tag&kp&n - Talomo Valley, 3-13 June 1945
Wangan, 15 June 1945
Calinan, 18 June 1945
B&guio, 17-18 June 1945
Tamg&n Trail, 6-19 June 1945
Tamogan Trail, 10 July - 1 August 1945
Sarangani Bay, 16. July- 7 August 1945 (lst Bn.)
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CCJOlENDATION BY THE COWANDI!l} GENERAL
24th DIVISION
The 21st Infantry Regiment is cited for extraordinary heroism
and outstanding performance of duty in action against the enem_y far
6 to 16 November 1944, and from 1 Kay to 19 June 1945, on Leyte and
llindanao Islands •
On 6 November i944, the Regiment launched the first of a relentless series of attacks against Breakneck Rid~e, key to the ene~ defense system at the -head of the Ormoc Corridor. Despite almost
constant rain; the en~'s through exploitation of nearly perfect de- ·
fensive terrain; meagre and uncertail'l supply, and dwindling reserves
of manpower as compared with the enemy's constant reinforcement, the
21st Infantry took the offensive and held it against a veteran eneJV
force. ·By frontal attack and envelopment, the 21st maintained such
pressure against a numerically superior enemy, that in twelve days
it advanced 2000 yards and seized complete contrel or the dominating
high ground. The Regiment counted a total of 1,779 enemy dead, an
irreparable blow to one of the Japanese Eopire's finest divisions~
Undoubtedly many others lay undiscovered in the tangled terrain.
This bitter and sustained struggle broke the enemy hold on the northern end of the Ormoc Valley and paved the way for the subsequent
capture of Limon and the ultimate neutralization of the ~ntire island.
So severe had been the fighting that every third line soldier was either
killed or wounded. Seven rifle company commanders fell~ The· Regiment
then aided, after a short rest, in the annihilatiQn of the enemy on
Mindoro, Marinduque, Lubang, and Luzon. It struck lfindanR.o on 17 April
as an assault unit of the 24th Division, seized the Malabang Airstrip
and the key river port of Cotabato, and took part in the Division's
lightning drive across the island. On 1 May, commencing at Bago, 140
miles from its starting point, the Regiment attacked 6,500 Japanese
troops concentrated in the Talomo ·River Valley. These elements were
strongly supported by artillery, armed with an inordinately high proportion of automatic weapons and manning expertly placed positions,
built over a period of years, and naturally camouflaged by lush tropical growbh. For fifty-one heat-ridden days, with thick abaca fields
channelizing its attacks, but permitting strong infiltration against
its flanks and rear, the 21st continued the indomitable assault. After
fourteen days it was able to commit only 54% of its original strength,
but it never relaxed pressure. Without losing momentum, it absorbed
1000 replacements. By 18 June the Regiment had advanced twelve miles,
taken the finest airfield on Davao Gulf, killed by actual count 2,133
enemy troops, disorganized and scattered the remainder and destroyed
or captured all of their organic equipment. In addition to its heavy
battle casualties, the attrition of severe heat, difficult terrain and
continued strain had forced hospitalization of 1,411 other officers and
men. · During the gruelling period every assigned objective was taken on
schedule. The fierce fighting spirit of the Regiment comnrunicated itself to every man, old and new alike, and morale remained grimly high.
These actions of the 21st Infantry Regiment reflect the finest traditions of the United States Ar~ and will stand as a bright page in the
nation's military history.
.

I
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ROSCOE B. WOODRUFF
l.lajor General
Commanding.

TiiE TWENTY FIRST REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM

(On Leyte)

21st Infantry Regiment
52nd Field Artillery Battalion
1st Platoon, Company A, 3rd Engineers
Collecting Company A, 24th Medical Rgt.
Company A, 44th Tank Battalion
Company C, 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company C, 85th Chemical Battalion (4.2" mortars)
7th Portable Surgical Hospital

I

After the battle of Breakneck Ridge the RCT was changed from
time to time to include other Engineer Units, new Portable Surgical
Ho~itals, and tank ~nd TD units, but the 52nd Field Artillery - a
magnificient battalion of 105mm howitzers - remained with the 21st
Infantry throughout al'~ the fighting in the Philippines except for
a few weeks at Caragara when the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion was
substituted.
It is desired here to pay tribute to the 52nd Field Artillery
Battalion. No one knows more than the infantryman in battle how much
we rely on our own artillery. The 52nd was always there with its g_uns
to support us with its accurate and heavy fire for every step of our
advance. Their forward observers were always with the most advanced
infantrymen arxi performed acts of gallantry daily. Their guns were
always our closest friends. Many a dea~ ·Jap claimed on the scoresheet
of the 21st Infantry was really killed by our brothers of the 52nd.
llaey a soldier owes his life to them. Every honor which we claim for
the 21st Infantry: Regiment we gladly share with the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion.
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19th Int'antry

3rd Batta]_ion
Lt. Col.. EDWARD M. POOTLETHlrAIT

Jrd Batta1ion
Major ELMER C. HOIJARD

63rd F,A. Batta1ion
Cal . CORNELIS deW. 11. LANG

24th Caya]_ry aeeonnaiQapce Troop
lst Lt. RICHAHD V. COLLOPY

lith F.A. Ba.tt,alion
Lt. Col. JOSEPH H. HODGES, Jr.

Lt.

Artillerr Batta]_iop Clgpmanderg

6Q3rd Medium Tank; Company
Capt. RICHARD B. THIEllOLF

Wth Amphibirus Tractor Ba.tta1iO!l
.llaj or .P'RAHK R; McLJ.VI

24th GNartermo.ster Cammy
lst Lt. GEORGE SlllltERS (prior to 26 Oct 44)
lst Lt. LEONARD LEVITT (26 Oct to l4 Dec 44)
lst Lt. JOH.N P. ROWLA.ND (ai'ter ,14 Dec 44)

Ta!!k .Botta]_ion
Lt. Col. T()d H. HOOS

44th 4ed1um

632Pd Tallk Destrgyer Bo.ttAl,ion
Lt. Col. HUGH lol. F.AiiNING

24th Sigpal CgmpAw
lst Lt. HARLEY E. (;LA:(TON

3rd EnginoeT Jlattalion
Major JCIIN G. STARR prior to 12 NaY 44)
Lt. Col. JUH.N S. B. DICK (at'ter 12 Nov 44)

13th F,A. fi!.tto.lion
Lt. Col.. HAROLD E. LIEBE

6PIUil~
Lt. Col. J .&JlES F. PEARSALL, Jr.

2nd Batta1ion
Lt. Col. ROBERT B. SPRAGINS

l58tb Orrloopge b b Disposal_ Sqgadrsm
1st Lt. 1IWII c. TilT.Oif

B5tb Choico.l B&ttal.ion
Maj ar JCBN L. CARSON

724t,b Clrdmpce ~cmuurr
Capt. LESTER J. RINGENBERG wrior to 6 New 44)
Capt. HOWARD RICHAHDSQI la!'ter 6 lew 44)

Ba.ttal_ion
Major JOHN M. F.ALIER

52b~ F A B&tt&lion
Major IEIIUEL I. m.J.CIER

3rd Battal,ion
Lt. Col. ERIC P. !WID

Lt. Col. SJ,!.MOOR JW>ISaf

M..Bttta1ion

1st Batto.lign
Major JCIIN P. L&AHI (prior to 8 !lew 44}
llaj or L.UIAR 11'. LI'l'TLJI (atter 8 llcw 44)

21st Iptaptry
Lt. Col. FREDERICK R. WEBER (priar to 7 lOY 44)
Colonel WILLWI J. VERBECJI: latter 7 !lew 44}

24th !edigo.l

53;ap Epgineer Boat ADd Shore Regimental Cqmmnnder
Colonel .ALE.IANDElt N:. NEILSON

1st Bat~iop
Major EDli'IN N. EDRIS prior to 23 Oct 44)
Major HENRY G. GOCIO, Jr. (23 Oct to 26 Oct 44)
Lt. Col. THCJUS E. CLIWORD, Jr. (attar 26 Oct 44)

34th Inr~trx
Colonel J.U.l!RE! s. NEWMJ.N Prior to 31 Oct 44)
Lt. Col.. CHEST~ J.. DJ.HL~ (31 Oct to 24 Dec 44)
Colonel 'llLLIAII W. JENNA (after 24 Dec 44)

lst Ba.ttAl,ion
Lt. Col. FREDERICK R. ZD:RA'l'H

Lt. Col.. GEORGE R. CHAPIUJI, Jr.

Infantry Regiaonta]_ Cmmenders

Cqmmonding Genoro.l 24th Diyiaion J,rtlllery
lll'.igadier General lf!LLLUI.R. GRUBtli

Qqgroonr!W Ge%!oro.la. 24th Divifion .LandW Tey
Major Gell8ro.l FREDERICK J.. IRVOOpriar to 17 !lew 44)
Majar Genero.l '.'USCOE B. WOODRUFF {atter 17 NaY 44)

Cggnding Gonaro.l .I Corps
Majar Genero.l FIWIIU.IN c. SIBERT

Cgmmnnrling GeDOro.l S1rt4 .Army
Lieutenant General WALTER IROKGER

Copppa.ndinlz General, Southwest Paciric 'l'heator
Gell8ro.l DOJ GUS Nac £RTHUR

ror the
Li:YT.i ISLAND OPERATION

The Cl!Al.N OF C<MWa>

PEARL HARBOR AND THE EARLY DAYS
When the Japanese ·struck Pearl Harbor, the 24th Division was one of
the two divisions garrisoned in the Hawiian Islands. This was December
7, 1941. The division suffered light casualties only., The division was
composed basically of three regimental combat teams built around its three
infantry regiments. Threse regiments were the 19th Infantry (Rock of
Chikamauga), the 21st Infantry (Gimlets) and the 34th Infantry. The 24th
Division was a Regular Army Division. The division immediately began to
strengthen the defenses of Oahu and train for jungle warfare and amphibious landings.
When the threat to the islands had passed, the division sailed for the
South Pacific, arriving at Rockhampton, Australia in August 1943. Then
began another long period of training which was soon to bear its first
fruit.
HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA
On 22 .April 1944, D-Day for the Tanahmerah Bay-Hollandia Campaign, the
Regiment launched its first campaign against the Japs. This invasion
climaxed a long period of training and defensive action in Oahu, Australia,
and Goodenough Island.' The Gimlets smashed thru thirty-five miles of rough
jungle terrain in four and a half days and fought one battle enroute. This
campaign has since been rated as the fastest and best coordinated campaign
in jungle warfare.
After a practice landing on the coast of New Guinea, the Gimlets loaded
on transports and became part of a 850 ship convoy. Seven days later, on
the morning of 22 April 1944, the Regiment landed at Tanahmerah and Depapre,
New r~inea.
ACTION CF THS 21ST INFANTRY, 22 APRIL 1944
The 21st Inf~ntry, commanded by Col. Charles Lyman, less the lst Battalion, to land at Tanahmerah Bay, secure a beachhead, and move overland
to Depapre. The 3rd Engineers to construct a road from Tanahmerah to
Depapre. The 52nd Field Artillery to go into position at Tanahmerah Bay
and be prepared to fire in support of the Regiment.
ACTION OF THE lst BATTALION, 21ST INFANTRY
The lst Battalion, 2ist Infantry, was ordered to land at Depapre Bay,
secure a beachhead, leave Company 11 A11 to hold the beachhead until relieved
by the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry. The lst Battalion, less Company "A"
to move out immediately and seize the Regimental objective, the high ground
overlooking Depapre.
At 0830 the morning of 22 April 1944 the lst Battalion, commanded by
Lieut. Colonel Thomas (Jock) Clifford, had successfully established a beach. head at Depapre Bay. Company 11 A11 quickly organized the defense of the beachheaq/ and the remainder of the Battalion moved out toward Mariobe, the Regimental objective.
At 1600, 22 April, the 1st Battalion had seized Mariobe, and dug in for
the night. · The first day of the campaign had been uneventful with exception
of a few Japs killed by naval fire, and two prisoners captured by a patrol
from Company 11 C11 lead by Lieut. Charles Counts. These were the first Jap
prisoners to be captured by the Gimlets.
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The landing of the Regiment at Tanahmerar w~s not so successful. The
terrain that looked so good in aerial photo s t urned out to be impassable
swamp. This beachhead had to be abandoned and the Regimental combat team
moved by landing craft to the Depapre beachhead. A small detachment of
the 2nd Battalion was sent overland from Tanahmerah to Depapre to reconnoiter the shore. The Depapre beachhead, although inadequate, became the
beachhead of the entire 24th Division.
On the morning of 23 April the Gimlets bagged their first Jap. Pvt.
Martin of Company "C", looking up from a breakfast of "K" ration, saw a Jap
peering thru the bushes. A well aimed shot earned Martin the honor of being
the first Gimlet to kill a Jap. This was number one on a list of many thousand doomed to stop Gimlet lead.

Eager to contact the ene~, the 1st Battalion pushed on. All morning of
the 23rd of April Jap reconnaissance patrols moved parallel to our column
but no contact was made. At 1500, 23 April 1944, the 2nd Platoon, Company
11 0 11 , commanded by Lieut. Jack Wright, contacted and drove in a Jap outpost
on Distassi Creek. Distassi Creek was named in. homr Qf Sgt. Distassi, the
first Gimlet killed in action against the Japs. The 2nd Platoon of Company
"C" had engaged a strong ene~ force estimated as two rifle companies reinforced.
The 1st Platoon, Company "0", commanded by Lieut • .Robert (Ace) Malone,
was ordered to envelop the ene~'s left flank. Moving quickly the 1st
Platoon overran a Jap outpost of twenty men, crossed the creek and drove
to center of the enemy strong point where they met stubborn resistance.
The weapons platoon of Company 11 C11 , commanded by Lieut. William Langford,
went into action, made a direct hit on a Jap armored car and neutralized
three machine gun nests. Company ncn was commanded by Captain Roy Marcy.
Lieut. Phillip Irons lead a platoon of Company 11 B11 up and moved into position on the right flank of Company 11 C11 • The small area '16s a hell of sound,
gun flashes, and the hoarse shouts of men in battle.
At 1630 Colonel Clifford ordered the 1st Battalion into perimeter for
the night. Just before dusk the Battalion was greeted by Father Brady,
the Regimental Chaplain. He was making the rounds giving away cigarettes
and words ,of encouragement. Chaplain Brady had gone ashore with the bulk
of the regiment, but upon l'l!aring that the 1st Battalion was in a fight,
had made the hazardous trip up over the mountain to join the 1st Battalion.
That night the enemy pulled out of their defense on the creek, broke into small groups, and continued to harass our perimeter until dawn of the
24th.
The morning of 24 April patrols were sent out and reported that the
enemy had withdrawn. At 0900 Company "A", having been relieved from the
beachhead, rejoined the 1st Battalion and was sent across the creek to
occupy the Jap position. Orders were received to hold our position until
the Regiment could be consolidated and rations and ammunition brought forward. At 1100 the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infan~ry, joined the 1st Battalion.
At 0730, April 25th, the 1st Battalion continued the advance on Hollandia.
The terrain opened up as we followed an ~roved road toward the drome. Enemy equipment and supplies had been abandoned beside the road as the terrified enemy hastily withdrew. In some houses tables were found set for meals
that were never eaten. Occasionally a sniper would harass our column but
never again did the enemy attempt to block our advance to Hollandia.
10 a

At 1155, 26 April 1944, Company 11 C11 , the Advance Guard of the Regiment,
pulled upon a high hill overlooking the Hollandia Drome. As far as the
eye could see lay blasted planes. The Regimental Commanaer ordered the
Jrd Battalion to pass thru the 1st Battalion and seize the Drome. The Jrd
Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Chester A. Dahlen, moved across the
Hollandia Drome and secured the field. Later in the day the Jrd Battalion
sent a patrol on to the Cyclops Drome where contact was made between the
24th and 41st Divisions thus ending the campaign~
So far, I have dea·c ribed only the action of the lead battalion of the
Regiment. To the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Seymour E. Madison, fell the task of supplying the lead battalions. The track over the
mountain proved impassable for vehicles, even for the G~I.'s friend, the
jeep. Instead, Gimlets wanting to fight, found themselves lugging boxes of
K rations and ammunition in a long file up the rugged trail to supply the·
battalions forming the spearhead. It was ignominious work for highly
trained combat men, but to their credit.
The campaign was officially over but much fighting remained to be done.
The Hollandia Invasion had isolated 60~000 Japa to the south. They of course
would attempt to join the forces north of Hollandia. The avenue of escape
to the north was canalized through the Hollandia area. Trail blocks were
established on all trails and trail functions leading north. It was in this
kind of action that Pvt. Monroe McGee of Company nCn distinguished himself.
McGee contributed a total of 45 Japs, killed, to the Regimental list. He
was often referred to as, "One Man Patrol McGee".
When the mop-up was completed, the enemy had lost 1771 killed, and a
then unprecedented number of priaoners - 502. This number was shared equally
by all battalions of the Regiment. The Regiment had suffered only 32 casualties during the entire campaign. The main part of the division remained
at Hollandia until the time was ripe for the invasion of the Philippines.
SIXTH U. S. ARMY -- PACIFIC VETERAN
By General Walter Krueger, USA
Commanding General, Sixth Armr
By mid-october 1944, Sixth Army had cleared Western New Britain of enemy
forces, had reconquered the Admiralties, had completed its operations on
the north coast of New Guinea, had seized and secured southeastern Morotai
in the Halmaheras, and was enroute to Leyte Island to begin the liberation
of the Philippines. In order to appreciate the operations which followed,
it is necessary to understand General MacArthur's over-all plan for the Philippine Campaign. First, the Leyte Operation was to be undertaken to obtain
naval, air and supply bases from which to provide support for future Philippine Campaigns; next, the plan called for a hop from Leyte across the
Visayas to seize southwestern Mindoro so as to establish airfields within
125 miles of Manila Bay; and third, a landing was to be made in the Lingayen
Gulf. area of Luzon,~ followed by a rapid drive southward to seize the Central
Plain-Manila area, to open Manila Bay to our shipping , and subsequently, to
destroy hostile forces remaining on Luzon. All of these operations were
assigned to Sixth Ar~ and plans for t heir accomplishment were well under ·
way by the time Sixth Army.was enroute to Leyt e .
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The Leyte Operation was divided into three tactical phases. Phase
One consisted of an amphibious operation to secure the entrances to
Leyte Gulf. Phase Two comprised major amphibious assaults: to seize
the coastal strip of eastern Leyte from Tacloban to Dulag, including
the airdromes and base sites in the area; to open San Juanico Strait
and Panaon Strait; and to secure the central valley of Leyte including
the Carigara Bay area on the north central coast. ·Phase Three called
for the destruction of hostile forces remaining on Leyte and the clearing of hostile forces from southern Samar. Phase One of this operation
lasted from 17-19 October 1944, during which time the 6th Ranger Infantry
Battalion occupied Dinagat, Homonhon and Suluan Islands, thus securing
the entrance to Ley~e Gulf. Phase Two was initiated on 20 October 1944
when X Corps and XXIV Corps landed on the east coast of Leyte in a powerful amphibious assault. These landings followed by one hour the landing
of the 21st Infantry Regiment .of the 24th Infantry Division on Panaon
Island,. where this regiment rapidly established control over Panaon Strait.
Sixth Army quickly exploited its initial successes. In the X Corps zone
. of action the 1st Cavalry Division on 20 October seized Tacloban Airfield
and on the following day captured Tacloban. Five days later elements of
this division were moving northwestward along San Juanico Strait toward
Carigara. The 24th Infantry Division secured Palo on 21 October, then
advanced rapidly into the Leyte Valley, and on 29 October succeeded in
gaining contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division south of Carigara. In a coordinated attack by unit.s of these two divisions Carigara
was captured 2 November.
Meanwhile, in the XXIV Corps .zone of action, the 7th Infantry Division
captured Dulag airstrip on 21 October, advanced rapidly westward to seize
the three airfields in the Burauen area by 25 October, and captured Dagami
on 29 October against heavy enemy resistance. Other elements of this division pushed southward, secured Abuyog and then advanced westward across
the mountains to occupy Baybay on the Camotes Sea. The 96th Infantry Division, which had landed on the right of the 7th Infantry Division, initia}ly by-passed enemy positions on Catmon Hill and seized the southern
portion of the Leyte Valley within its zone of action. This division
attacked Catmon Hill on 28 October and qy 31 October had completely el~
ina ted all enemy resistance there. · Following this action, the 96th Infantry Division began the relief of the 7th Infantry Division in the DulagBurauen-Dagami-Tanauan area.
By 2 November 1944, Sixth Army had gained control of the broad Leyte
Valley and its airfields, had opened Panaon and San Juanico Straits, and
had secured Carigara on the north central coast and B~bay on the west
coast, thus successfully ·completing the second phase of the operation.
It soon developed, however, that General Yamashita, the Japanese commander
in the Philippines, intended to hold Leyte at all costs. The Japanese High
Command had already committed its navy in a bold and desperate attempt to
defeat our naval forces in Philippine waters and destroy our shipping in
Leyte Gulf. In the historic Battle of Leyte Gulf which occurred during the
period 24-26 October, this threat was turned back by our Third and Seventh
Fleets. A large part of the enemy naval forces were sunk and the remainder
withdrew in a badly damaged condition.
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In spite of this disastrous -~ ~vai defeat, General Yamashita rushe1
reinforcements to Leyte on all aVailable craft, openly stating that the
battle of the Philippines would be won or lost on Leyte Island. From
Cebu, Panay, and Uindanao, enemy reinforcements came in barges, landing
craft and other minor shipping; and from Luzon reinforcements poured southward in cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and transports. In spite
of terrific losses inflicted by our air attacks on his convoys, the enemy
succeeded in landing a corps headquarters, and the bulk of · five divisions,
besides a ·considerable number of corps, combat and service troops. By
.early NOvember, it was clearly apparent that Phase Three of the operation
· would be difficult and protracted, due not only to the heavy reinforcements
which the ene~ was rushing to Leyte, but also to the advent of the rainy
season and · to a lack of adequate air support ·caused by our inability t .o
build airfields in the- m:>rass that Leyte had become.
,J>hase Three began on 3 November ·when X Corps advanced the 24th Infantry
Division westwa~d from its positions at Carigara. This division captured
Pinamopoan 'on 4 November and then turned southward on Highway 2 in the dir~ction of Ormoc. Shortly thereafter, it encountered strong and stubborn
resistance 6h Breakneck Ridge which was not ' eliminated until· 16 November.
End of Excerpt from General Kruger's Report.
X CORPS - LEITE
By Major General F. C. Sibert, USA
Commandin~ General,. X Corps

I Corp~, wxier Sixth Army, in its first, operation landed on Leyte on
20 October 1944 in the first and decisive battle of the Philippines.
Its initial objectives, the seizure of Tacloban, Tacloban Airstrip,
.·Palo, juncture with the xnv Corps, and the opening of the San Juanico
Strait, were accomplished in five bloody days in the midst of thousands
of~riendly filipinos and one typhoon.
. By the twelfth day, the final Corps objective was taken when the 24th
Infantry, Division, - driving up Leyte Va~ley, coordinated with the 1st Cavalry- Division in a combined attack on Carigara. Elements of the 16th
Japanese Division had been badly mauled and remnants driven into the hills
between Ormoc Val~ey and Leyte Valley. The first of the Japanese reinforee'ments were met in the center of the valley at Jaro where elements of the
Japanese 30th Division from Mindanao and elements of the 102d Japanese DiYision from Cebu were kicked aside h1 the 24th Infantry Division.
Japanese reinforcements were now pouring into Ormoe and the Corps was
· given the mission of advancing to secure that Port. The 24th Infantry
Division advanced west along Carigara Bay and turned south on the highway
. towards LiJOOn and Ormoc. The. _1st Cavalry Division moved into the hills between the two valleys to prevent aey hostile attempt to cross into Leyte
Valley.
On turning south towards Lim:>n, the 24th Infantry Division had a meeting
. engagement with the crack Japanese 1st Division and a gruelling fight ensued before the 24th Infantry D~vision finally overran the Japanese .main
position (Breakneck Ridge).
.
End of Excerpt from General Sibert's Report.
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ROSTER OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED
INFANTRY
AS CF 20 OCTOBER 1944
'
'

TO 21ST

Able, Sothoron K.
Aitken, llalco.m D.
Allen, Shelton P.
Anderson, Ernie o.
Anglim, Edward ll.
Babich, Peter C.
Barker, Silas R.
Battin, Donald H·.
Becker, Philip A.
Bemis, Russell B.
Berkowitz, Julius
Blair, Oa ther
Bland, Irvin G.
Blaney~ Kermit B.
Bowman, Wheeler G.
Boyd, Wilbur B.
~rown, Robert A.
Brown, Roy c.
Browning, Newton F.
Bunkley, Thomas H.
'Bussell, Frank T.
Buttice, Angelo P.
Byrd, William M.
Clifford, Thomas E. Jr.
Coers, Burt N.
Cooper, Clee s.
Corrigan, Michael J.
Counts, Charles R.
Courtney, Burl
Crosson, Hugh s. Jr.
Crouch, Theodore
Curles, Cecil ll.
Dantzler, LeRoy A. Jr.
Dice, Francis R.
Didak, Eugene J,
Eastman, Walter R.
Eddy, Lowell P.
Edleson, Harold
Ender, Robert R.
·Evans, Roy A.
Farmer, Edward s.
Farrell, John B.
·Fisher, Francis R.
Ford, Clarence R.
Foster, Lute A. Jr.
li'ourqurean, Wade D.
Gilbert, John T.
Girardeau, John H. Jr.
Goldpaugh, John J.
Goean, Robert L.
Gullie, Frank J .
Haas, Arthur c.

1st Lt.
Capt.
Capt • . ·
1st Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st ·Lt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
2nd ;Lt.

llajor
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
Lt.Col.
lla.jor
.2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
llajor
2nd Lt.
2nd Lt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
let Lt.

w.o.

lst Lt.
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.
2nd Lt.
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
. 1st Lt.
Capt. ·
1st Lt.
Capt.
W.O.
1st Lt.
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Co. I. Plat. Ldr.
Hq. 3d Bn., Bn. S-3
Regtl. Ammo Off •
Co. A •. C.O.
Co. L. C.O.
Co. A.
Co. K.
Co. E.
Pers. Off.
Asst. Rgt. S-4
Rgt. Dent. Sur g.
D~S. Sixth -Army
-D.s. 24th Div.
Co. L.
Co. A.
Co. I.
Hq. 1st Bn., Bn. s-f
Co. G.
Rgt. S-1
Co. K.
.Regt. S-4
Co. B.
Rgt. Com. Off.
Leave in U.S.
Rgt. Surg.
Co. F.
Co. A.
Co. C.
Co. L.
2nd Bn. Ex. Off.
Co. B.
Cannon Co.
D.S. 24th Div.
2nd Bn. Bn. Comdr.
Co. E.
3rd Bn. Com. Off.
D.S. SiX.t h Army
Cannon Co. c.o.
Co. H. C.O.
As at • A.mnlo •. Off.
Co. D.
Hq. Co. lst Bn.
Co. E.
Co. F.
Hq. Co. 1st Bn.
Co. A.
Co. K.
Leave in U.S.
Leave in U.S.
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn. C.O.
Asst. S-4
Co. H.

('

Halderson, Llewellyn D.
Hall, Claude H.
Haller) RObert F.
Hammer, Richard P.
Handel, David
Hansen, David W.
Hartley, Russell w.
Hartman, Wm. H.
Hawkins, William S.
Haywood, Major G.
Hudson, Roger W~
Hughes, William C. Jr.
Irons, Philip S., III
Ivey, Paul B.
Jameson, Charles R. Jr.
Johnson, Dale E.
Jones, Erner
Kelley, Jack H.
Kester, Alfred J.
Kilgo, Robert L.
tancaster, James L.
Langford, William N~
Lannin, Thomas R.
·
Leahy, Johri P.
Leatherman, Leland F.
Lenm, Stanley C.
Leaky, Albert W• .
Little, Lamar w.
Lockhart, Gerald L.
Langridge, Kermit c.
Luria, Sidney B.
McFarland, James
McMaster~ Rudolph J.
Maclean, Ardell G.
Madison, Seymour E.
Malone, Robert H.
Marcy, Roy W. ·
Marks, Arthur
Marquez, Thomas
Mayer, John D.
Miller, George J.
Moore, Dan. c.
Morean, Gilbert W.
Mote, Jack A.
Murphy, James F.
Nacheff, Steve P.
Oler, William L.
Olson, Erwin L.
Parent, James M.
Patrick, Wm. J.
Pierce, James F.
Postma, James L.
Prall, William A.
Ramee, Eric P.

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd

Lt.
Lt.
Lt.
Lt.
Lt.
Lt.
Lt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.

w.o •.

1st Lt.
1st Lt.
Major
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
Major
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st _Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
Lt.Col.
1st Lt.
Major
Capt.
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
Lt.Col.

Co. E.
Co. F.
Co. K.
Co. H.
D.S. Hq. 24th Div.
Co. D.
Co. B.
Co. B.
3rd Bn. Surg.
Sv. Co. MTO
Hq. Co.
Co. A. C.O.
3rd Bn. S-3
2nd Bn. S-2
Co. F. C.O.
Co. I. C.O.
2nd Bn. Surg.
Co. C. C.O.
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn.
.Co. E. C.O.
Asst. Rgt. S-1
Co. D.
Hq. Co. 2nd Bn.
1st Bn. Bn. C.o.
Rgt. S-2
2nd Bn. S-4
2nd Bn. Asst. S-2
3rd Bn. Bn. Exec.
Co. B. C.O.
A. T. Co.
3rd Bn. Surg.
1st Bn. Com. Off.
Cannon Co.
Co. C.
Rgt. Exec.
Co. ·c.
Leave in u.s·.
1st Bn. Surg.
Co. G.
2nd Bn. S-3
T .D. 19th Inf.
Co. H.
A. T. Co.
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn.
A.T. Co.
Rgt. Asst. S-4
Leave in U.S.
Serv. Co. c.o.
Co. F.
3rd Bn. S-4
Co. K.
3rd Bn. S-3
Co. I.
Hq. 3rd Bn. Bn. c.o.

Reid, Neil E.
Rannaker, Evert D.
Rhein, William L.
Rogers, Edward J.
Rogers, Woodrow 'N .
Rosenblatt, Benjamin
Sabatine, Matthew
Sellmer, George
Seyle, Frank Vl.
Sloan, Nicholas E.
Smigrod: Seymour
Smith, Henry M.
Smith, Vinson s.
Stanford,, Don D.
Steward, Alvin E.
Suber, Tom i'i.
Swast, John J.
Thompson, James H.
Trembley, Arthur H. Jr.
Ufer, Karl A.
Upton, Sherwood A.
Vinneau, Ernest L.
Walters, Murray M.
Weber, Frederick R.
Nheeler, Leroy C.
White, William C.
Whitney, Charles R.
Wr'.i.tney, Howard H.
Wicker, Glenes E.
Wilson, Milton E .
Wright, Albert J.
Young, Emitte L.

Capt.
2nd Lt.
lst Lt.
Capt.
lst Lt.
2nd Lt.
lst Lt.
2nd Lt.
lst Lt.
Capt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
lst Lt.
Capt.
Capt.
Capt.
lst Lt.
Capt.
Capt.
lst Lt.
Capt.
Lt.Col.
2nd Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
lst Lt.
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Co. M. C.O.
Co. I.
Asst. Dent. SUr g.
Co. A. C.0.
Co. C.
Co. G.
Hq. Co. lst Bn.
Co. M.
Hq. Co.

.

Rgt.

S-3

Co. G.
Rgt. Hq. Co. (I & R Plat)
1St Bn. S-4
Jrd Bn. S-1
Co. F.
Co. K. C.O.
Co. D. C.O.
2nd Bn. S-1
Co. D.
Regimental Chaplain '
Leave in U.S.
Co. K.
Asst. Rgt. Chap.
Rgt. Commander
Co. M.
Sv. Co. A&P Off-.
Co. L.
Co. K.
A. T. Co • C• 0.
Co. K.
Co. C.
Hq. co. 3rd Bn.
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At the northern end of the Ormoc Valley on Leyte Island, the
21st Infantry fought and won one of the most bitterly contested
battles of the war. Fighting centered around Breakneck Ridge, a
deeply accented terrain feature. Breakneck Ridge is not a ridgeline, but is formed by a series of knobs. The low ground thick
with shoulder high cogon grass, the pockets between the hills thickly wooded. The valleys are deep and precipitous. Even a small force
ingeniously emplaced could have exacted enormous casualties. The
seriousness of the task became apparent when the presence of the
First Japanese Division was determined. The First Division, fresh
from Manchuria, superbly trained and equipped, organized a system of
trenches and interlocking pillboxes, varied to cover both surrounding
trenches and prepared fields of fire. Heavily supported by 75mm, 105nun,
and l50mm artillery, this crack combat unit had developed what they considered an invulnerable line.
·During the 12 days from 5 November 1944 to 16 November 1944 (inclusive), a technique for clearing connecting trenches in terrain impassiblJ for tanks, was per!ected. Assault fire carried into a trench
from which teams with ·grenades and tol1IIIIY' guns cleared the file from bend
to bend. It was impossible to ~pot these fortifications because of the
grass and excellent camouflage, Spider holes dug flush to the ground
remained undiscovered even after troops had searched the area. Hundreds ·
of these holes were scattered indiscriminate~. Coordinated attack was
difficult; move~nt limited by sniper fire and barely discernible automatic fields of fire.
Against this determined opposition an average of 200 yards a day
was ,gained until the entire Breakneck Ridge was occupied. In the 2000
yard advance from the enemy's original front lines, 1,779 Japanese bodies
had been counted. It is reasonable to assume many more lay dead in thick
tropical vegetation. The action had been bitter for the 21st. Losses
comprised heavy battle casualties and many from causes other then battle.
Officer. casualties were inordinately heavy. At the conclusion of the
action, line companies averaged 1 officer and 85 enlisted men.
Difficulties arising from extremely broken terrain, sporadic communi- catiop, and inaccurate mapping were complicated by an intricate supply
problem. Incessant rain transformed Leyte into one big mud hole. Carrying parties exhausted themselves carrying anununition, water and rations.
Rear echelon personnel were sent in and finally whole fighting units
labored to supply the front lines. The men of the regiment were continual~ on the move, some fighting by day ~nd hauling supplies by night.
Aside from the discomfort and serious drop in efficiency under this rain,
it provided a protective curtain during the day and covered the ene~'s
movements in night attacks. With Breakneck Ridge secured, the backbone
of the island's resistance was broken. The successful termination of the
action immeasurably hastened the end of Japanese occupation of Leyte.
By the time the 21st Infantry was committed, the enemy had completed
its organized withdrawal from Pinamopoan and Carigara to the Breakneck
Ridge area. Since the Ormoc Road runs through the ridge, this high ground
takes on a .definite importance.
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The Jap First Division was a cocky outfit.

On November 4th the Regiment landed at .Tanuan to meet the threat of
newly landed Jap reinforcements. On the 5th the 21st Infantry Regimental combat team was trucked and mrched rapidly across t .he Island to the
vicinity of Pinamspoan on the North shore. In the days to follow the
bloodiest battling of this war was to take place between Pina.mapoan and
Limon. The 21st Infantry met the enemy First Division, a. force three
times its size, head on. After a week of this fight while the 21st was
still slugging forward, two arms reached out around our flanks and struck
the Japanese rear Limon. These daring flanking movements, although not a
part of the Battle of Breakneck Ridge, described hereatter, deserve mention
here. One Battalion of the Thirty-fourth Infantry under command of Lieut.
Colonel Thomas Clifford (formerly of the 21st Infantry) took the right and
one Battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry under . command of Lieut. Colonel
R. B. Spragins enveloped from the left. These ~wo battalions made wide encirclements and were completely cut off from other troops and almost without lines of communications. This daring plan of Major General Fred Irving,
Division Commander, was entirely unsuspected by the enemy. Both battalions
fought desperately and gallantly. There is no doubt that the Japanese First
Division was caught off balance and crippled by these two battalions.
·
This is a story of the 21st Infantry and the details of the fights of
Clifford and Spragins will not be recounted here. However, the story of
our successful action on Breakneck Ridge, fh all probability, would never
have been written had it not been for those two gallant battalions.
In the following account the actions of the Regiment are described in
some detail. In .reading it, one must remember that every move, every defense, every attack was closely supported by artillery. The division
artillery of the 24th Division included three battalions of 105W howitzers,
the l)th, 52nd and 63rd Field Artillery Battalions and ,the 11th Field Artillery Battalion, 155MM howitzers. In addition to the constant and heavy t
supporting fire of this artillery, the X Corps artillery of one battalion
each of l55MM howitzers, 155MM guns, and 8 inch howitzers fired day and
night in· our support.
BREAKNECK RIDGE OFFENSIVE
On the morning of 5 November 1944, the 21st Infantry was ordered to
move to the PINAMOPOAN area and relieve . the 34th Infantry. Dispositions
of Battalions at 0600, 5 November 1944 were as follows: 3rd Battalion and
Headquarters Company were in the vicinity of COLASION: 1st Battalion at
vicinity of CAPOOCAN, 2nd Battalion and Separate Units had just arrived at
TANUAN and were preparing to move to vicinity of TUNGA. At approximately
0930, 5 November 1944, a meeting was held at the 34th Infantry CP at
PINAMOPOAN. Officers attending from the 21st Infantry were the Regimental
Commander, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion Commander, S-2, S-3, and 3rd
Battalion S-3. General plan of relief which was agreed upon was as follows:
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry to have road priority and move directly up Highway #2 and relieve 3rd Battalion 34th Infantry as soon as possible. Upon
arrival in that area by 3rd .Battalion 21st Infantry the 3rd Battalion 34th
Infantry was to i.Jmlediat ely move to the .r ear with priority on road. Approximate location of the 3rd Battalion 34th Infantry at the time of relief was
( 07 .1-68.0). 1st Battalion 21st Infantry was to nvve up after the 3rd
Battalion, 34th Infantry had cleared, and occupy the area held by 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry in the vicinity of (07.5-68.2)
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From approximate~ 1000-1115, the Regimental Commander, Lieut. Col.
Frederick Weber, 3rd Battalion Commander, Lt.Col. Eric ~e, and Regimental S-3, Capt. Nicholas Sloan, made reconnaissance of the area to place
the two Battalions. At the Jrd Battalion, 34th Infantry CP, the Executive
Officer, 34th Infantry joined the Reconnaissance party. The Regimental
Commander decided to make a reconnaissance for the lst Battalion, and the
Jrd Battalion Commander, Regimental S-3 with the Executive Officer, 34th
Infantry as a guide were to look over the forward area. It was soon discovered that the highest and most commanding ground in the area hadn't been
occupied so the Jrd Battalion Commander decided to occupy it upon arrival
of his Battalion. The party picked up a squad from Company 11 E11 , 34th Infantry at Point, "A" and proceeded towards the bridge. Men from this squad were
dropped off at lntervals to the east of the road to occupy the high ground
(Point 11 C11 ) , thus providing local security for the Reconnaissance Party •. At
the bridge two jeeps from the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion were parked and
drivers said that the officers and a forward observer party were on the high
ground conducting fire at a school house that had 25 Japs in it. The Executive Officer, 34th Infantry confirmed this. The Reconnaissance party proceeded from the bridge forward to Point 11 B'1 , without security as the squad
was all disposed. At the furthermost point that the Reconnaissance party had
advanced they could see the target that the Artillery was firing on. The target was about 300 yards on up the road. At this point the Reconnaissance
party came back to the bridge and worked their way up to the high ground on
the east side of the road at Point 11 C". From this high ground, the Artillery
firing on OP hill was observed. No contact was ever made with men from Company "K" who were sent up from the road to occupy this ground while the party
made its reconnaissance up the road. At approximately 1115, the 3rd Battali~n
Commander left to meet his Battalion. The Regimental S-3 met the Regimental
Commander and returned. While enroute back to the CP a reconnaissance was
made for the Regimental CP. A site at Point 11 A11 was selected. At '1230, upon
return of the Regimental Commander and the S-3 to the Regimental CP, the Regimental Executive Officer had a message from the artillery that their forward
OP was being attacked. A message was sent to the 3rd Battalion Commander at
1240 to investigate and take necessary action. At 1330, the 3rd Battalion
Commander requested the artillery to cease firing. This fire soon ceased.
Later on in the afternoon of 5 November 1944, it was learned that Company "K" had occupied OP Hill with slight opposition and had freed the 52nd
Field Artillery party. Company 11 Itt had occupied the high ground later named
"Hot Spot Knob". Both companies dug in. The 3rd Battalion attempted to run
ammunition, food and .shovels to "I" & ttK" Companies but enemy fire prevented
this. Small amounts of ammunition reached "K" Company. Meanwhile the 1st
Battalion roved to the vicinity of PINAVOPOAN. 11 A11 and nan Companies then
moved to areas occupied by 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry. Company "C" remained in the vicinity of COLASION to guard bridges. By dark, troop dispositions were as follows: Company "l" and Heavy Machine Gun Section, "Hot
Spot Knob"; Company "K" and Heavy Machine Gun Section, O.P. Hillr Company
"L" as follows: 1 platoon as litter bearers and carrying parties; 1 platoon
for Battalion CP defense, 1 platoon with Company 11 K11 • During the night both
Company "!" and 11 K" were counterattacked. The 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry

18

BRONZE STAR
Captain TOM W. SUBER, Infantry. U. S. Army. For heroic
achievement in connection with military operations against the
enemy near PASSANGRAHN, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, from 29 April to 3
May 1944. When two patrols of an infantry regiment were ambushed and pinned down by intense enemy machine gun fire,
Captain Suber immediately organized and personally led another
platoon to the scene. Due to his excellent leadership, initiative and ~ood judgment, the enemy was taken by surprise and
quickly fled, thus relieving the beleagured patrols. Throughout this entire period Captain Suber displayed a high degree
of initiative and leadership. quickly establishing control of
his men after landing. and maintaining excellent control and
orP,er during the advance to HOLLANDIA DROME, in spite of tremendous supply and evacuation difficulties. Captain Suber's
unselfish devotion to duty during this entire period reflects
great cre~it upon himself and the military service.
SILVER STAR (POSTHUMOUS)

J

Staff Sergeant AHTOHIO PEPE, Infantry, United States Army.
For gallantry in action nee,r Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philippine
Islands, on 6 Hovember 1944. Sergeant Pepe volunteered to go
to the rear to bring up vitally needed machine gun and mortar
ammunition. With utter disregard for his own safety he crossed
ground in a truck under intense enemy fire. Upon returning with
ammunition the truck vas hit. putting it out of action. Sergeant
Pepe jumped out of the truck and assisted in the defense of this
ammunitio~ securing it until elements of his unit were able to
reach i't. He gave his 1 ife for this cause. Sergeant Pepe 1 s courage and determination are a credit to himself and are in accord
with the highest traditions of the service.
SILVER STAR
Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) DOMINIC R. CASTRO. Infantry.
United St·a tes Army·. lor gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge.
Leyte. Philippine Islands. on 6 Hovember 1944~ Sergeant Castro
was a squad leader in an infantry rifle company. The enemy made
a bayonet charge on his position. Sergeant Castro was hit by a
grenade and also bayoneted. He stayed in his position without
medical attention until he was properly relieved. By his remaining in position, enemy infiltration was not possible. Sergeant
Castro displayed true devotion to duty and was an inspiration to
allrwho witnessed his actions.
SILVER STAR
Private CHARLES E. CLEMMER, Infantry, United States Army.
lor gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, Philippine
Islands, on 5 November 1944. Private Clemmer was an automatic
rifleman in an infantry company. During a heavy attack against
the enemy he was on the left flank of his platoon. In this

actio~ the squad leader and several of the men were killed
One enemy sol4ier threw a grenade at Private Clemmer's BAR
and he caught the grenade in one hand and threw it back thus
saving the lives of the BAR team.
Private Clemmer's quick
thinking and complete disregard for his own personal safety
was a source of ~nspiration to all vho witnessed his actions
and reflects great credit upon himself and the military service.

SILVER STAR
Staff Sergeant (then Private First Class) ANTHONY J.
JASIUIEWIEZ, Infantry, United States Army.
For gallantry
in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 5 November 1944.
Sergeant Jasiukiewiez was a scout ~or an infa~try rifle platoon.
He pushed forward in front of his platoon under heavy
enemy fire and coverea a trail to prevent an enemy flanking
movement while his platoon moved into position.
Later in the
same action, he volunteered and went on three patrols into enemy territory and brought back valuable information concerning
enemy strength and dispositions.
Throughout the whole action,
he demonstrated a high degree of personal couiage and disregard
for his safety and was an inspiration to all the men of his
platoon.
His action reflects great credit upon himself and
the military service.
SILVER STAB
(

Private MELVIN L. TAYLOR, Infantry, United States Army.
For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 6
November 1944.
Private Taylor volunteered to go to the rear
to bring up vitally needed machine gun and mo!tar ammunition.
With utter disregard for his own safety he crossed ground in
a truck under intense enemy fire.
Upon returning with ammunition the truck was hit putting it out of action.
Private
Taylor jumped from the truck and assisted in the defense of
this ammunition securing it unt
e ements of his unit were
able to reach it.
Private Ta or's coura~ and determination
are a credit to himself and are in accord with the highest
tradi-tions of the military service.
SILVER STAR
Major (then Captain) TOM W. SUBER, Infantry, United States
Army.
For gallantry in action in the Philippine Islands, on 5
and 6 November 1944. About noon, on 5 November, a group · of
artillery observers were beseiged by the enemy at an observation
post situated on a ridge.
As commanding officer of the advance
guard company of an infantry battalion, Captain Suber led the
attack against the enemy, personally participating with the assault ele:neuts.
His prompt and energetic action and his fearless
leadership uudoubtedly saved the lives of the artillery observers.
Captain Suber's company occupied and organized the defense of the
ridge.
The enemy attacked the company's perimeter once during

the day, and three times during the night.
Due to his organizational ability and his timely use of counter-attack, his company
succeeded in repelling the enemy attacks.
Th~ perimeter was subjected to almost continual fire by enemy automatic weapons, knee
mortars, and artillery. Despite the enemy fire, Captain Suber
exposed himself time · after time observing the situation and visiting and enco~ raging his men. Captain Suber's cou1age was a source
of inspiration to all me mbers of his command and reflects great
credit upon himself and the military service.
BRONZE STAR
Private First Class GEORGE L. JESTER, Infantry, United States
Army.
For heroic achievement in connection with military operations·
against the enemy at Pinamopoan Pass, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on
6 November 1944.
Private Jester was an acting squad leader of a
mortar squad i.n an infantry rifle ·company.
His great vigor and leadership in controlling his men when they were subject to heavy mortar
and machine gun fire from the enemy, saved not only the men under
his control, but also valuable equipment.
His coolness and courage
were an inspiration to his unit and reflect credit upon himself and
the military service.
BRONZE STAR

)

Private First Class ROBERT B. MILLER, Infantry, United States
Army. For heroic achievement in connection with military operations against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 5 November
1944 . Private Miller was a rifleman in an infantry rifle company.
During a heavy attack and under continuous enemy fire he evacuated
several wounded men who otherwise would have died. He brought up
much needed ammunition and acted as a runner for the platoon.
He
later directed fire on a trail on which the enemy was bringing up
reinforcements, and caused heavy casualties among the enemy.
Private
Miller's to t al disregard for his own personal safety was a source of
inspiration to all who witnessed his actions and reflects great credit upon himself and t he military service.

SILVER STAR

Secon~ Lieutenant (then Technical Sergeant)ANDREW E. P.RISTAS, Infantry,
Upited States Army.
For gallantry in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islanda, on 5-6 November 1944.
On 5 November 1 944 Sergeant Prist&$ was
commanding a 'platoon of heavy .. J O caliber machine guns, when two compani~s of
the battalion were cut off by the enemy . In the face of enemy fire and with
complete disregard for his own personal safety, Sergeant Pristas went from
machine gun to machine gun of his platoon checking ammunition and targets, and
instilling confidence in his men.
When the withdrawal was ordered after three
enemy attacks on the night of 5-6 November 1944, he remained behind with one
section of his machine guns to cover the withdrawal of his company, firing upon the advancing enemy for fully one half hour and successfully carrying 6ht
his aission.
His outstanding courage and devotion to duty in the face of 'he!y
fire is worty of the highest traditions of the military service .
BRONZE STAR (Posthumous)
First Lieutenant LLEWELLYN D. BALDERSON, Infantry, Unit~d States Army.
For heroic achievement in connect ion with military ope rat ions against t _he
enemy near •••••,••••• , on 6 November 1944.
Lieutenant Halderson was a rifle
platoon leader when the perimeter of his company was attacked by an estimated
com~any of the enemy.
In the face of enemy rifl~. machine gun and mortar fire,
Lieutenant Ha.lderson c':Q:ecked his part of the perimeter and found a. gap created
by several casual ties.
Under enemy fire he cros•ed the area, secured reinforcements and a box of grenades, returned and successfully filled the gap and preJ' vented a break-through by the enemy
He found one of his men lying woundea
n,,rby and assisted him back to the center of the perimeter where he received
mt4ical attention. _ Lieutenant Balderson's undaunted courage and devotion to
4~~1 ~eflect great credit upon himself and the military service.

took over beach defense in PINAMOPOAN sector and established strong
outposts to the South of Highway #2 before dark.
Plan of attack for the following d83". Companies "I" and "K" to
clear ridge assisted by Company "A" attacking up the road. Company
"G" to follow and be prepared to make reconnaissance of area South of
LIMON and MOUNT CATABARAN. At 2100, the S-3 met advance party from 2nd
Battalion at CAPOOCAN and made reconnaissance of Bivouac area in the vicinity of COLASION. 2nd Battalion closed in Bivouac area at 2345. The
Third Battalion was attacked all night by strong enemy forces and were
under heavy artillery concentrations.
There was no map whatsoever of the terrain except a radically inaccurate map of Leyte Island which was 1/250:,000 SCjille. This condition
was true for the next twelve days.
'
·

)

6 November 1944: 3rd Battalion units were completely cut off and under
violent attack. Company 11 A11 jumped off at 0800, from vicinity of 3rd
Battalion CP (Point "D") to advance to vicinity of bridge. At 1155 stiff
opposition drove Company "A" to the rear. Casualtieswere high especially
among off:i:.cers. At 0920, the first message came from Company 11 I 11 on ''Hot
Spot Knob" stating they saw 20 Japanese retreating towards LIMON. At 0925
Company nC" reinforced with Filipino scouts left to occupy Hill 1525 which
overlooks 3rd Battalion defensive area. At 1140, report that snipers were
working in towards Company "B" who sent a patrol out to intercept. At
approximately 1300, the Third Battalion withdrew to the vicinity of the
beach. Meanwhile 2nd Battalion and elements of the 3rd Battalion were reorganizing and defending line along former 3rd Battalion CP. (Poi.nts "A"
and "0".). Jrd Battalion assembled and reorganized in the vicinity of
PINAMOPOAN. During the night of 6 to 7 November 1944, 2nd Battalion CP
was counterattacked. Company 11 C" returned at approximately 1710, and reported no contacts but that the guides and scouts had become lost and
brought them ?ack.
7 November 1944: 2nd Battalion jumped off at 0800. Company "E" was on
right of road and reached intermediate objective with small opposition.
Company 11 G11 on left of road ran into trouble in bottom of gulch prior to
reaching intermediate objective. Tank destroyers were used to fire direct
fire into pocket. Tanks were sent down road and before reaching the bridge,
one tank was knocked out by a Japanese who placed a land mine on it. Company "L" was ordered to take intermediate objective on left of road by wide
encircling mvement to the left. Company "L" failed to reach objective by
dark and withdrew, and set up perimeter with Company nFn, on left flank of
intermediate objective.
The

following sullllll&ry for the period above is taken from Headquart ers

X Corps weekly report No. 3, for the week ending ll November 1944.
"No outstanding activity utltil evening of 5 November 1944. By evening
the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, occupied the high ground 1000- 1500 yards
south of PINAMOPOAN and were in contact with an estimated 300 Japanese."
' 16 November 1944, the Japanese succeeded in driving the 21st Infantry
from the ridge and by night had dug in on the Northwest slopes of the
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ridge and harassed our forward elements with mortar, and 75mm Artillery
Fire in addition to several piecemeal attacks during the night, one of
which resulted in_the death of 18 Japanese, including a Captain, two
Lieutenants. By evening a patrol from the 21st Infantry, had reached
Hill 1525 and had made no contacts .n
n7 November 1944, the leading Battalion 21st Infantry made contact
with the forward elements of an estimated enemy battalion on a general
line from (06.6-67.0) to (07.5-66.5). The enemy well dug in and -delayed
their _advance with small arms, automatic weapons, mortars: and a battery
·of artillery. Several pockets of resistance were cleaned out during the
day but the enemy resisted stubbornly, from well dug in positions on commanding terrain. Company 11 G" 19th Infantry upon occupation of Hill 1525
at 1700 discovered a Japanese perimeter of unknown strength on the South
Slope". (It was later known that Company "G", 19th Infantry was not on
Hill 1525 but was one or two miles to the east thereof.)
Casualties for 21st Infantry, 5, 6, and 7 November 1944.
40 Killed in Action, 117 Wounded, and 3 Missing.
Extract from Headquarters X Corps Weekly Report No. 3, for week endigg
11 November 1944.
"The enemy's operations plan as of 6 November 1944 ~nvisiaged the 57th
49th and 41st Regiments disposed from left to right on the semi-circular
and ridged high ground running generally Southeast from a point Southwest
of PINAMOPOAN - - - that dog tags, pay Qooks, and other identifications
taken from enemy dead indicate that enemy units are in and disposed in
accordance with proposed plan of operations disclosed in captured map of
6 November 1944.'1
At dawn 7 November 1944, Regimental Field Order #19, was distributed to
units concerned. Extracts there from as follows:
1. a. Enemy, strength undetermined, holds high ground on ridge 400
yards South of 2nd Battalion. Elements of the 1st Japanese Division,
remanents of the 16th Division in foothills and mountains South of line
CARIGARA - PINAMOPOAN.
b. Division artillery supports attack with 15 ~nutes preparation
from 0750 to 0805 on intermediate objective. Further fire on call.
2. 21st Infantry resumes attack South astride PINAMOPOAN - ORMOC ROAD.
Time of attack 0800, 7 November 1944. Formation: Column of Battalions,
2nd, 1st, 3rd. Line of Departure: Present front lines.
3.

a.

2nd Battalion 21st Infantry:
(1) Initial objective: Ridge 400 yards South of Present Front
Lines.
(2) First objective: Seize and secure high ground (see opns
· sketch).
(3) Will patrol from first objective.

- b. 1st Battalion initially Regimental Reserve - present positions
will be prepared to move on or~er.
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c. 3rd Battalion initially Regimental Reserve - present positions
will be prepared to move on order.
d. 52~~ Field Artillery will mass its fires on intermediate objective from .0750-0805, then lift to first objective. Thereafter fires on
call.
e. 1st Platoon, Company
to support 2nd·Battalion.

"A.", 44th Tank Battalion will be prepared

f. Co.aq::>any "C" 85th <lhemical Battalion will reconrtoiter for positions .to support attack on first objective.
g.

3rd Battalion; 19th Infantry (attached), secures PINAMOPOAN

area.
h • . 1st Platoon, Company ''A", 3rd Engineers continues with present
mission.
i. Company "C" 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion upon arrival will
reconnoiter for positions to support attack of 2nd Battalion.

j.

)

7th Portable Surgical Hospital continues with present mission.

In this attack as stated . above, Company 11 E11 alone aqvanced 250 yards
and took the hill to their immediate front (North of the road and right
flank of the assigned "intermediate objective".) There they held the
ground for the remainder of the day and that night, although there was
a strongly held pocket of resistance on their left (South) which was not·
taken. Company "G" and the tanks were held by this pocket and failed to
gain its intermediate objective. Company "L" was then ordered to make an
encirclement to the left and take the portion of the intermediate objective on the left of the road. This attack failed~, It withdrew to the
southwest and joined Company 11 F11 which had advanced about 400 yards and
then withdrew due .to a misunderstanding of orders. Company 11 F11 when
joined by Company "L'' was on the near slope of the hill assigned as the
intermediate objective for the day.
A~ noon 7 November 1944, Colonel W. J. Verbeck assumed command of the
regiment.

Service and supply echelons which were far in rear (TUNGA) at the beginning of the operation were just now appearing. Rations and ammunition
supply presented the greatest difficulties and supply functioning (only
moved by carrying parties) were very inadequate.
At 15:45, 7 November 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Madison, formerly Regimental Executive Officer assumed command of the .2nd Battalion. The former
Re gimental C:ommander was appointed Regimmtal Executive Officer. All positions consolidated and units reorganized.
At 2000, 7 November 1944 - Field Order ·120 was issued, Extracts therefrom as f~llows:
.
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Today at ~G.o\IU lloly .tilTy will tire at ei181Q;Y in the Ticinity

~.

(;ra2U"'se) Situation&
4J.st In! Regt is now located on the line connecting Hill 582 m,
8 km S of CARIG~, to up.l)Sr reaches of ·!U.JlSON• RiTer.
17lst lnd In! Bn is located on tbe line connecting Hill 1696 to a
point 6 km S ot CA.i'OCCJ.N.
DiT Hq N ot JW!UR.W• (Til presumably CABuu.N).
lst In! .Regt on the parabolic line connectillg Hill 1525 to a point
2 km Sli: ot Hill 1525,
49th In! Regt at the central line, .NW ot Hill 1525 (NIK<BU•) (TJI
meaning not clear).
57th lnt Regt (less lat Bn), lat Hen, l/3 ot ~. Arty (01!8 gun),
lOth !Ivy Fd Arty (2 guns) deployed at cuned line, 3 km W ot ~as.
Fd Arty Regt at~· (TN presumably ~T.\IJARAN) 3 km E ot
~· (TN) and will tire on: the ene!IIY positions at C.UUC:~ and

Qlr

L

12 dbser...ation planes
En81Q;Y that landed at ~ seems to be retreatillg to

mortars
20/30 !.1-4 Ta.nk.e

70

Kne!IIY 24th DiT at ~aDd Q.U>~
DiT CQ!Idr Lt Con RWlN•. Location v.nltnaorn.

20 km SE of TU~ - 8 guns
s ot ~ fr ri ght 15 km - 21 guns
•
10 km - 36 guns
15 km - tow guns

Jjfnell!y (.lwlerican) Situa ti en '

T!l.U6LATION .Q[, ~ ~SIT!!ATlON ~~

SAMAR I

8

I~M-

1. a. Enemy resis~nce of unknown strength is located in the ravine
along the road at ( 07 .5:1..67 .0) and is dug into the hillside on both sides
of the road. Occupied defensive installations are also located on high
ground _at (07.0-66.1) and (09.2-63.8)
b. Division and corps artillery is sited for close support of
operation.
2. This Regiment will attack South, 0700, 8 November 1944 with two
bcl.ttalions in assault. 2nd Battalion with Company 11 1 11 attached on the
right; lst Battalion on the left; by an initial -frontal attack and wide
envelopment of enemy's right to destroy enemy forces delaying along highway 2.
3. a. 2nd Battalion Company ''L" attached will attack to capture high
ground to the South at 0700. From there this Battalion will attack southward to secure the ridges ( 06 .5-66.2)-( 07 .2-66.0)-( 08.3-66 .o).
b. lst Battalion with -Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon
attached will, from its present position envelop the enemy right flank,
occupy Hill 1525 (3000 yards to Southeast) and will be prepared to continue attack on Highway 2 when ordered.
3rd Battalion was held in Regimental reserve and all attached units
assigned supporting missions. A 10 minute artillery preparation was
to proceed the attack of the 2nd Battalion.
:The

~ere

At 0700 the 2nd Battalion jumped off and attacked objectives and the
pocket of resistance along the road. Flame throwers were employed to
good advantage. Enemy artillery was active, shelling the road, the bridge
at the bottom of the gulch and ranging in near Regimental C.P. at 0840 Co~
pany itF" reported from internediate objective that it was moving forward to
secure the high ground on the final objective.
At 1700,-7 November the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was attached to the lst Battalion far the purpose of reconnoitering a
route to Hill 1525 the next day. The 1st Battalion started on its wide encircling move at 0700, 8 November 1944 and moved towards Hi'll 1525. Infor.mation was received from Division that the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry had
been order~d to move and to hold 1525, so the 1st Battalion had b~en ordered
to move from that hill on an azmuth of 280 degrees to cut ORMOC read about
1800 yards south of LIMON to prevent the escape of the ene~ from PINAMOPOAN
Ridge Line •
·
'
At 0832, 8 November 1944 message received from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry that they were on high ground near Hill 1525 but had not secured good
observation • . (it later proved that this Battalion had taken the wrong ridge
to the South from the beach and were from two to three miles to the Northwest of Hill 1525.)
At 1600, the 1st Bat~alion reported being on the South Slopes of Hill
1525, and was in contact with a force of ene~ armed with automatic weapons,
and rort~rs on the North and Northwest slopes of the same hill.
Nothing further was heard .from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry.
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SILVER STAR (Posthumous)
Sergeant FRANCIS E. HOGG, Field Artillery, United States
Army. For gallantry in action against the enemy near Limon,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, 8 November 1944. Sergeant Hogg, a
radio operator with an artillery forw.ard observer party attached
to a cowpany of ·infantry which had been assigned the miss ion of
guarding our extremely -important left flank against repeated strong
enemy attacks, displayed extraordinary beroisw in attewpting to
attend a radio frow another field artillery battalion which he
realized would .have wade possible the furnishing of additional
artillery support to our infantry. Despite the heavy enemy fire
which had wounded the forward observer in his party and all members of the only other field artillery party present, and with
utter disregard for his own safety, he rushed from his foxhole
to retrieve ' a temporarily abandoned radio from the other artillery battalion upon being told the infantry needed addition!'l
artillery support. He had barely cleared his foxhole when be
was killed by enemy fire. Up to the time he was fatally wounded he performed his duties in an outstanding manner and contributed greatly toward breaking .u p repeated enemy attacks and
in saving our troops many casualties. Sergeant Hogg 1 s unselfish ·
and outstanding act of heroism and his exemplary devot i ·o n to dut,were an inspiration to all those with whom he worked and reflect
great credit upon himself and the military service.
SILVER STAR
First Lieutenant LESTER B. KING, Field Artillery, United
States Arwy . For gallantry in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte,
(
Philippi ne Islands, during the period 8 and 9 November 1944.
Lieutenant King was assigned as artillery forward observer with
a cowpany of infantry which had been assigned the mission of
guarding the extremely important left flank of our lines, Shortly before noon on 8 November the enemy began ~aunching a series of
deterwined attacks in an attempt to dislodge the company from its
commanding position. During one of these attacks around 1200 op
8 November, Lieutenant King becawe badly wounded in the arm and
hand by wachine gun fire. Kno~ing that the bard-pressed cowpany
greatly depended on hiw for artillery support and realizing the
extrewely urgent need for such support, he refused to leave ·his
post of duty although in great pain from his wounds. For twentyfour hours under heavy fire and with no . ~edical attention except
first aid, he brough effective artillery fire on one enemy attack
after another until the enewy advance had been stopped and reinforcewents could be sent up to help the company out of its difficult
situation. By his great skill and heroic conduct, he was to an outstanding degree responsible for breaking up the repeated enewy attacks
and for thus permitting the company to hold our left flank intact until a counterattack could be organized to drive the enemy back,
SILVER STAR
Technical . Sergeant WILLIAM SCRAPPER, JR., Infantry, United
States Army. For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands,
on 9 November 1944. On this day, an infantry battalion attacked

and seized a hill. After the hill vas seized, the enemy counter
attacked fiercely..
Dur i ng t his enemy counter attack, Sergeant
Scrapper was the platoon serge ant of a heavy weapons platoon.
While inspe c ti ng his heavy mach i ne gun positions, he discovered
that the crew of one of his heavy guns had been put out of action
by enemy fire.
Sergeant Scrapper realizing that the fire of the
machine gun was necessary in aidi n g to repulse the enemy counter
attack , alone set up the machine gun again and made it ready for
firing.
Be then to;k the position o f gunner, · and resu111ed fire upon
the enemy. He performed all the functions of the members of the gun
crew, and succeeded in maintaining f ire upon the enemy until the
counter attack was repulsed.
The fire from Sergeant Scrapper's machine gun contributed materially t o repulsing the counter attack of
a determined enemy.
Sergeant Scrapper's daring and fearless display
of courage was a source of inspi r ati on to all who witnessed his actions, and reflects gre~t credit upo n himself and the military
service.
SILVER S TAR
Captain CHARLES R. JAMESON, Infantry, United States Army. 7or
gallantry in action at Pinamopoan , Leyte, Phillipine Islands, from
8 November to 15 November 1944. During this period, Captain Jameson
displayed leadership and personal courage of the highest order.
On
I
8 November, he led the successful attack on "Hot Spot Knob", a part
of Breakneck Ridge, consolidating the position and coordinating its
defense for the next six days . Countl ess times during this period,
) Captain Jameson exposed himself to the fire from enemy positio n s,
some only fifty yards distant, to visi t outlying parts of the p e rimeter and to act as observer for art illery and mortar fire.
On 10
November, he extricated a platoon from a position in which they were
receiving flanking fire on both sides . He was the last man to withdraw.
On 11 November, he stood up in t he face of a vicious enemy
attack where the enemy automatic fi r e was inflicting heavy damage,
and shouted! "Get up and return the fi re!
They are not shooting
at you, they're shooting at me!" On 1 5 November, his personal dar ing and leadership were largely respons ible for the knocking ou t
and capturing of five Japanese light machine guns. Captain Jameson's
courageous actions reflect great credit upon himself and the military service.
SILVER STAR
Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) LOUIS G. KEPLER, Infantry,
United States .Army.
For gallantry in action at Breakneclc Ridge,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 10 Nove mb er 1944.
Sergeant Kepler
was a squad leader of a light mach ine gun section of an infantry
rifle company.
During the withdrawal of the company, which his
squad was covering, he succeeded i n c r a wling to his gun and destroying it when further action agai nst the enemy could not b e
taken.
The men in Sergeant Kepler's ~ quad had all been killed or
wounded by extremely heavy enemy mac hi n e gun and mortar fire, which
continued throughout the time h e was destroying his machine gun.
Once the gun was put out of ac t ion, he assisted in removing the
----~~nded to safety.
His outstandi n g bravery in this instance is
nota
and reflect 's high credit u po n himself and the military
service.

At dark 8 November 1944 the units of the 2~st Infantry were disposed
as follows:
1st Battalion on South Slopes of Hill 1525·.
Company 11 F11 at Point "F" on BREAKNECK RIDGE its final objective for
the day and was in contact with strong hostile forces to its South and
East.
Company 11 E11 at at Point 11 E11 on its intermediate objective.
The Bridge on the ORMOC ROAD between Points "B" and 11 C11 had been destroyed by the enemy. This cut the only route of approach to OP lUll to
Tanks and Tank Destroyers.
Enemy emplacements flanking this bridge with rifle, automatic weapons,
moz:tar and artillery fire were holding Company 11 E11 in place.
Company 11 L11 at "Point 11 C11 had not advanced but had been subjected to
infiltrating attacks .by enemy infantry throughout the afternoon. At 1530
the last enemy attack against Company 11 L11 had failed.
Artillery fire of 15 centimeter caliber was now being received in the
area of "the intermediate objective" and the Regiments rear elements. Overs
from this fire were hitting in the bay to the North.
· Throughout the day the enemy had continued to stubbornly resist. the
advance of all elements, sniper fire was continuous in front, flanks and
rear of all positions. 43 Japanese bodies were counted within our position.
The enemy capabilities at the close of 8 November 1944 as enumerated by
G-2, 24th Division were as follows:
a. Offensive action towards PINAMOPOAN by enemy forces moving North frdm
OR!v!OC.
b. Offensive action North toward PINAMOPOAN combined with flanking effort
in direction of JARO over TAMBUCO - JARO trail (6 miles to Southeast).
c. Infiltration to our rear areas to disrupt our lines of communications
and harass our Perimeters."
The 21st Infantry was ordered by ·Commanding r~neral, 24th Division at .
1000, 8 November to maintain the initiative at all costs.
The 24th Division Field Order 9 November 1944 is quoted in part as
follows:
"3a.

21st Infantry will:
(1) Attack and capture Division objective (Ridge Line 4000
yards South of LIMON).
(2) Upon capture of Division objective, patrol vigorously to
the South and prepare to continue attack towards ORMOC.
(3) Will protect 'Nest flank of Corps: The zone of action of
the 21st Infantry was approximately 4,000 yards~

ACTION OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 21ST INFANTRY, 9 November 1944.
There was heavy rain all day reaching Typhoon proportions by 1430. The
1st Battalion at dawn, leaving Company 11 A11 to hold Hill 1525 until the
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early expected arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry moved on an
azmuth of 280 degrees towards the ORMOC road South of LIMON carrying out
"'
their order to make the. wide envelopment of the enemy's right.
At 0950 the 1st Battalion less Company 11 A11 had proceeded generally
West for approximately one and one half miles and reported they were held
upon the slopes of a hill within sight of the .ORMOC Road by heavy enemy
fire and were being attacked from front and both flanks.
At 1140, 1st Battalion had moved to the Northwest slowly and was less
than a mile East of LIMON.
No word had been received from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry but it was
assumed that the Battalion was moving towards Hill 1525.
At 1150, Company 11 A11 on Hill 1525 was being hard pressed to hold the
position against heayy ene~ frontal and flank attacks. The First Battalion commander was ordered to withdraw to Hill 1525 with the remainder of
the Battalion ahd ho]d that hill.
At 1250 withdrawal was complete and Battalion Commander reported he was
· being attacked by strong enemy forces on three sides. He reported his .
losses were ·heavy.
The Regimental Commander reported to division that no sign of the 2nd
Battalion 19th Infantry had been noted, and 1st Battalion was hard pressed
on Hill 1525; at 1400, 1st Battalion Commander reported that he had re. treated from Hill 1525, and was using Company 11 A11 as a covering force for
the withdrawal. At 1830, 1st Battalion had withdrawn 3500 yards to the
North and had formed a perimeter for the night South of the Beach, East of
PINAjfOPOAN.
.
The 2rid Battalion, 19th Infantry had confused directions and guides from
another organization had misled them. They were in fact 3000-4000 yards to
the Northeast of 1525 in very rough wooded and hilly country. ·
ACTION OF 21ST INFANTRY, LESS 1ST BATTALION, 9 November 1944.
The Regiment was ordered to attack astride the ORMOC Road with the 2nd
Battalion (Less Coinpany "F") -on the right of the road and the 3rd Battalion·
on the left (South). Limited objective was assigned (From "Point 11 F" to
11 Point 11 B" and to the Northwest.)
Machine gun preparation was fired by "H"
and "M" Companies for half hour preceeding attack.
At 0930 Company 11 I 11 arrived at "Point C11 •
At ·1025 Company ·11 E11 advanced towarJ "Point B11 from its location at

11

Point
Ell.

At the same time Company 11 1" jumped off from "Point C11 and advanced toward their objective along the ridge running South. At the same time
Company 11 G" commenced a northern encirclement from "Point E11 to attack OP
Hill from the North.
All companies had forward observers from artillery and fire of opportunity was brought down on all enemy resistance. Attacks were supported by
heavy 60mm and 81mm Mortar Fire, and the 2nd Battalion had 4.2 Mortar forward
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"Sit- here and ·listen to the oonct'!l't,"

It began frighteningly and ~ature-'
ly with a ten-minute bUrst from Jap 75millirneter attillery, crashing 200 yards
to our left. Then our mortars began
whoomphing overhead. Between . roars,
the fiat, snapping note of a Jap sniper's
rifte sounded just above us.
"That's Charlie," said Colonel Verbeck.
"He always gets excited when the show
' starts."
Excited or not, Charlie had been up
there in the cogon grass, which is as high
as New Guinea's kunai, for several days
and had already killed about fifteen
Americans, including Frank Prist, _Acme \
photographer (see page 36) · Char~e was
g~ and he had one of the worlds be
hiding places.
>We heard the concert ~mt an~i~-:mo·~ed up along th~ road m the Jeep f
MaJ. Gen. F. C. St~rt, commander
the Tenth _Corps. Bng. Gen. Keruae
Cram~r, assiStan~ commander <?f the 24~.
rode m back wtth General Stbert while
your correspondent cro.uched m front,
flanked by two MP's wtth gun_s cocked.
Slowly we oozed along the stde of the
hill and then in~hed up the Jidge, which
an unkno~ pnva!e had aptly dubbed
Breakneck m ~e truddle. of the week-long
fight to take 1t. The ndge was saucershaped and there were few trees on it.
It was pocked by ravines and round the ~
gullies the grass was 6 (eet high. :t'he ~
smell of Jap dead floated sickly over 1t. ·;

. the CGlonel invited.

.

~.

"
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15!
roads and bulldozt!rs had to pull dozens
of trucks throu~. The strategy employed
by the 24th, m whtch one rcg.m~t
•worked down the road and two regtments flanked it on ~th sid,es, leap&Ogglng from ridge to ndge, created a need
for food drops from planes. But when
the. planes ~arne back shot full of holes,
native earners and carabaos had to be
used exclusive~y. .
. ..
. ,
The casualties m the dtviSton, whtch
has been in line 27 co~secutive days and
was responsible for killing some 5,500
Japs, ran as high as 50 pe~ cent among
co~bat troops. Much of thts was due to
smpers.
. .
Advances were hmtted to 400 or 500
yards a day along the road. The Nips
almost always counterattacked late in the
afternoon, and if the Americans. overextended their lines they lost the ground·
they had gained. So they made a point of
attacking in the morning, consolidating
and waiting for the Japs to recoil.

~------------
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'the next ridge, still unnamed, 50 yards with rilles and fistfuls of grenades. In
taway. The mortar . fire was landing in addition to the spider holes, the Nips
mean, black bursts on the forward slope, had the usual number of coconut-log
~and behind it was the incessant chatter of bunkers and pillboxes as well as the
'machine-gun fire, ours and the Japs'. Two natural ally of the cogon grass. They
'of our companies were seeking to Hank made a point of burrowing into both
'the hill from the sides, but it was slow sides of every slope, and downhill the
igoing.
.
reverse sides of the ridges we.re as diffi• A private shouted up to us from a pit. • cult to capture as the ascendmg slopes.
"Better duck," he said. "'They've been
The 24th Division had to advance by
fsniping over here and we had some Jap inches, using grenades, flame throwers,
~artillery a few minutes ago."
and rifles. Tanks were employed along
~
the route where feasible but the rainy
Burning Out Spiders: There was season in the Philippines is poor tank
. othing sensational about this fight in the weather. Most effective were light and
oc corridor. It was just slow, muddy, medium American artillery and the con:and nasty. Probably nowhere else have stant blanket of mortar fire over the hills.
~Japs been dug in 50 well. Their favorite Phosphorus fire. spewed by mortar over
~'position was in a spider hole. Spider wide areas with the aid of the wind,
holes are one-man foxholes. Thel' are. burned out large areas of Jap resistance.
usually 2 feet wide at the top and wider
at the bottom and run from 4 to 6 feet • Food and Blood: The supply prob!in depth. The Japs like to place ma- !em was critical throughout. Ammunition
!chine guns in them or just lie and wait and food bogged down on washed-out
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Charlie The ,Smp~m Col. W1lliam Verbeck, commandmg officer of the 21st Reg1ment of the 24th Division, sat at the
phones talking to his forward observers.
"We1l attack at 10:30," the colonel said. "Use your Harne throwers and we11 give
you fifteen minutes of 81 mortar before
1
them. How's that?"·
Two Ridges: Near the summit, we got '
I The other end of the wifl} expressed out and started.crawling. From the top
approval and the colonel rang off.
we watched the progress of the battle for

The command post was knee-deep in
mud ob the side of the hill, and when we
climbed up from the road it was nip and
tuck whether we would make it or slide
back into the quagmire below. It was
pouring and although it was 10 o'clock
in the morning the sky was dark. Behind
us was the Philippine Sea off the east
coast of Leyte. and in front were the rolling ridges which 1or e!even muddy days
had alrt'ady provided the stiffest battleground in the history of the Southwest Pacific. This was where fresh, craciC' Jap
troops, landed at Ormoc 15 miles to the
south, were being deployed by General
Yamashita along a jagged mountain and
vnlley line. This was the second phase of
the Leyte battle-a fi~t-rate Jap delaying
action and maybe something more.

The incredibly tediowt and bloody ttuk
of rooting out the Leyte laps is described
graphically in this dispatch from Robert
,Sllaplen, NEWSWEEK war correspondent:

Battle of the Leyte Spider Holes
One of War's Hardest, Bloodiest

y, and Nasty

observers and used this fire to great advantage.
In a grenade, rif~e and flame thrower action the remaining pocket in
the gulch just East of "Points C and E" was eliminated.
At 1150 Company "L" reported· heavy rifle and mort,'ar fire slowing its
advance.
At 1305 Company "L" was still progressing on the top of the ridge in
the center of its zone of action.
·At 1335 Company "G" reported having taken its objective but due to
heavy enemy fire of all ~eapons was organizing the Eastern slopes of
the ridge 300 yards . North o.f "Point B11 •
At 1815 Company "G" received counter-attacks which were repul&ed. At
dark the forward line was as follows; Company "F" at "Point F", Company
11 1 11 at 11Point Gu, Company "I" at "Point C", Company "E" in the v:icinity
·
of high ground just Northwest of "Point B11 , and Company "G" on East slope
of ridge 300 yards·North of "Point B11 • A platoon of heavy machine guns
was attached to each rifle company to tie in their perimeters for _. the
night. Company "K" was in reserve near "Point A". 400 Japanese bodies
were counted during this day's action.
An agressive mission was assigned to the .Regiment for the next day.
The front of the Regiment was reduced qy the assignment of Hill 1525 to
the 19th Infantry.
)

·10 November 1944: The night and morning of 10 November 1944, the weather was heavy rain, and the ground was intensely muddy. During the night
the enemy cut wire lines to the .forward battalions. Message from X Corps,
10 November 1944 relayed through Headquarters 24th Division st~ted: 11 Early
arrival of reinforce.rrents expected."
Casualties of the Regiment at this time had reached, 72 Killed in Action,
232 Wounded, 7 Missing. Officer casualti_e s ~ere especially high.
Division Field Order No. 8, dated, 2310, 9 November is quoted in part:
11 2.
24th Division will attack with four (4) battalions in assault enveloping hostile left (West) flank, secure objective and protect the
Corps West Flank.
Time of attack: 0700.

"3· a. 21st Infantry reinforqed:
Will attack with two (2) battalions in assault, seize and hold
its portion of the Division objective prepared to continue the attack.
b. 19th Infantry (-2 Battalions):
Hill attack _with one battalion from present positions in the
vicinity· of Hill 1525 seize -and hold its portion of the Division
ob j ective. (Note: This Battalion was not actually on Hill 1525.)
c. 34th Infantry reinforced (-1 Battalion):
(1) Will have 1st Battalion under Division control assemble
CAPOOCAN BEACH not later than 0500, 10 November 1944. Move
over water by LVT, land (2 miles West of PINAMOPOAN) attack,
capture and hold its portion of Division objective.

X.

Success of the LEYTE campaign depends upon quickly and
completely destroying hostile forces now to our front."

The following is extracted from Headquarters X Corps, Weekly Report
No .• 3, dated 11 November 1944:
11 10 November 1944, the 24th Infantry Division failed to move forward,
and e1.emy resistance continued strong. However a pocket of resistance on
North Slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE was eliminated."

The following is extracted from Headquarters 24th Division Periodic
Report No. 22, 1800, 10 November 1944:
"All efforts to Jrove down or around the reverse slopes of high ground
just East of the road (06.6-66.6) were met by heavy small arms and automatic .weapons fire. Irttermittant artillery fire received by forward elements of the 21st Infantry at close of period. Forward artillery observers
believe that they have located the enemy artillery positions and counter
battery fire is being effected. Enemy bodies counted in day's action by
ilst Infantry - 78".
11 It is estimated that the 21st Infantry, was now opposed to at least 2
Battalions of the Japanese 57th Infantry Regiment, and at least 1 Battalion of the 49th Infantry Regiment. IdentificatioBs also were found confirming presence of the 1st Infantry Regiment to our front. These are
three Infantry Regiments of the First Division, recently arrived from
Manchuria. Enemy troops are well trained, well equipped and fed and appear
to be first class fighting soldiers."

At 0930, the 1st Battalion moved forward in column of companiea, Company
Company 11 K11
was at this time at "Point EH •

"A" leading, and passed through Company 11 K11 and rwved south.

. At 0955 Company "G" took OP Hill.
bridge and guarded it.

At the same time Company

11

I 11 moved to
t

1st Platoon, Company 11 A", 3rd Engineers began reconstruction of the bridge
to permit the passage of tanks. This bridge building job, carried out under
fire, was an accomplishment of the 1st Platoon, Company ttA", 3rd Engineers.
The enemy had destroyed the bridge and Captain Latane, 11 A11 Company commander,
had measurec the distance to be spanned. He took the figures back and timbers were cut to the exact size. The structure virtually prefabricated was
trucked as near the gulch as possible and the bridge was assembled under
fire.
At 1120, Company 11 1 11 seized the high ground 300 yards South of its previous day's position and held commanding ground ("Point H11 ) . At 1010 the
enemy pocket of resistance between 11 G11 and 11 1 11 Companies was cleared out
and the entire ridge was thus secured.
The 1st Battalion was directed to attack the ridge 200 yards to its
front (West) by maneuvering in the draws on either side of the enemy held
spur. This attack failed to materialize. At the close of the day found
the 1st Battalion on its morning positions. The 1st Battaion Commander
was r elieved and Major Little, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion was placed
in command.
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Cbmpany 11 G11 was relieved by Company "A" and Company 11 G:t withdrew to
the perimeter held by Company 11 K'1 •

•

At 1535 Company "Lrr received strong artillery fire.
The Battalion of the 34th Infantry on the right and the 19th Infantry
6n the left were in rear of the extension of the flanks of the 2l'st Infantry and were believed to be moving south to come abreast of the 21st
Infantry. Supplying rations and ammunition to the scattered units still
presented the greatest threat to the success of the operation. At no time
was more than a unit of fire present in the Regiment.
11 November 1944: During the night 10-11 November 1944 the enemy cut
telephone lines from Regiment to all Battalions. Headquarters X Corps
\'ieekly Report No. 3, is quoted in part as follows:
"11 Noyember 1944, the 21st Infantry penetrated the enemy strongpoint
on the South slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE. This was the second of two pockets
which ~d offered resistance for three days. Breakthrough was accomplished
with the assistance of eleven tanks. Fifteen out of twenty known heavy machine gun positions were eliminated. The pocket of resistance has not been
cleared but has been considerably weakened."
For the

per~od

115 enemy bodies were counted.

At 0805 a message received that the lst Battalion, 34th Infantry on our
right was moving towards their objective south and west of LIMON. Heavy
intermittent rains throughout the day with very slippery mud underfoot. Artillery preparation was to be fired for one hour prior to 0900 on enemy ridges
and pockets along BREAKNECK RIDGE. Company "C" 85th Chemical Battalion maintaiood harrassing fire on reverse slopes South of 11 Points, F, H, G" and OP
Hill at the rate of approximately two rounds every five minutes all night.
From 0645 to 0745 concentration of 750 rounds were to be fired and from 08300900 a concentration of White Phosphorous was to be fired. Forward observers
with each rifle company for Artillery, 4.2 Mortars and 8lmm Mortars were to
bring down fire of opportunity on all enemy points of resistance. At 0900
the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off abreast 1st Battalion on the right
(North of OP Hill). The 2nd Battalion in column of companies attacked to
the South and West. Company "E'' moved through Company "F" and attacked
South. Company "G" attacked Northwest along the ridge in the direction of
OP Hill to connect with the 1st Battalion.
Company "I" was held at "Point C" with one platoon guarding the bridge.
The attack of~e 2nd Battalion towards the South met strong enemy resistance
almost imme<;Y.tately from the South and from wooded ridges to the East of CORKSCftElN. At 0955, Company "G" in 2nd Battalion reserve was moved up to CORKSCREW. Company _"L" still attached to the 2nd Battalion attacked the resistance
to the East and met heavy resistance ·from woods 150 yards to the East. Company
11 F 11 along Hot Spot Knob, in the meanwhile had passed through Company "E", observed 150 Japanese digging in on th~ ridge to their east. They brought down
heavy mortar and machine ,gun fire on ·this position, and then attacked and
occupied the ridge with one platoon. At first this· position was believed to
constitute. the heavy enemy resistance from the east, but 11 E11 , "G" and "111
Companies still found their southward operations were flanked by heavy fire
from the East. The terrain was such that a 200 yard advance represented a
500 yard movement on the terrain.

The 1st Battalion·' s advance met little resistance initially. At 1320
the Engineers reported the bridge completed. The tanks would be unable
to advance to the top of the BREAKNEcK without support of riflemen to the
front, rear and with the column due to suicide attacks by enemy soldiers
with magnetic mines and grenades. The approach to the bridge to the OP
Hill was known to be heavily mined. A squad of Engineer Mine Detector
personnel, twelve enlisted men from the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, and a plato on from Company 11 1" were employed as
rifle cover for the tanks in their advance up and over to the South slop-es
of BREAKNECK.
Captain Van Winkle, Commanding Officer of Company 11 A11 , 44th Tank Battalion led his tanks on foot and pe rsonally directed their operations
under heavy fire. He was ttdce wounded but returned only after the operation was completed. On the section of the road running South for 300
yards from the OP Hill, the tanks, although road bound due to the nature
of the terrain, engaged and destroyed numbers of pillboxes, and automatic
weapons, and cleared the way for the advance of the 1st Battalion. The
tanks withdrew before nightfall with the loss of one tank. The 1st Battalion gained its objective (ridge at "Point J·n.)
At 1815, a report was received that the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry was
slowly moving So4th to a position Northeast of LIMON.
All positions were consolidated and 350 rounds of White Phosphorous wer~
used with effect on enemy positions facing the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The
wind was qlowing generally south and enemy positions in spider holes were
cleaned out thereby . Fields of fire were also cleared in the high cogan
grass bordering ou r perimeters by this fire. During the days action th6
1st Battalion fired 1,500 rounds of 81mm Mortar.
The following is extra.c ted from Headguarters X Corps Weekly Report No.
4 dated 18 November 1944:
11 The 12th of Novembe r 1944., the enemy resisted our advances South down
the reverse slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE. However, progress was made by our
forces until after 1300, whe n the enemy strength began to build up. By
1600, the enemy firepowe r- had reached such a degree of intensity that our
forward elements were forced to consoliJate the ridge. During the night
our units were harassed by infiltration into our perimeters and some artillery fire. "

The G-2 Periodic Report No. 24, Headquarters ?4th Infantry Division,
the following is ~ed:
nAt the end of this period (1800, 12 November 1944) the 21st Infantry
forced to consolidate their positions on BREAKNECK RIDGE by heavy en~my
fire from an estimated two battalions with all arms including artillery.
During the d~ of 12 November 1944, the Regiment counted 97 Japanese
bodies killed during the day. At 0715, 12 November, the Anti-tank Company was dispatched to the position of Company "G" to relieve them. The
· strength of the companies at this time was low. The 1st Battalion commanded by Major Little averaged one officer and one hundred enlisted men
per companj·. Some returned sick, wounded, and about 50 replacements were
received at this time and were split among the rifle companies. All rear
echelon personnel who could be spared from their duties were sent as replacements to the rifle companies. Native carriers, in limited numbers
were obtained to carry ammunition and rations to the front line companies.
One hot meal per day could now be fed to combat elements. Ammunition reserves were built up to about 1! units of fire.
28

SILVER STAR
Colonel WILLIAM J. VERBECK, Infantry, United States Army. For gallant.ry
in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on ll November 1944. The
regiment of infantry which Colonel Verbeck was commandin~ had been held up for
five days by a determined Japanese force of infantry and , artillery. The enemy
was strongly entrenched in the gulches and on the rev&rs e slopes of a commanding ridge about two thousand yarda southwest of Pinamopoan. They were fresh
first-line troops, equipped with a high percentage of automatic weapons. At
this critical time Colonel Verbeck organized a striking force consisting of one
platoon of medium tanks protected by the regimental intelligence and reconnais£ance platoon and one engineer mine - detector squad, and personally led it on
foot to the crest of the ridge, _from which point the infantry and tanks were,
for the first time, able to advance and hold ground. The turning point had been
reached. From then on our troops were able to move steadily forward. Colonel
Verbeck's example of bravery and energy had inspired his troops with the drive
needed to overcome an aggressive well-trained enemy force and is in keeping with
the highest of military traditions.
SILVER STAR (Posthumous)
First Lieutenant DALE E.JOHBSOi, Infantry, United States Army. For
gallantry in action in the vicinity of Pinaaopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands,
on ll November 1944. Lieutenant Johnson accompanied a group of his men during
a tank ·action, the miasion .of his party being to protect the tanks in their advance from suicidal attempts of the enemy to lay mines under the tracks of the
vehicles. During th~ tank action, three wounded men, left behind from the
previous day's fighting, were discovered on high ground that was swept by eneay fire. Li•utenant Johnson unhesitatingly crawled to the high ground under
eneay fire and, with the help of three enlisted men, evacuated these casualties to safety. He supervised the e~cuation of the wounded soldiers with a
calm steadiness. Later in the same action, with a small party, he occupied
a ridge under heavy enemy fire and protected both flanks of the tank column
with fire from this commanding terrain feature. Li.e utenant Johnson was killed
ia a later actio~ against the enemy. Lieutenant Johnson's courage and total
disregard for his own personal safety were a source of inspiration to all who
witnessed his actions, and reflect great credit upon himself and the military
service.
BRONZE STAR
Captain (then First Lieutenant) SOTHORON K. ABLE, Infantr~, United States
Army. For ~eroic achievement in connection with military operations against
the enemy near Pinacopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on November 11, 1944 .
Captain Able with the remnants of his platoon of Infantry was directed to furnish rifle protection to a platoon of medium tanks. Leading the column on foot
under enemy fire Captain Able escor.ted the tanks to the crest of an enemy held
ridge 2000 y~ds southwest of Pinamop.oan. From this point the tanks and Infantry were ab-le to advance and hold ground. Captain Able then assisted in the
removal, under fire, of our wounded who had been lying near the crest for two ·
d.ays. His energy and courage are a credit to himself and the military service.~

View of Pinamopoan- Breakneck Ridge
Looking North to South Towards
Limon From Carigara Bay, Leyte.
II November 19ijij
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The attack plan was for the 3rd Battalion under Lt.Colonel Ramee with
the Tank Company attached to continue the attack East astr~de the road
on the top of BREAKNECK RIDGE. All Regimental flame throwers were supplied
to the 3rd Battalion. After the tanks had crossed the crest the 1st ·Battalion was to attack on the right, and envelop the enemy's left (West) flank.
2nd Battalion in reserved between "Points F and H".
At 1045, the 3rd Battalion jumped off. At the same time the Anti-Tank
Company reported securing the ridge in front of .Company "G" last night position.
At 1115, tl;Le tanks were beyond the cut on the ridge and reported receiving
very little hostile fire.
At 1125 Company

11

C11 took its objective (Hill at "Point K11 ) .

At 113 5, Companies 11 L11 & 11F 11 took their objcctives C~.t "Points M and N",
respectively and were concentrating their fire on the draw between their
positions.
At 1220, Companies "F" and "K" had made contact at Point 11 0 11 , and the
whole of BREAKNECK RIDGE had been taken. 3rd Battalion reported reac~ing
its days objective.
At 1415, the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Plat0~n of Regimental ·Headquarters was sent out to mop up snipers overlooking the bridge. Reported
successful mission. Sniper fire in our rear elements ceased for the first
time after this action.
At 1545, all front line units reported that enemy fire to their front and
flanks was increasing and that the enemy was being reinforced. No further
advances were made. Consolidated perimeters were set up for the night. There
was little enenw activity and no counter-attacks were made during the night.
2,200 rounds of 81mm Mortar Here expended during the day.

13 November 1944: As will be discerned by glancing at the map BREAKNECK
RIDGE is not one ridgeline . but in reality is a series of six ridges none of
which are continuous but are formed by a series of knobs. The low ground is
thick with coeon grass to a height of four feet. The pockets between the
hills are rugged and thickly wooded. The valleys are deep, precipitout. Although all commanders constantly endeavored to· prevent the ~ttack from breaking up into a series of uncoordinated combats, the terrain did not permit
exact timing or coordination. Jump off times were often postponed due to the
difficulties of supply of ammunition.
Headquarters X Corps i'veekly Report No. 4, had the following · report concerning the action of the 21st Infantry, for 13 November 1944:
"During the day the 21st Infantry advanced South from BREAKNECK RIDGE,
and at 1500 were 400-600 yards South of the crest' of the ridge. At that
time the right flank ( West) of th e ·road was not in contact, while the left
flank (East) of the road wa s encountering some Tesistance. At this time an
enemy attack developed from the crest with approximate strength of one company but the attack was repulsed and the Japanese withdrew.n
G-2 Periodic Report No. 25, Headquarters 24th Infantry Division, is quoted
as follows:
"Enemy identif ications at BREAK1TECK RIDGE - 57th 'Infantry, Headquarters
29

SILVER STAR
First Lieutenant PliiLIP S. IRONS, III, Infantr;r,. United
States Army. For gallantr;r in action at Pinamopoan Ridge, Le;rte,
Philippine Isl~nds, on 13 lovember 1944. An infantry company was
given the mission of attacking and occupying two hills, two hundred yards to the left of a mountain road. This ground controlled
the road for four hundred yards. The company succeeded in occupying the extreme left hill which s ·e~ured the left flank, but the
platoon on the right flank ~as forced to withdraw. During this
operation the company commander was seriously wounded. At approximately 1400, Lieutenant Irons, belonging to another organization,
was sent forward to assume command of the company with the mission
of seizing the second hill and holding it all at costs. The enemy
;,as well entrenched and w.as in possession of commanding ground with
good observation. Lieutenant Irons reorganized a greatl;r depleted
unit of very tired men and seized the second hill after much hard
fighting. Later in the evening, after the second hill was seized,
he organized the defense of the hill with hardly sufficient personnel for adequate security. During the night his company was fiercely attacked by the enemy with grenades and bayonet&. This enemy
attack was repulsed. · The number of dead during this operation was
two hundred. Lieutenant Iron's leadership and courage were a source
of inspiration to all members of his company, and reflects great
credit upon himself and the military service.
BRONZE STAR
Technician fifth Grade FLOYD K. GULBRANSON, Medical Department, United States Army. For heroic achievement in connection
with military operations against the enemy at Breakneck Ridge,
Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 12 November to 18 November 1944.
As medical aid man for an engineer working party, Technician Gulbranson was the onl;r medical man in the vicinity. He rendered
quick and efficient aid to wounded infantrymen as well as his own
unit. He was constantly under fire from enemy snipers, but carried
out his work calmly and effectivel;r. Tech~ician Gulbranson's conduct under•fire reflects greatest credit upon himself and the military service.
SILVER STAR
Private First Class HARVEY B. PERRY, Medical Department, United
States Army . For gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte,
Philippine Islands, on 16 November 1944. On this day Private Perry,
a medical aid man for an engineering working party found it necessary
to render first aid to men from other organizations who were without
medical assistance. Be rendered the required aid quickly and efficiently without regard for his personal safety. Later a man from his
own unit was hit and the entire party pinned down by enemy machine
gun fire. Private Perry went fearlessly to his aid. In doing so
his first aid pouches were ripped from his back by machine gun fire.
he continued his errand of mercy, however, and evseuated the wounded

man safel;r. On this as well as on numerous other occasions,
Private Perr;r's conduct was a heroic example for the other men
of his organization and the armed forces of his countr;r.
SILVER STJ.R
Staff Sergeant (then Private . First Class) JOHN W. McCLELLAND,
Infantr;r, United States Ara;r. Jor gallantr;r in action at Le;rte,
Philippine Islands, on 12 November 1944. Sergeant McClelland was
acting assistant squad leader of an infantr;r rifle compan;r. After
his platoon had attacked a strongly defended Japanese perimeter and
_succeeded in penetrat1ng it, he was ordered to guard the rear of his
platoon. In this capacity, he person·ally accounted for six Japanese trying to infiltrate the position and isolate the platoon. Sergeant McClelland's fire, in the face of superior enemy numbers, was
entirely .responsible for keeping his platoon from being surrounded
and cut off. ·Sergeant McClelland's courageous action reflects great
credit upon himself and the military service.
BRONZE STAR
Private First Class .GEORGE H. DIEHL, Infantry, United Stat~s
Army. For heroic achievement in connection with militar;r op•rations against the enem;r at Hill 1525, Le;rte, Philippine Islands,
on 10 November 1944. Private Diehl was an acting squad leader in
an infantry rifle company which was engaged in combat with the enemy .
.Exposing himself to enem;r fire he worked his wa;r to three wounded men
and successively assisted each of them in reaching safety. Private
Diehl's courage and devotion to his fellow soldiers reflect great
credit upon himself and the military service.

BRONZE STAR
Staff Sergeant WILLIAM F. FRANCHER, tnfantry, United States
Arm;r. For heroic achievement in connection with militar;r operations against the enemy at ~e;rte, Philippine Islands, on 12 November 1944. Sergeant Francher was an acting platoon sergeant of an
infantry rifle compan;r. Sergeant Francher was wounded b;r enemy
artillery ~hrapnel but remained at his post directing mortar fire
until the company was relieved. He later had his wounds dressed
but refused to be evacuated to a hospital. Sergeant Francher's
actions were an inspiration to his fellow soldiers and reflect
credit upon himself and the military service.

BRONZE STAR
Staff Sergeant J. D. HAMRICK, Infantr;r, United States irmy.
For heroic achievement in connection with military operations
against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 12 November.
1944. Sergeant Hamrick, a squad leader in an infantr;r rifle company, during the heaviest barrage of artillery and mortar fire,
left the comparative safety of his foxhole to rescue one of his
wounded men at t~e risk of his own life. Sergeant Hamrick's courageous action set an excellent example for his men and reflects great
credit upon himself and the military service.

SILVER ST.A.R
Private First Class JACK FURMAN, Infantry, United States
Army. For gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 13 November 1944. Private Furman was twice wounded in action against the enemy but insisted on staying with his unit.
Later the same day, while the company was .halted at the battalion
command post on its way .back to a rest area, the battalion command
post received a surprise attack by a strong Japanese force. Private
Furman rushed at once to the outer perimeter where his fire was instrumental in silencing a Japanese machine gun. His resourceful
act ions were an inspirat-ion to his unit throughout the campaign.
SILVER S1'.A.R
First Lieutenant CLAUDE H. HALL, Infantry, United States Army.
For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on lZ November 1944 . On this day, Lieutenant Hall, platoon leader, while
severely wounded, and at further risk of his life, exposed himself
to en~my fire to direct artillery fire upon advancing Japanese ·
troops and an active enemy field piece. Lieutenant Hall's aggressiveness and leadership under fire served as a continuous example
and inspiration to the whole compan7 and reflects great credit upon
himself and ' the mil~tary service.
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3rd Battalion, 57th Infantry Regiment, lOth Company, 57th Infantry, lst
Battalion, lst Field Artillery Regiment; lst Platoon, lst Company, lst
Engineers; 57th Regiment plus lst Battalion. Quick firing guns, 57th
Regiment Gun Company, lst Field -Hospital. Enemy killed and counted during the day by the 21st Infantry - 135. 11
o
At 1130 the lst Battalion jumped off on the right of the Regimental
Front. Company "A" passed through Company 11 B11 at 1100 and advanced. The
attack was supported by Machine Gun fire from the vicinity of OP Hill firing into the draw. The tanks were held up by heavy Anti-Tank fire at the
southern exit from the draw along the road. Company "B" attacked on the
right flank down into the valley between "Point K and P. 11 It made a wide
envelopment of hill 11 P" moving onto it from the West. At 1300 Company 11 G11
(less one platoon) replaced Company 11 F11 • Company 11 G11 was on the left flank
of the ridge. l platoon Company 11 E11 was East thereof as further flank protection. At 1305, Company 11 A11 had taken objective 11 Point Q11 • Company 11 B11
was moving with little oppo~ion.
At 1410, Company 11 G11 reported being counter-attacked from the left (East).
At 1510, Companies '1E'.' and 11 C11 were being counter-attacked. Company 11 B11
was called back to help .hold the position of Company "C" which was threatened.
All counte~-attacks were repulsed. At 1525 the tanks withdrew due to poor
visibility. Rain storms prevented their proper use, and ammunition was almost exhausted.
At 1550, Company 11 F11 and the 2nd Battalion Command Post received strong
counter-attacks from the East at their position at 11 Point R". These attacks
were repulsed.
At 1710, all units of the 2nd Battalion were receiving and repulsing counterattacks.
At 1620 Company 11 1 11 was ordered to relieve Company 11 F11 • 1800 all positions
held and consolidated. The 2nd Battalion estimated it killed 342 Japanese.
The heavy r~ins commenced again at 1800.
14 ·November 1944: Extracts from the Periodic Report No. 26, Headquarters
24th Infantry Division, dated 1800, 14 November 1944.
"Japanese resistance in the area of BREAKNECK RIDGE is believed to be
broken •. With complete occupation of the ridge area to include minor high
ground to the ~outh, superior observation and fields of fire allowed the
21st Infantry to obtain the maxi.!Illm results with Machine Gun, Mortar, and
Artillery during the day. Particularly good results were gained from improved fields of fire for the automatic weapons. A combined Infantry team
of the 19th Infantry observed from Hill 1525, locating targets for the 21st
Infantry, 8lmm Mortar Crews. Enemy forces in this area suffered heavy casualties for the period. At 1700 enemy resistance consisted primarily of
pockets astride the PINAMOPOAN - ORMOC Road approximately 1,200 yards North
of LIMON.
The 21st Infantry counted 310 Japanese dead during the dey • 11
At 0930, units of the 19th Infantry reported from Hill 1525. At 1030
the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was dispatched to
Company 11 B11 from there to conduct. a patrol to the Nest of LIMON •

• 30

At 1110, Company 11 F11 was relieved and moved back to
Regimerttal Reserve.

11

Point A" in

At llZO .3rd Battalion was ordered to relieve the lst Battalion on the .
right of BREAKNECK RIDGE.
· At 12.30, lst Battalion had attained its objective along the line 11 Point
Company "B" took "Point P11 by an encirclermnt to the West.
The advance of the lst Battalion was supported by tanks one of which was
knocked out.

Q - Point P".

15 November 1944: During the night the 2nd Battalion commanded by Lt.
Colonel Seymour Madison receiyed three desperate counter-attacks. In the
last some enemy penetrated and were eliminated in a bayonet fight. Although
enemy fire prohibited a count of enemy dead, the following morning large numbers of enemy were killed. Between 0900 and 1400 all Battalions employing
all companies attacked and encircled remaining enemy reistances. 2nd Battalion also attacked East and eliminated enemy prockets from which its
counter-attacks bad been received. However, the 19th Infantry on our left
had not closed the wide gap between Hill 1525 and BREAKNECK so enemy reinforcements constantly filtered in and became strong before nightfall. On
the 16th o! November 1944 the Regiment again attacked supported by all
· attached weapons and units. On the evening 16 November 1944, -~he 21st Infantry occupied the last remaining high ground and potential defensive po~
sitions North of LIMON.
Headquarters X Corps Weekly Report, No. 4, dated 18 November 1944 states
as follows:
1
. ."15 November 1944, in the 21st Infantry sector resistance throughout the
day consisted of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and some artillery
fire. Sniper fire was received throughout the day in rear of the front line
element~.
Many small pockets of 25-50 Japanese in rear areas were wiped out
by machine gun and mrtar fire. During the night the 2nd an d. 3rd Battalions,
· 21st Infantry, were attacked by 25-50 Japanese supported by 81mm Mortar Fire.
Attacks were repulsed with 12 Japs killed in action in each case.
16 November 1944: · The i2Sth · Infantry passed through the 21st Infantry a·t
1200. During the morning the 21st Infantry had no enemy contacts but succeeded in mopping up rear areas. 11 ·
On ·l5 November 1944, the 21st Infantry killed and
and on 16 November 1944 the 21st Infantry killed 47.

~unded

245 Japanese,

Battle casualties for the 21st Infantry from 5th to i6th of November-6.30.
Sick, injured from other casuses or battle fatigue-1.3.3. Total 765.
Enemy bodies counted during the same period were 1, 779.

It can be assumed that there was at least one enemy wounded for every
counted dead, and also a number of dead uncounted.
At the time of the relief of the 21st Infantry by the 32nd Division, the
front line :was located along the line "Po~t "F", "L", "X", nyn •
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HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANTRY
of -trhe Regimental Commander
APO 24

Offic~

15 December 1944
Subject;

Enemy Tactics •.

To

Asst 1t Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth Army, APO #442.
(Thru: G-2 Channels)

1. In compliance with v~rbal request for material for inclusion
in a weekly G-2 Report, the following is submitted:
11 The 21st Infantry was committed to action against strong hostile
forces at PINAMOPOAN, LEITE ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, on 5 November 1944.
Elements in contact were 57th Infantry Regiment, 49th Infantry Regiment, and
small units of the 1st Infantry Regiment all of the First Division, and a
:&ttalion or .roore of the 1st Division Artillery including some 15 m guns.
During the period 5 November to 16 November 1944 the Regiment was directed to
"maintain the initiative at all costs". During the period the 21st Infantry
suffered 630 battle casualties, and killed and counted 1,779 enemy. The
twelve day period resulted in an advance of 2,000 yards of difficult terrain
over a series of six ridges South of PINAMOPOAN, now called BREAKNECK RIDGE.

All who contacted the enemy were impressed with his excellence in battle. Little was noted of reckless charges, needless sacrifices, or failure
to observe known tactical principles. The most outstanding enemy character.istic was his excellence in fire discipline and control of all arms. Without
exception enemy fire was withheld until the moment when its delivery in great
volume would give greatest effect. On 5 November 1944, the enemy on forward
slopes of the first ridge allowed his positions to be by-passed by two reinforced companies of the 3rd Battalion. The enemy in approximate strength of
one Battalion remained quietly in such concealment that the tYA:> companies advanced apparently without opposition on a routine relief movement and to secure
the high ground. Then the enemy opened with such great effect that·the two
forward companies found themselves completely isolated and unable to move, receive supplies or evacuate wounded. Only by super-human efforts bn the part of
the remainder of the Regiment were these two companies extricated.
/
During the daily attacks in the following ten days there were numerous
instances where enemy defensive areas often consisting of bunkers, eight to·
twelve machine guns, mortars and one company of riflemen would permit cautiously moving advance elements to pass their excellently concealed positions,
and fire on reserve troops moving in more compact formations.
Throughout the entire period, generally speaking, enemy resistance was
light in the morning a~d early afternoon hours.
After 1530, enemy resistance began to build up. It was extremely heavy
at about 1600, and then counter-attacks from front and flanks, and between
units commenced and increased in intensity until dark. Night attacks on our
perimeters although frequent were not as S.O.P. as is usual with Japanese

F9rces. During six nights there were no enemy counter-attacks at all.
By building up resist~ce late in. the afternoon, and counter attacking
in force before dark, the enemy was able to bring greatest fire, with
consequent demoralizing and disorganizing effect upon our assault troops
at a time when their energy and ammunition were as nearly exhausted as·
they would be at any time during the day. It ·also prevented proper consolidation of front positions before dark.
Envelopments and encirclements never forced retirement or evacuation
of any enemy position. Too great emphasis had been placed .on training that
mere encirclement meant a successful action. The team play of the encircling force, large or small, had to be continued through the stages of
occupation of the position, close combat within the position in conjunction
with the frontal effort and complete mopping up.
Enemy snipers were not found in trees although many_ trees offered good
locations. Snipers seldom if ever fired at vehicles on roads, no matter ·how
full of personnel they appeared to be. However, snipers were constantly firing at foot troops on roads, either as single individuals or in.formations.
Snipers were often posted in nests of three or four. Consequently a volume
of sniper fire could be delivered at once, even well behind the front l~nes.
When firing at a single man, a group of four snipers would emit only one shot.
This was apparently to conceal the location of the group. Many snipers used
telescopic sights. Their fire was extremely accurate.
Enemy artillery always fired into our positions when our supporting
artillery was firing in close support of our own advances. Often this
caused calls from rifle units to our artillery to cease firing. Enemy mortars followed the same practice as well as enemy small arms which fired when
our automatic weapons fired.
The typical shrieking, hysterical, so called Banzai Charge was noticeably not employed. Enemy counter attacks were supported by mortar fire and
automatic weapons.
Our tank attacks or even movement in column to attack positions had to
be guarded in front, flanks, and rear by riflemen. This was to prevent suicide attacks by Japs specifically left for that one purpose, with magnetic
mines, demolitions or grenades which were inserted in the tracks.
Enemy attacks were often delivered by units of infantry crawling all
the way t o close assault positions. These Japs had their helmets bristling
with grass and weeds. Often the first indication of an approaching attack
would be when outposts spotted grassy helmets moving in the deep cogon grass.
Our own men had elastic bands around their helmets for the purpose of inserting grass and twigs and often our defenses hesitated to fire as identification was difficult.
·
In no case was an enemy attack upon one of the perimeters of the 21st
Infantry units successful. Flame throwers, and white phosphorous were particularly effective and literally made the Japs squeal.
Enemy infiltraters at night would cut telephone wire lines, and then
wait in ambush for linemen to come to make repairs. Litter bearers and Aid
Men drew particularly heavy fire.
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Cover Illustration-A Jap machine gun emplacement on the
flank of a reverse-slope position prepares to fire at
American troops advancing against Breakneck Ridge during operations on Le,yte.

A Lesson in Jap Defensive Tactics

BREAKNECK RIDGE

Although the enemy used captured ordnance to supplement their own
fire, his snipers used only Japanese rifles. This permitted our troops
to detect their location because of the distinctive report.
The enemy used reverse slope defense tactics effectively. Every
reverse slope in the area was well defended. Every foot of the terrain
attacked was utilized properly for defense. His utilization of the terrain for defense was exceptionally good. All of his positions were
mutually supporting. Most -enemy fox holes were constructed in the shape
of an inverted boot. His fire step and firing position toward us was in
the toe. The deep heel was used to retire into for cover during our artillery and ~rtar fire. Ene~ artillery pieces were located in covered
emplacements well concealed with deep caves behind the gun for protection
of gunners.
One of our.bf,t'icers, Lieutenant Anderson, who regained our lines
after spending two days wounded inside enemy lines had an opportunity to
observe ene.!I\Y actions closely. All night was utilized for moving up
ammunition and supplies by hand cart. He reported machine gun positions
near draws and noses where the gun would be located on a forward slope.
When artillery or mortar fire fell near the position the crews calmly
went around the .reverse side on a trail going around a nearby corner or
curve to a protected reverse slope position. As soon as our fire ceased
the gunners immediately re-occupied their positions.
In many cases our riflemen failed to dig t~eir fox holes de~p enough.
During enemy mortar fire they were forced to crouch in their holes because
the shallowness prevented them from standing upright. This lost them their
observation completely and permitted the enemy to get up to bayonet range
to where our riflemen was disadvantageously located to protect himself. Had
he had a deep enough fox hole he·could have remained erect.and continued fir. ing from cover and better protected himself from closely advancing enemy infantry men.

W. J. VERBECK,
Colonel, 21 Infantry,
ColllllB nding.
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HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANT!ff
Office of the Regimental Commander
A.P .0. # 24.
6 December 1944.

Subject:

Commendation.

To

Officers and Men of the 21st Inf antr:l•

1. . The 21st Infantry was co·mmitted to action against strong
hostile forces at PINAMOPOAN, LEYTE ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, on
5 November 1944. The Commanding General, 24th Division directed:
"The initiative will be maintained at all costs. 11 From 5 November
to 16 November at 1200, a period of twelve days, this order was
carried out in continuous ~ombat against a superior and determined
hostile force. Every effort by the enemy to hold PINAMOPOAN RIDGE
was made. Under conditions of difficult terrain, unfavorable weather,
uncertain supply conditions and with no reinforcements the 21st Infantry ejected the enemy from PINAMOPOAN RIDGE. During the twelve day
period 1779 of the enemy were killed.

2.
It is with a feeling of deep pride that the undersigned
commends the Officers and Men of the 21st Infantry for their achievement.

W. J. VERBECK,

Colonel, 21st Infantry, .
Commanding.
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Enemy infiltrators would cut the telephone wire lines and then
a:mhush the linemen who came to repair the break
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The actual relief of the 21st Infantry from its positions on Breakneck
Ridge occurred on 17 November 1944. The Regiment which thirteen days before
had numbered 3050 now with a strength of less than 1600 officers and men
returned to the vicinity of Jaro for rest and rehabilitation. However, the
need for a deployed defense of the Western slopes of the Leyte Valley brought
forth orders to occupy defensive positions. Long To.rr.s were now bombarding
Ormoc from the vic.inity of Daro which was five miles west of Jaro. The 2nd
and 3rd Battlions, therefore, moved out from Jaro on 18 November and occupied
the hills around the guns. The 1st Battalion remained at Jaro. The rainy season on Leyte was now at its worst. Daro was cold and knee deep in mud. Our
troops had neither blankets, dry clothes nor socks. Many were ill with dysentery, and immersion foot. It rained constantly. Further to the '/ lest in the
high mountains were stationed one company from each of the two battalions.
One company was on Mount Laao and one on Mount Mamban. Supplies and food
bogged down on the muddy roads and trails. The veterans of Breakneck dug in
and raised banana leaf roofs and waited. Mount Laao and Marnban were rough.
We stayed here until 10 December.
CARIGARA
From 10 December to 26 December the Regiment moved to the North coast of
Leyte to take up positions to defend the beach against enemw landing or raiding attempts. The First Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of Barugo, a
pleasant town which had been left comparatively untouched by the War. The
1st Battalion was under the command of Major Lamar
Little. The Second Battalion under command of Major Francis R. Dice and the Third under Lt.Col. Eric
Ramee stretched from Carigara to Capoocan. Rest and rehabilitation took place.
New clothing and equipment arrived and some replacements were received.

w.

MINDORO
Elements of the 21st Infantry participated in a number of campaigns during the period 21 December 1944 to the 6th of March 1945. The 3rd Battalion
under the command of Lt .• Colonel Eric Ramee sailed for Mindoro on 21 December
where attacks on the convoy at sea caused casualties and heavy loss of equipment. Landing at San Jose, Mindoro, this battalion was under cQnstant air
attack and withstood a naval bombardment by enemw battleships, cruisers . and
destroyers. The remainder of the regiment sailed from Leyte fo·r :Mindoro on
27 December. On the 28th the convoy was under bombing and Kamikaze attack all
day and two ships of the convoy carrying munitions and gasoline were blown up
with a "loss of all aboard. No 21st Infantrymen however were lost. Other ships
were also bombed and sunk and the regiment suffered some casualties. The Regi~
ment landed on December 30th having been attacked and bombed all the trip. In
defensive po~ion the troops were subject to repeated air bombings. until 7 January 1945.
·
In the first ten days of January 1945 elements of the 3rd Battalion successfully defeated enemy garrisons at Bongabong and Pinamalayan on Mindoro
and at Boak on Marinduque Island. Company I under Captain Sothoron Able in
two sharp fights brought Pinamalayan under our control while Lieutenant Milton
E. Wilson with Company K surrounded the Jap· garrison of Boak in a schoolhouse
and killed them all.

MINOORO (cont.)
The liberation of Northern Mindorowas carried out by the 21st
Infantry. Lt. Colonel Henderson acted as military governor and restored order and civil liberties among the peoples. In conjunction
with a small guerrilla regiment under command of Major Ramon Ruffee,
the 21st Infantry - less lst Battalion which was at San Jose - moved ·
overland from Pinamalayan toward Gusay, a Jap strong point, where it
was reported that 400 enemy troops were concentrated. At the same
time Company F under command of Captain Charles R. Jameson, Jr., moved
by water in commandeered sail boats to Najuan. I Company guarcfed Pinamalayan. K Company was still at Boak in Marinduque Island. The 2nd
Battalion (less F. Company) surprised and dispersed the enemy at Gusay
on January 19-20. On the evening of 19 January a Japanese patrol was
ambushed by Regimental Headquarters personnel in the Regi~ntal Command
Post where they had walked without knowing that the 2nd Battalion was
surrounding their own base at Gusay. The 2nd Battalion had just complet'ed
a four day march from Pinamalayan through the mountains with only carometas and ponies and buffalo carts for transportation. . Regimental c.P.
and Headcparters company had accompanied the 2nd Battalion. furing this
march two rivers were crossed on parts of bridges destroyed by the enemy's
delaying forces. Every item of equipment including about 3000 rounds of
Slm.m. mortar ammunition was manhandled across the river. Only one Jap
escaped alive from the ambush in the Rgt. C.P. 81m.m. mortars immediately
fired on Gusay with good results.
·
·
Company F, disembarked because of unfavorable winds and finally completed a gruelling mrch to Najuan on .foot in time to cut off the enemy's
. withdrawal from Gusay towards Calipan, the capitol.
Captain Kermit Blaney was in command of L. Company which spearheaded
the 3rd Battalion's (-) thr.ust to take Calipan. There were sharp fights
at Km. 8, Km. ?, and Km. 6. The guerrillas participated in this fighting
of 23 January. On the 24th the 21st entered the capitol without opposition
· and the enemy withdrew to the hills to the West. We rested in and around
Calipan and first tasted the joys of being entertained qy a liberated people.
Food was good for awhile. There also was Calipan gin.
·
In San Jose a regimental area add camp was established, badly needed
replacements were received, equipment and clothes were replaced and a period
of rehabilitation and training was started.
DIPOLOO
During the last days of March 1945 a force of one division was assemblea
for the capture of Zamboanga in Southwest Mindanao. Just prior to the amphibious assault, the air attacks against the enemy in Zamboanga were stepped
up. Marine air group 24 had landed at Dipolog on the Northwestern coast of
the Zamboanga Penninsula. They were using the Point as a base of operations
as it was in the h.mds of friendly Filipino guerrillas. Information was received that an enemy force of atout 400 was advancing from the interior to
capture Dipolog. Accordingly typ companies of the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry were flown to Dipolog from Mindoro in transport planes. This airborne
force secured the air base and the town and the hostile force turned back.
This was the first landing of ground forces on Mindanao.

37

GIMLOS

Signboard at Entrance to "Gimlets Grove"
San Jose, Mindoro

GUERILLA REPORTS
The Japanese force defending Northern Mindoro was driven from Calipan
on 23 January 1G45 and scattered towards the mountains to the #est. For
the next week the Regiment of Mindoro guerrillas under command of Major
Rarr~n Ruffee carried out a campaign to finish off the defeated.Jap force.
These Filipino troops had greatly assisted the 21st Infantry in its Mindoro Campaign. Now, reinforced by mortar and machine gun uriits from the
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 21st Infantry, they tackled the enemy in the hills.
Two sample accounts of guerrilla actions follow:
· PHILLIPINE ARMY
BOLO AREA
29 January, 1945
SUBJECT:
TO

Encounter ~ith the Japs, report on
CO, Bolo Area

On Jan. 25, 1945, Lt. I. Minay with twenty four (24) armed men, Sgt.
Aploinar with eleven (11) armed men and the Trench Mortar Section of eleven
(11) men all under my direct command proceeded to Katuwiran to establish our
line of attack.
At 6:00AM the next day, Jan. 26, 1945 I sent patrol out to verify
enemy positions. Within 25 minutes the patrol arrived reporting that the
Japs were concentrated at Longos foot Bridge and among the houses within
the vicinity.
I ordered Lt. I. Minay and Sgt. Flores to deploy the men one hundred
yards ahead of the Trench Mortar, before I ordered the Mortar Men to fire.
Exactly at 8:00 AM the pounding of the Trench Mortar began at the place
where the Japs were concentrated. On the first concentration of fire the
Japs were at once demoralized and they were all scattered around. My men
were able to advance as far as 25 yard from the enemy positions. We saw
most of them already armless. In our first encounter the Japs retreated
and I ordered all men to advance to gain the positions of the Japs. We
were on failure because of the heavy machine-gun fire concentrated to the
place where we deployed. The Japs have one (1) .50 cal. MG, and two (2)
.30 cal. MG with several sub-machine guns in operation. I ~rdered the men
to hold the line. For about three hours heavy exchange of fire 'Mas made.
On this first encounter of ours the men on the front estimated that they
were able to kill twenty (20) plus. · Ne could see those armless JaF'S taking
rifles from the· dead ones. The firing of the Japs lasted for two hours.
At 2:00 PM I ordered a concentr~tion of Mortar fire to the place where
we spotted the machine gun emplacements. The Japs did not answer our fire.
After 30 minutes, we heard the Japs firing at our right and left flanks,
while the machine guns began to fire again at our front covering their advance to our line of resistance. Still the boys held the line. The boys
were able to kill lots in their advance for they advance on an open field.
Fearing that we might be encircled I ordered my men to withdraw to our first
line of attack and hold the line again. The machine-gun fire lasted for two

hours. 'Little by little we retreated to the other siJe of th8 river.
In my supposition all in all we were able to kill .forty (40) Japs.
We still saw blood scattered around on their fox-holes and alonr, their
ways of retreat, when we attack them last 28 Jan. '45. .le have captured
one (1) box of ammunitions .30 cal. Japs machine gun, one (1) rifle .25
cal. and several magazines of .50 and .30 cals. machine guns.
The Japs left plenty of ammunitions on the field.
most of their ammunitions during our combat •

i'hey have wasted

. /s/ RAMON ANONUEVO
1st Lieut., Inf.
CO 11 C" Co

PHILIPPINE ARMY
BOLO AREA
29 Jan. '45
SUBJECT:
T~-

Combat report (Longos Campaign)
CO, Dolo Area

1. · The following combat reports in Longos against the enemy are
hereby submitted.
2.

a.STRENGTH OF OUR UNIT · -

Five (5) Officers and one hundred
fourteen (114) enlisted men.

b .NUMBER Cf ARMS

One hundred · seventeen (117) rifles
and two ( 2) Trench r.fortars 81 },lM.

c.OFFICER IN CHARGE ----- Lt. DOMINADOR B. ADEVA, Inf
OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED - Lts. ANONUEVO, GIMENEZ, BACARRO &
MINAY.

)

.

d.CASUALTY SUSTAINED -----

NONE

e.BOOTY TAKEN ------------

A~~UNITION, RIC~

f.SUPPLY -----------------

Furnished by Civilians

and considerable
Japanese Army Supply.

3. ENE1IT STRENGTH ----------- Three hundred to four hundred (300
400) including officers.
b.Number of ~rms---------c.SUPPLY

--------------~--
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Estimated to be two hundred (200) including rifles and machine guns.
The Japs had considerable number of
rice and cattle taken forcibly from
civilians.

d.ENE11Y DISPOSITION -- All Along the road from Longos to
Calabugao. Entrenchment had. been
established all along these points.
e. NAME OF OFFICER ----

UNKNOWN

!.CASUALTIES SUSTAINED- Estimated to be from forty (40) to
fifty (50) .inen.
4. NARRATIVE REPORT ----- The enemy composed mostly of those who
retreated from.GUSAY and CALAPAN were entrenched all along the road from
Longos River to Calabugao northward. They numbered approximqtely from
three hundred (300) to 400 men including Officers. Machine gun emplacements were established in their barracks covering the _road in the East side.
They were e,v idently ready for any attack as Japs had been observed entrenched
in their fox-hole day and night. In the morning of Jan. 28, 145 my men and
four (4) officers an:i one hundred fourteen (114) enlisted men after receiving
instructions from me disposed themselves along the East and South sides of
the enemy positions. At -zero "hour" has been announced; the signal whic~,
will be the pounding of. the Trench Mortar to the enemy positions, followed
by two (2) smoke shells. The last two (2) smoke shells served as the 11 zero"
hour and for the men to jump in the enemy.
At nine (9:00 AM) of the 'same day the pounding commenced, and after
one half hour, of pounding, the signal.for the whole unit was delivered.
Our men at a double quick, but cautiously approached the enemy position.
Enemy were seen dislodged from their entrenchment and were subjected to our
rifle firing. The enemy was not able to effect any firing as they were all
in panic, caused principally by the acute firing of the Trench Mortar and
the traversing rapid firing of our men. However, their main force were able
to "take offtt for the mountain located in the \!fest side of their position.
Our men got hold of their positions taking as enemy booty, ammunitions, gas
mask, rain coats, rice and meat. Scouts were immediately dispatched within
the vidnity but discovered no enemy. However, foot-prints were discovered,
presumably Japanese, leading to the mountain.
We stayed in the place until late in the afternoon, when I received re- _
ports that the enemy was somewhere in the mountain, two and a half kilometers
from our position, which was within a Trench Mortar range~ I~~ediately I
ordered a twenty minutes pounding in the direction specif'ied, with all the
ammunitions left. An hour later report was received that the enemy in that
.area was again in turmoil. American lone plane was also observed encircling
within the enemy area dropping several small explosions, which to my est~na
tion were hand grenades. *
The complete detail regarding enemy casualties is still in the process,
as our S-2 Officer with his personnel are out in that area for more information. More reports will follow.
/ s/ DOMINADOR B. ADEV A
1st Lieu t • , Inf
In-charge of Operation.
*Regimental Cqmmander, 21st Infantry, observing the·action in a L-5
observation plane.

0068
General Orders)
No. 68
)

WAR IEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D.C., 14 August 1945.

BATTLE HONORS.-As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul.
22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. IIII, WD Bul. 11, 1942),
citations of the following units in the general orders indicated are con..;
firmed under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the
name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved
honor and distinction:

*

*

*

19. CANNON COMPANY, 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT, is cited for outstanding
heroism and gallantry in supporting the drive of an airborne divi~ion
from Nasugbu to Manila, Philippine Islands, 31 January to 5 February 1945.
On 31 January the Cannon Company, 21st Infantry Regiment, landed at Nasugbu, Luzon. It was the only armored unit in support of the airborne division at that time. When heavy enemy resistance was encountered at
Cayungan .on 1 February, this company moved forward under hostile artillery
and autowatic weapons fire to cover the advance of leading units across a
deep ravine. By direct fire, promptly and accurately placed, this company
neutralized enemy automatic weapons permitting the seizure of the position
with minimum losses to our forces. On 2 February at Aga the division advance was held up by another strongpoint. Despite the fact that its vehicles
drew heavy hostile artillery, mortar, and automatic fiTe, this company advanced rapidly to forward positions and again by direct fire neutralized the
enemy position. On 3 February, during the advance. on Tagaytay Ridge, from
an area subject to enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, the Cannon
Company, 21st Infantry Regiment, delivered direct fire on enemy emplacements,
-greatly facilitating the seizure of the area. On 4 February, with assault
units of the division, . this company surprised and destroyed hostile groups
in four stone houses guarding approaches to the· Imus River Bridge. This
action enabled the mined structure to be secured before it could be destroyed.
By aggressive action at I.:a.s Pinas the same day, the self-propelled mounts
reduced pillboxes near the Las Pinas Bridge, permitting this bridge, also
mined, to be secured before the charges could be detonated. Capturing these
tlro bridges intact was of greatest importance to the 31-mile advance made by
the division that day. At Paranaque 5 February, encountering main defenses
of the heavily fortified Genko Line guarding approaches to Manila and Nichols
Field, the company pushed through streets covered by hostile artillery and
antitank guns and mined with 250 KG aerial bombs, destroyed numerous pillboxes and large roadblocks, and materially aided the breaching of outer defenses. Throughout this entire series of actions_, the Cannon Company, 21st
Infantry Regiment, subordinated personal safety to aggressive action despite
heavy casualties, and by its gallant action earned the admiration of all units
it had supported. (General Orders 69, Headquarters, Eighth Army, 25 June 1945,
as approved by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.)

*

*

*

-~·

*

By order of the Secretary of War:
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff
Official:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General
41

. In the Luzon campaign from 31 January 1945 to 3 March 1945, the
Cannon Company, ?1st Infantry, attached to the 11th Airborne Division~
participate~ in the following engagements:
Nasugbu, Wawa; Lian, Tagaytay, Imus, Paranaque, Zapote, Las Pinas, Nichols Field, Fort '.Vil1iam
McKinley, Alabang and ·Los B~ros. During this campaign four ou t of their
eight self-propelled mounts were destroyed in act ion. The Company suffered
heavy casualties among them the Company Commander, Captain Harold Edleson,
killed.

LUBANG
The First Battalion now commanded by Major Nicholas Sloan conducted
a rapid campaign on another island. Previous reconnaissances had been
made by scouting parties under command of Lieut. Philip Irons and.Lieut.
Thomas R. Campbell. Twenty-four hours prior to the main landing of the
First Battal~on, a force under command of Lt. Campbell landed on Lubang
and a road block was established to cut off enemy retreat into the jungle
hinterland. Then Campbell with another small force attacked an ene~
garrison in the capitol city of Lubang and killed several on the night of
28 February - 1 March. He was in radio communication with the landing
force. Sloan's men made an amphibious landing after a naval bombardment
at the town of Tilic on Lubang Island. At the same time Campbell's force
approached Tilic to help the landing force. After securing Tilic, Sloan's
battalion pushed the enemy into the hills where after receiving some losses
~n a sharp encounter dispersed and destroyed the ,enemy force of 200 or more.
The entire action lasted from 1 March until 6 March. The battalion then
returned to San Jose.
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BRONZE STAR
Captain KERMIT B. BLANEY, Infantry, United States Army.
For meritorious achievement in connection with military operations against the enemy in the Philippine Islands from 22
January to 15 May 1945.
ring the Rorth~ast Mindoro Campaign
at Km 8, Km 7 and Km 6 south of Calipan, qaptain Blaney was
company commander of a rifle coml?&nY which was assault company
of a battalion of infantry attacking toward Calipan. In a steady
advance against continuous enemy automatic weapons defensive positions Captain Blaney showed great ability ap.d personal courage
i~ maintaining aggressive advance and defeating the last enemy
defenses south of Ca¥ipan. From 3 May to 15 May 1945 during the
- Mindan~o Campaign, Captain Blaney a rifle company commander, led
his companr continuously throughout the period in daily attacks.
His ability and outstanding leadership were considered to be a
great asset in main-tenance of the initiative during this period
when casualties were very high. Captain Blaney was withdrawn
from combat on 15 May upon division order for temporary duty in
the United States.
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BRONZE STAR
Captain (then First Lieutenant) PHILIPS. IRONS, III, InfantrY', United States -Army. For' meritorious achievement in connection
with military operations against the enem7 at Lubang, Philippine
Islands from 16 to 17 February 1945. Captain Irons was leader of
. a reconnaissance patrol consisting of two officers and three enlisted men which landed on enemy-held Lubang Island prior to the
main operation. It was the mission of this patrol to determine
the location, strength and general condition of the Japanese garrison. Captain Irons and his men were brought to within a mile of
the island by PT Boat at night. From this point they roved to shore
in small rubber boats. Armed only with rifles, grenades and submachine guns the meu stepped ashore, concealed their rubber boats,
and moved cautiousl7 up the beach. Since. reconnaissance was impossible in the darkness they found~ sheltered spot and slept until
daylight. The following morning Captain Irons . led his .men inland.
Ia reconnoitering over exceedingly rough terrain through enemy
territo~y he to~k his men to the crest of a twenty-six hundred fo~t
hill commanding the island. From here he was able to observe enemy
installations for an entire day carefully noting roads and bridges
· and drawing sketches of the terrain features. Throughout the twoday mission Capt~in Irons displayed ~uts~anding leadership. resourcefulness and courage under the constant danger ox discovery by the
enemy. The information he obtained was of great value in planning
the subsequent operation ~hich was carried out successfully with a
minimum loss of life and. time. Captain Iron's heroic devotion to
duty and disregard for his personal safety reflect great credit upon
himself and the military service.
BRONZE STAR
Private JOAQUIN R. TAPIA, Infantry, United States Arm7. For
heroic achievement in connection with militar;r operations against
the enemy at Lubang, Philippine Islands, on 2 March 1945. Private
Tapia volunteered to join a patrol of four members to reconnoiter
at night in advance of our own front lines to locate enemy machine
gun postions and to rescue any living from four of our men who were
missing from the afternoon's action. During this operation Private
Tapia was killed. Private Tapia's total disregard :for his own personal safety was a source of inspiration to all members of the patrol
and reflects great credit upon himself and the military service.

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 21ST INFANTRY 1 10 March 1945.
COLONEL
Verbeck, William J.
LT COLONELS
Henderson, Arthur H.,
Ramee, Eric P.,
MAJORS
Dice, Francis R.,
Bussell, Frank T.,
Marcy, Roy W.,
Suber, Tom
Sloan, Nicholas E.,
CAPTAINS
Stanford, Don D.,
Girardeau, John R., Jr.,
Kelley, Jack H.,
Lockhart, Gerald L.,
' Thompson, James H~,
Jameson, Charles R., Jr.,
Childs, John A.
Aitken, Malcolm D.,
Williams,. Jay B., Jr.,
Becker, Philip A.,
Candler, Eugene N.
AUen, Shelton P.,
Reid, Neil D.
Olson, Erwin L.,
Brown, Robert A.
Kilgo, Hobert L.,
Able, Sothoron K.
Blaney, K~rmit B.
Vienneau, Ernest L.,
Wicker, Glenes E.,
Ender, Robert R.,
Mayer, John D.,
Haywood, Major G.
Curles, Cecil M.,
CAPTAINS, MC 1 DC, CH.
Coers, Burt N., ..•..••. Major •••
Berkowitz, Julius
Jones, Erner
Mutzig~r, Dudley H.,
Cashman, Malachy, J.P.,
Luria, Sidney B.,
Walters, Murray M.,
Rhein, William L.,
Cathcart, John #.,
1st LIEUTENANT
Parent, James M.,
Hash, Russell T.,
Farmer, Edwards.,
Mote, Jack A.,
Moore, Dan c.,

Regt'l Commander
Regt'l Ex 0., (SC)
Comdg 3rd Bn., (SC) (Lv U.S.)
Regt '1 S-2, (SC)
Regt'l Supply O, (S-4) (Lv U.S.)
Conrlg 2nd Bn. (SC) ·
· 3rd, Bn, Ex o., (sc)
Comdg 1st Bn., (SC)

w.,

Hq Co 3rd Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1)
Ex 0, 1st Bn.
Ex 0, 2nd Bn.

Regt'l S-3, Regt'l Opns 0.
Hq Co 2nd Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1)
·
Comdg Co 11 F'1
Comdg Co 11 C11
Hq Co 1st Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1)
Hq Co 3rd Bn, Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0. -"'Pers Adj, Ass't Adj, Bond & Ins 0.
Corndg Hq Co. (Lv U.S.)
Regt'l Munn 0., Actg Regt'l S-4
Comdg ·co "M"
Comdg Serv Co, Unit Load~ng 0.
Regt 1 l S-1, Regt'l Claims 0.
Comdg Co 11 E11
Comdg Co 11 1'1
Comdg Co "L"
Comdg Co "K"
Comdg A-T Co
Comdg Co "H"
2nd Bn Hq., Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0. (Lv U.s.)
Regt 1 l MTO, Serv Co
Comdg Cannon Co
Regt'l Surgeon, (MC) (Lv U.S.)
Regt 1 l Dental Surgeon, (DC)
2nd· Bn Surgeon (MC) (Actg Regt 11 Surg.)
2nd Bn Surgeon (MC)
·
Regt'l Chaplain (CH)
3rd Bn Surgeon (MC)
Ass't Regt 1 1 Chaplain (CH) (Hosp)
Ass 1 t Regt'l Dental Surg., (DC)
lst Bn Surgeon (MC)
Com:ig Co 11 G11
Co 11 C11
1st Bn Hq, Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0.
3rd Bn Hq Co; Bn MTO, (Lv U.S.)
Co "H''
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1ST LIEUTENANTS (cont.)
Farrell, John B.,
Freeman, Coleman R.,
Goldpaugh, John J.,
Sullivan, John c.,
McNamara, 'iVarren M.,
, Malone, Robert H.,
Miller, George J.,
Dantzler, LeRoy A., Jr.,
Seyle, Frank 'N .,
Stewart, Alvin E.,
Stimson, Arthur E.,
Trembley, Arthur N., Jr.,
Oler, William L.,
Corbishley, Sidney F.,
Trammell, Alonzo K.,
Boyd; Nilbur B.,
Sicely, Maruice F.,
Smith, Hobert P., .
Harrurar, Frank W. ,
tannin, Thomas R.,
Williams, Herbert Jr.,
Kirkpatrick, Earl R.,
Smith, John H.,
Margolis, Robert J.,
Nelson, Vernon R.,
Small, Jack
StClair, Robert J.,
Sundquist, Raymound M.,
Niegand, Allen W.,
Fosse, Maurice J.,
Snyder, Henry A.,
'Nisor, Robert L.,
Doyel, James T., Jr.,
Wilsey, Clarence R.,
Camp, Paul B.,
Cassel, Robert F.,
Corri.gan, Michael J.,
Counts, Charles R.,
Crouch, Theodore
Hall, Claude H.,
Irons, PhilipS., III,
Langridge, Kermit c.,
Morgan, Norman 0.,
Wilson, Milton E.,
Bland, Irvin G.,
Froome, James N., Jr.,
Hammer, Richard P.,
Kester, Alfred . J.,
Langford, ~Nilliam M.,
Lemm, Stanley c.,
Lesky, Albert W.,
Murphy, James F.,
Patrick, ivilliam J.,
Sabatine, Matthew
Young, Emmitte E.,

2nd Bn Hq Co.
A-T Co, (Lv U.S.)
Co 11 M11
Co "F" (Atch Unasgned)
Comdg Co 11 D11
Comdg Co 11 A11
Co "E"
A-T Co
Regt 1 1 Gas & Cam 0.
Co "F"
.
Regt'l Liaison 0, Custodian of
Classified Documents.
Co "D 11
Co 11 L 11
Serv Co, Regt'l MMO
Hq Co, 2nd Bn
Co 11 I 11
Co "E"
Co 11 F 11
Co "G"
Co 11 E11 (DS 24th Div)
3rd Bn Hq Co., Bn Comm 0.
2nd Bn, Hq Co
Co 11 A11
Co "C"
Co 11 K11
2nd Bn Hq Co, Bn Comm 0.
Co 11 B11
Hq Co
1st Bn Hq Co, Bn Comm 0.
Co 11 D11
Cannon Co.
Co: 11 D11
1st Bn Hq Co Bn MTO
Co 11 H11
A-T Co
Cannon Co
Regt'l Ass 1 t S-3, I & EO.
Co 11 C11
Comdg Co "B"
Co "F 1' (D .s. 24th Div, G-4)
1st Bn, Bn S-2
A-T Co
Cannon Co
Co 11 K11
Co 11 1'1
Regt'l Hq Co, Regt 1 1 Comm 0
Co 11 H 11 (Lv U.S.)
,3rd Bn Hq Co, (Hosp)
Co 11 D11
2nd Bn, Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co
Co 11 G11
A-T· Co
3rd Bn, ·Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co
1st Bn, Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co
3rd Bn Hq Co

Co 11 A11 ( Lv U.S.)
Serv Co, Ass't S-4
3rd Bn Hq Co
2nd Bn Hq, Bn S-2

Van De Riet, Harry J.,
Bemis, Russell B.,
O'Hara, James M.,
McKeon, Robert G.,
Routen, Eugene v.,
Henebery, John J., Jr.,
Hudson, Roger w.,
Marquez, Thomas
Campbell, Thomas
Bunkley, Thomas H.,
Hartman, William H. ,
Buttice, Angelo P.,
1st LIEUTENANTS, MC, DC, CH.
Klann, Herman R.,
Chukur, Vincent J., •.••• 2rid Lt •••
2nd LIEUTENANTS
Didak, Eugene J.,
Eddy, Lowell P.,
Ford, Clarence R.,
Steinberger, Joseph G.,
Smith, Arthur c.,
Battin, Donald H.,
Morton, Stuart C.,
Carmody, Robert J.,
Mullis, Jack R.,
Reifsnyder, Henry G., Jr.,
Ryan, Donald H.,
. Lehrer, Joseph A.,
RUnciman, Alexander P.,
Levine, Solol!lOn
Prickett, Loyd L.,
Nacheff, Steve P.,
Proctor, Harold I.,
Fittz, Samuel C.,
Grevie, Peter ¥i.,
Hamby, Paul W.,
Whalen, John c.,
Munson, Frank W.,
0 'Brian, Donald A.,
Lostroch, Elwood, L.,
Procento, Anthony
McConnell, Paul E.,
Rob erts, Harris K.,
Massar, George D.,
Martin, Clarence A., Jr.,
WARRANT OFFICERS J .G.
Lancaster, James L.,
Evans, Roy A.,

(Hosp)

·co "E"

Co "H"
Regt'l Liaison 0.
Co t1G 11
Co 11 C11
Co "ll"
Co 11 B11 (Hosp)
Co 11 B 11

R.,

Ass't Regt'l Chaplain, (CH)
Ass't Regt'l Surgeon, (VAC)
Co "E" (Hosp)
A-T Co
Co 11 F 11
Co 11 I 11
SSO, Postal 0, Asst S-1, (Serv Co)
Serv Co, Ass 1 t Adj.
Co 11 G"
Co 11 A"
1st Bn Hq Co
Co 11 H11
Co 11 L11
Jrd Bn Hq, Bn S-2
Co "I"
Co "L"
Co 11 K11
Ass't S-4, Serv Co. (Lv U.S.)
Co 11 L11 (Hosp)
Co 11 E11
Co ''D"
Co NKtt
Co 11 K11
. Co "Mn
Co · 11 G11
· Hq Co, (DS 24th Div)
Co 11B11 (Hosp)
1st Bn Hq Co
Co "C''
Co 11 H"
Co 11 F11
Ass 't Rgt '1 S-1 (Lv U.S.)
Ass 't Munn o., (Lv U.S.)
\
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Excerpt from
"THEIR lAST STRONGHOLD''

A narrative account of
THE 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION
on
MINDANAO
by Major General R. B. Woodruff

HEADQUARTERS EIGH'.m ARMY, APO 343, 24 May 1945.
TO:

Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, APO 24.

The lighting advance Mindanao and the courageous fighting in the
Davao area have added new laurels to the already distinguished record
of the 24th Division. · The courage and skill of officers and men defeated a determined enemy on ground of his own choosing and has opened
the way to a rapid completion of the destruction of Japanese forces on
Mindanao. My warmest congratulations to the 24th Infantry Division upon
the attainment of this objective.

R. L. EICHELBERGER,
Lieutenant General, USA,
Commanding.

I

MORO GULF TO DAV AO
The distance and pace of the 24th Infantry Division's thrust from
Moro Gulf to Davao stand as a unique achievement in tropical warfare.
Despite sporadic resistanc.e , scores of destroyed bridges, roadblocks,
ambushes and innumerable mines, the infantry spearheads traversed 140
road · iniles in 17 days, ending this assault march with the capture of
Davao.
In less than three months of campaigning the division broke Nippon's
last bastion in the Philippines, killing 7,000 of the enemy.
Davao was the oldest center of Japanese colonization in the Philippines, subjected to. Nipponese penetration for almost thirty years. The
city's 19,000 most influential citizens were Japs. During the planning,
stage of the campaign, Intelligence estimated that 36,000 enemy troops
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held Mindanao. Of these, 18,000 were reported in the Davao area --- the
last strong concentration of Japanese forces in the Philippines. The
enemy had had three years in which to prepare against the inevitable attack.
He was well prepared. He expected the invasion to come from the sea, directly on Davao. Most of his guns faced Davao Gulf. Our overland backdoor
attack caught him "with his pants down".
The division's assault march and the bitter fighting which followed
moved through every kind of tropical terrain; fertile valleys and ridgestudded jungles, swamps and tortuous mountain passes, rich abaca and coconut plains, saltwater expanses and swift flowing rivers, country populated
by a conglomeration of Christian Filipinos, Mohammedan Moros, and heathen
savages:,
Large sections of Mindanao's" rain forests have never been explored by
white men. Mountain chains, dominated by Mt. Apo (9,692 feet), follow a
general north-south course through the island. The broad lower courses of
the Mindanao River proved to be an asset to the division's assault, but the
gorges of the upper Davao and Tolomo Rivers in the wild hinterland of Davao
constituted the most difficult fighting terrain of the campaign.
The invasion plan called for a landing in force on the shores of Mora
Gulf and the seizure of Malabang Airstrip, one of the largest and best on
the island; then for a bold drive across the island via Highway #1, the
"National Highway", which runs cross-island to Digos on Davao Gulf, thence
north along the coast to Davao City.
Thirty six hours before
that Malabang Drome had been
lin Sibert, commanding the X
ing be made at Parang. This
convoy still sailed the high

the scheduled assault, information was received
seized by guerrilla forces. Major General FrankCorps, therefore directed that the initial landrequired a change in Division plans while the
seas.

At 0800, 17 April 1945, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry landed at Baras
and secured Malabang Strip and town. wVhile the 34th Infantry Regiment remained a "floating reserve 11 , a naval bombardment pounded Parang. Fourteen
hundred high explosive shells were hurled against the narrow landing area,
followed by a rocket barrage.
At 0900, the first wave of the 19th Infantry Regiment hit the beach at
Paraqg. While one battalion secured the beachhead against light resistance,
~nether pushed rapidly down Highway #1.
A 240-foot bridge across the Ambul River had been burned. The spearhead
forded the shoulder-deep river, carrying all weapons and equipment, and secured high ground four miles south-east of Parang. By 1330, the 21st RCT had
come ashore, followed by .the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, .and drove southo
Overw~ter reconnaissance from Parang to the estuary of the Mindanao River fell
to the 24th Cavalry Reco,nnaissance Troop. By the end of the first day a 35mile strip of the coast was in American hands.

Though the Division Co.runander stepped into a spider hole and emerged
with cracked ribs, Colonel William J. Verbeck, in command of the 21st Infantr,y, became the first casualty of the invasion. The Colonel was washing his face in a helmet and ducked for a final rinse when a sniper fired.
The slug tore across · his back. A burst from the submachinegun of analert
driver toppled the Ja~ out of a building twenty-five yards away. This was
the third and last Jap killed during that day.
Push to Pikit
At .dawn, 18 April,. the 19th RCT commenced the drive tpward the important road-and-river junction of Fort Pikit, an oli American installation.
A vanguard detachment dug in around . the junction of Highway #1 and the road
from Cotabato. Th~t night a for.ce of Japs supported by mortars and machineguns charged the perimeter. The assault was repulsed. Seven dead Japs were
found at sunrise.
, Meanwhile, the 21st RCT had embarked on an audacious amphibious thrust
at Pikit by way of the Mindanao River. If successful, this movement around
the right flank of the advancing 19th would cut off all Japs between Ft.
Pikit and Parang.
Aboard armed LCMs, one battalion passed through the gloom& estuary of
the Mindanao Riv~r and occupied the provincial capital of Cotabato. It re. ported many ~rocodiles, but no Japs. On 19th April a vanguard company,
patrolling upriver beyond Lomopog, encountered a clever enemy trap.
A Moro reported that 75 Japs were encamped in a bamboo grove about 2,000
yards distant. The company pressed upon the grove and was stopped by a mortar barrage. Simultaneously, a banzai attack struck its flank. The company
fell back t~ward the river, leaving one squad to cover the withdrawal. Crouched -in tall sword grass, the squad was surrounded by Japs. However, they held
tneir own through the night 'and the dawn, and killed 14 Japs on their return
trip to the company.
It was then discovered that one man was missing, Pfc William Roepke, 38
years old, a replacement in his first day of combat. Out on the left flank
of the company he had held his position for three hours, picking off Japs,
before he became aware that his company had withdrawn and that he was alone.
_The sun was merciless. Heavy rains fell during the night • . Roepke held his
post through twenty-hours, killing every Jap who looked his way. When he finally decided to shoot his way out he raised his score of dead Japs to thirteen.
End of extract from General Woodruff's narrative.
'
DAVAO CAMPAIGN
The combat efficiency of the 21st Regiment was good upon leaving Mindoro for Mindanao. The recent acquisition of replacements had necessitated
a brief but conc~ntrated training period. At the completion of this training period the regiment was considered ready for combat.
On 17 Apr~l the 3rd Battalion landed near the town of Baras in southern
Mindanao, secured a beach-head, the town of Malabang and its airfield.

---Agressive j:>atrolling was done along the Malabang-Lake Lanao Roa~ and
along the Malabang-Parang Road. The lst and 2nd Battalions lancled at
Parang .and took over the security of the beach-head there. ,:rhe Regimental Commander was wounded at Parang and Lieut .Co).:onel Arthur Henderson, Regimental.... Executive, ably ~ommanded the 21st. .

.

,

On 18 April the 2nd Battalion. ( -E Co) conun.anded by Lieut .Colonel Roy
Marcy made an amphibious 100\Tement from Paral'lg up the north branch of the
Mindanao River and seized Cotabato •. "F" Company urxier Captain Wicker then
moved to the .junction of the_north arid south branch of the river. Meanwhile "E" Company, Captain Kilgoe commanding, rooving up the south bt:anch
. of the river,. landed at Tamontako~ One platoon then continued up tne river
contacting ttFrt Compaey. "F" Company pushed on from the juncti~n of the two
branches of the river, assaulted and .took the town ·of Lomopog. They patrolled up. the river from Lomopog to Ulandang and thence to Paidu Pulangi. tJpon
being relieved by the 34th ~nfahtry the battalion reassembled at Cotabato~
The entire regiment was assembled in the Cotabato area preparatory to
moving to Fort Pikit and thence overland toward Davao. After rapid movement
poth day and night for some 140 miles, troops were tired from lack of rest.
1 May found the regiment nearing Bago preparing to- begin an offensive which
was to last for fifty-one consecutive days. Colonel Verbeck had recovered
from his wounds received at Parang and was again in comoand.
The terrain in this area was a ·continuous climb going north into the
hinterland. There were numerous streams and deep ravines. The entire area
was practically covered by abaca groves so thick, moverrent through .them was
almost impossible. The road net generally consisted of a system of parallel
. ~ads at intervals of some 3 to 4 thousand yards, running north and south
with an occasional uni.rrproved road connecting them.
For three years the Japanese · had pre~ red and perfected the ' defens.e of
this area. Knowing that any enemy attack must necessarily follow along this
road net, the Japanese built innumerable pillboxes and a very elaborate system of trenches, foxholes, and spider holes. Not only had these been camouflaged by the Japanese, but by natural growth as well. It was quite often
impossible to detect these emplacements when only a few feet from them. Full
advantage had been taken of the dense abaca groves. Many of their emplacements wer e very cleverly placed in these groves. Due to the denseness of the
surrounding vegetation and intense heat, movement off the roads was very
limited.
During the period of operations by the 21st Infantry, 1 May - 19 June,
an area 12,000 yards wide was cleared for a distance of approximately 12
miles. Elements -of the lOOth Japanese Division, totaling approximately
6, 500 men, faced this regiment. It is known that elements of the lOOth Division Artillery and the 30th Division Artillery were also operating in this
area. An unusually large number of automatic weapons were employed. by the
enemy. Many AA guns were captured which had been used for ground action.
Heavy mortars and light machine-guns were also plentiful as were 47mm AT guns.
The artillery pieces consisted mainly of 75mm guns.
This offensive action was completed with great loss to the 21st Infan-:try. Our casualties both killed and wounded were higher than ever sustained
in one battle in all the history of the 21st Infantry. The.s e officer casualties included the Regimental Commander wounded, two battalion commanders
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wounded, three company commanders killed, anj ten company
wounded.

co~~nders

On 2 May the lst Battaliqn, commanded by Major Nicholas Sloan, pushing
north an-d west from a point 2000 yards southwest of Bago, drove within 1000
yards of Mintal. This advance was made against sporadic rifle and machinegun fire. At the end of the day this battalion was receiving long-range
artillery fire. The 2nd Battalion, moving forward from the road junction at
(22.0-50.4), pushed northeast along the road to Libby Drome, then swung southeast to destroy enemy forces between it and the 2nd Battalion, l9th Infantry.
At the end of the day this enemy had been forced into a small pocket near the
south end of the Drome.
During the night of 2 1~y, the lst Battalion repulsed two strong counterattacks. The first attack at 2100 came from the north, while the second at
0330, was directed from several points on the battalion perimeter. Known
enemy dead totaled 20 KIA.
The following morning the battalion received artillery fire. Effectively
placed counter-battery fire silenced the enemy positions. The battalion resumed its attack to the north against moderate small arms fire. After a sharp
fire fight in the outskirts of Mintal, the battalion captured the city and pushed reconnaissance toward Tugbok.
Marcy's battalion continuing its drive to destroy enemy forces in the
Libby Drome area, pushed southeast from Libby Town to within 1000 yards of
the lst Battalion, 34th Infantry, which was securing the south end of the
field. The enemy well dug-in in an abaca plantation, offered strong resistance. Closely coordinated infantry, artillery and air attacks destroyed
many strong points in this area.
The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Tom Suber, relieved from
Line of Communication security missions, was moving to an assembly area at
a point 2500 -yards southwest of Bago.
The lst Battalion (-C Co) in the Mintal area repulsed counterattacks during the night. During the day, strong combat patrols were dispatched toward
Tugbok, where they directed counter-battery artillery fire on enemy positions.
Company "C", located southeast of Mintal, during the night successfully prevented. enemy infiltration attempts. During the morning a strong Jap counterattack was repulsed. Thirty Japs were counted dead. The 2rid Battalion continued its assault on the enemy emplacements on the southeast end of Libby
Drome. By 1200 the battalion had neutralized this resistance, established
road blocks and secured the high ground in _the vicinity of (27. 5-54. 5). The
3rd Battalion advancing northwest toward Mintal along the road on the northeast side of Libby Drome, encountered enemy emplacements afid barbed wire
entanglements.
The morning of 5 May Suber's Battalion contacted the enemy well entrenched in -an abaca field. Trye 2nd Battalion was sent around the left of this
battalion to flank the enemy position. As the 2nd Battalion made its attack,
the 3rd B~ttalion pushed forWard in a coordinated Infantry-Tank attack. The
tanks immediately drew heavy crossfire from 57mm, 75mm and 90mm guns located
in the hills on the north bank of the Talomo River. All three tanks received
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hits but were able to return under their own power. By the end of the day
the _2nq Battalion had crossed the Libby Drome, and from positions on the
northeast, were firing into the enefl\Y's flank. The airfield was cleared of
Japs, but the field still received enemy fire from artillery and AT gun
· positions located on the northeast bank of the Talamo River.
The 3rd and 2nd Battalions, following an intense artillery and air
preparatio-n attacked enemy strong-poihts in the abaca fields north of Libby
Drome. One Jap counterattack was repulsed. Very strong resistance was met
from mutually supporting pillboxes, and covered by artillery and mortar fire
still coming from positions irt the hills northeast of this area. Six hundred yards of ground pockmarked with enemy strong-points, were taken by the
3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, protecting the left flank of the regiment,
supported the attack. The 1st Battalion continued to block escape routes of
the enemy to the north.
At 070645, May, the 3rd Battalion received artillery fire killing 6 men
and wounding 35. Counter-battery neutralized the enemy's guns. Attacks
toward Mintal continued by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions . The foll'owin g day the
2nd Battalion broke through the enemy defenses and reached Mintal. One 40mm
gun, one HMG and one LMG were captured and 32 Japs were killed. Meanwhile,
the 3rd Battalion continued to receive enemy artillery fire from the high
ground on the north bank of the Talamo River •
. The 1st Battalion forced a crossine of the Talamo lli.ver north of Mintal
preparatory to attacking east along Mintal-Bancal Road, to establish a roadblock in the rear of enemy forces in contact with 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. This plan of action never materialized as the enemy resistance southeast of Mintal on the northeast bank of the Talamo River was so intense, it
became necessary to abandon the 1st Battalion's bridgehead.
During the first crossing of the Talamo River, when heavy sniper fire
had pinned down the forward elements, Private First Class James Diamond advanced alone, killed the first sniper and then directed the fire of a selfpropelled howitzer on the pillboxes and the remaining snipers. Later he
evacuated several wounded comrades across the swift, shoulder-deep Talamo
River while mortar and ~achinegun fire raked the water and both banks.
Through painfully injured, he brought the casualties to safety by driving
an abandoned jeep eight times through fire so intense that all four tires
were punctured.
When his battalion was ordered .back, Diamond volunteered to repair the
blasted Talamo River bridge. With one helper he built a foot span which enabled the battalion to withdraw across the river despite a concurrent mortar
barrage. Private Diamond was killed in action on 14 May and is being recom·
mended for the Medal of Honor.
The 1st Battalion was then moved under cover of darkness back to a position near Bancal immediately in rear of a Battalion of the 34th Infantry.
The plan was to attack two Battalions abreast clearing the high ground overlooking the river and Libby Drome, thereby relieving pressure on the 3rd
Battalion advancing northwest in the Drome area. This battalion repulsed
a heavy gr enade attack during the night.
Japanese forces in the Mintal area realizing the seriousness of their
position were attacL:ing our Mintal force, harassing them continuously in
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an effort to dislodge them, before the regiment's positions were consolidated. An enemy patrol attempting to destroy a br~dge in rear of the lst
Battalion along its supply route were engaged at AT Company during the
ni~ht and were driven off.
Eight enemy dead were counted. An estimated
100 of the enemy attacked on the morning of 11 May, 59 of whom were killed.
Four LMGs and two heavy mortars were captured at this time.
The two day offensive by the 1st Battalion cleare::l. the high ground overlooking Libby Drome, eliminating the last positions from which the enemy
could bring the airstrip under fire. The 3rd Battalion, having the pressure
lifted by the 1st Eattalion's advance, broke through the last enemy defenses
on its left flank and pushed against scattered resistance to Mintal.
Postions were consolidated and improved by aggressive patrolling in all
directions. Tugbok was attacked and after two days of heavy fighting it was
secured. Snipers were active north of the town and fire was being received
from posit ions out side the town.
The 21st Infantry was given the mission of crossing the Talomo River
above Mintal, driving north to the road junction at (22. 7-59. 8), thence northeast to cuty off the escape routes of thP. enemy being driven north by the 34th
Infantry Regiment east of the Talomo Iliver.
The 3rd Battalion forced a crossing of the Talomo River against exceptionally strong positions. The crossing was made under intense fire from
mortars and small arms, by ~g the arm pit deep river. This battalion·
secured the high ground overlooking this crossing. Element-s of the 1st Bat~
ta.lion passed through the 3rd Battalion and pushed north and secured the road
junction at (22.7-59o8). The 2nd Battalion remained in Tugbok, where Lt.Col.
Marcy's men were engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese north and south
of his position and in the town itself.
'
The following day the lst Battalion pushed north toward the road junction
at (22.5-61.4) encountering slight resistance until a point approximately 300
yards south of its objective was reached. Here a defense consisting of two
pillboxes supported by a number of individual foxholes connected by trenches,_
all surrounded by a double apron fence, halted the advance. A brisk fight ensued but an attack supported by tanks overran the position and the road junction was reached. A small scale night attack at this point was repulsed. Ten
Japs were killed.
·
The 3rd Battalion, resuming the offensive, passed through the 1st Battalion and pushed east against determined resistance. Numerous pillboxes were
encountered and overrun along this road. During the night, several counter. attacks were repulsed. F~rty-one of the enemy were counted dead. The 1st Battalion in the vicinity of road junction (22.5-61.4) and the 2nd Battalion in
Tugbok received sporadic harassing, machine-gun and mortar fire. The 3rd Battalion's forward elements reached (24.7-62.8). The order for the regiment to
_hold the ground it had taken was received. The gallant Lieut.Colonel Tom Suber
fell seriously wounded at this point after his battalion had taken its final
objective. Active patrolling in all unit sectors accounted for 25 more enemy
dead. The reg~ment was relieved on 29 May and withdrawn to the vicinity of
Lobogan.
The Regiment's job was now to drive north from Lobogan, generally along
three roads, clearing the area in a zone adjoi.ning that in which it had operated fpr the preceeding month.

BRONZE STAR (OAK .LJAF CLUSTER)
Captain SOTBOROB K. ABLE, Infantry, United States Army.
For meritor1ous achievement in connection with military operations against the enemy at Mindanao, Philippine Islands from
11 April to 20 June 1944, As a commander of a rifle company
Captain Able contributed to a marked degree to the successful
participation of an Infantry Reglment in the Mindanao operation.
By his outstanding leadership, exemplary conduct and tactical
ability Captain Able exerted a driving force upon his company
which kept it on the initiative in spite of strong enemy resistance and heavy los&es to our troops.
Captain Able led and directed the advances of his company courageously and continually
exposes himself to heavy enemy fire until seriously wounded on
7 May 1945. Throughout the operation he maintained coolness and
composure in a manner befitting a combat company commander.
BRONZE STAR (2BD OAK LEAF CLUSTER)
Major NICHOLAS E. SLOAN, Infantry, United States Army.
For
heroic achievement in connection with military operations against
the enemy near Mintal, Mindanao, Philippine Island~, on 10 May
1945. His battalion vas order to withdraw across the Talomo River
late in the evening in order to be in position for an attack the
following morning.
The enemy detecting the movement, put down a
mortar and artillery barrage on the narrow corridor through which
his troops had to move.
With the field artillery liaison officer,
he moved back up the ridge to a position from which they could direct our artillery fire on the enemy's position. Although enemy
mortar fire was falling near his observation post, Major Sloan
proceeded to adjust artillery fire upon enemy guns.
The enemy
fire shortly diminished to single sporadic rounds thus enabling
our troops to continue an orderly withdrawal.
Major Sloan's
courage and resourcefulness reflect credit upon himself and the
military service.
SILVER STAR (OAK LEAF CLUSTER)
Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) TOM W. SUBER, Infantry, United
States Army.
For gallantry in action near Min tal, Mindanao, 'Philippine Islands, from 4 May to 13 May 1945.
Lt. Colonel Suber exhibited
exceptional ability and qualities of l~adership in comw'anding his
battalion. While attacking up the road toward Mintal, the enemy had
superior observation from a hill outside the battalion sector to the
right flank,
From this high ground, the enemy constantly subjected
the troops to rnortar, automatic weapons, artillery and anti-tank fire,
Through the skillful tactical disposition of his men, Lt. Colonel
Suber kept casualties at a minimum while continuing to drive forward.
During the attack he was constantly with the front line rifle companies, under enemy observation, often subjecting himself to small
arms and mortar fire in order to maintain complete control of his
troops
His extreme coolness under fire, even while member . of his
command group were wounded around him, his disregard for his ovn
personal safety, and his determination to accomplish his ' mission,
gave his officers and me~ complete confidence in his leadership.
His tactical decisions were alvals sound and well directed.
On 25

May 1945, while with one of his assault companies, Lt. Colonel
Suber was wounded three times by an enemy machine gun
Some of
his men attempted to evacuate him put he would _not permit them to
submit themselves to the fire, and dragged himself to safety even
though seriously injured and in great pain. Lt. Colonel Suber's
courage, determination and devotion to duty are a credit to himself
and the military service.
SILVER STAR (Posthumous)
Second Lieutenant KEITH 0. CLEMENTS, Corps of Engineers, United
States Army. For gallantry in action near Min tal, Mindanao, Philippine ,Islands, on 15 May 1945. On this day Lieutenant Clements, a
platoon commander, was making reconnaissance of a bridge to determine
the possibilities of repairing the structure. The bridge ,was under
very heavy enemy motrar fir-e and enemy sniper fire which made his
approach· to the bridge extremely difficult . After cautiously working his way to the bridge site and having to take cover from enem7
action, Lieutenant Clements fQund on arrival that crossing the river
could only be accomplished by wading the swift ~urrent which was
armpit deep. On the other side were several litte~ casualties that
were in urgent need of medical eare. With utter disregard for his
own safety and with t~e help of two volunteers, Lieutenant Clements,
under heavy enem7 fire, improvised a foot bridge by which the 'patients
could be brought acrosR and thus helped in saving the lives of the
men. His action in the emergency reflects the greatest credit on
himself and the military service. Lieutenant Clements was later
killed in action at Bunawan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on ' 22
May 1945.
BRONZE STAR
Colonel WILLIAM J. VERBECK, General Staff Corps, (then Infantry), United States Army. For heroic achievement in connection with
military operations agai.nst the enemy near Bayab~~Pts, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on 30 May 1945. · On this day one compan7 of infantr7
of the United States Army
one compan7 of infantry of the Philippine
Army were moving toward their objective, the town of Bayabaa
The7
were stopped approximately 1500 yards east of their objective by an
enemy strong point which consisted of approximately 20 of the eneay
established in a defensive position in a cave. !his strong point was
holding up the advance of the two entire companies with heavy machine
gun fire. Upon learning the situation Colonel Verbeck, at that tize
a Regizental Commander, took over the command of the lilipino Company ~nd with guerrillas as guides began a flan~ing move into the
town through heavy abaca thickets at about 200 hours. · Several times
during this mo~e they received sniper fire but roached their objective without casualties. They immediately set up a ro~ block in
the town and so euccessful had been their move that wh~n six Japs,
armed with a light machine gun and knee mortar, walked into the area,
they were killed wi,thout loss to our forces. Due to the flanking
move the strong point was cut off and the next da7 the Americ~~ infantry company knocked out the enemy ~esistance which had heretofore
halted the advance. This allowed them to reach their objective of
Bayabas. Colonel Verbeck's heroic achievement in leading the lilipino company on this expedition reflects great credit upon himself
and the military service.
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deapit& a wound, he
·
wounded llnd repaired a bridge un·
Posthumous Medal of Honor der heavy fire. Finally, he gave h •
Marks Four Heroic Days
life drawing fire to enable hia P&·:
trol to reach safety.
ll. WASHINGTON, March 17-The
Medal of Honor has been awarded
· •posthumously to Pfc. James H.
Diamond of the Twenty-first . In;jfantry Regiment, Twenty-fourth
(Victory) Divisior,, for four days
of heroism in action, May 8, 9, 101'
· 'and 14, 19•5, along the Talamo ·
River on Mindanao in the Philip.
pines. It will be presented to his
mother, Mrs. Kate 0. Diamond, of
Gulfport, Miss.
Private Diamond killed a Japanese sniper and directed fire
eliminating enemy pillbOxes. Then, .
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! .. MEDAL OF HONOR.-By direction of the President, under the provisions
of the act of Congress approved 9 J'uly 1918 ( wri Bull. 43, 1918), a- Medal of
Honor for conspicuous gallimtry _a nd intrepidity at the risk of life above and
beypnd the call of duty was awarded -posthumously by the War Department
ln the name of Congress to the following-named officer and enlisted man:
Private First Class James H. Diamond (Army serial No. 3487Zl09), as a
member of a machine-gun section, Company D, 21st Infantry Regiment, Army
of the United States, displayed extt"eme gallantry and intrepidity on 8, 9, 10,
and 14 May 1945, at Minta!, Mindanao, Philippine Islands. When a Japane~
sniper rose from his fox hole to throw a grenade into their midst, this valiant
soldier charged and killed the enemy with a burst from his submachine gun.
Then, by delivering sustained fire from his personal arm and simultaneously
directing the fire of 106-mm and .50 caliber weapons upon the enemy pillboxes
immobilizing •his and another machine gun section, he enabled them to put
their guns into action. When two infantry companies established a bridg_ehead,
he voluntarily assisted in evacuating the wounded under heavy fire and, securing
an abandoned vehicle, transported casualties to the rear through mortar and
artillery fire so intense as to render the vehicle inoperative, despite the fact
he was sulfering from a painful wound. The following day he again volunteered,~
this time for the hazardous job of repairing a bridge under heavy enemy fire.
On 14 May 1945, when leading a patrol to evacuate casualties from his battalion,
which was cut off, he ran through- a virtual hail of Japapese fire to secure _an
abandoned machine gun. Though mortally wounded as he reached the gtln,
he succeeded in drawing sufficient fire upon himself so that the remaining
members of the patrol could reach safety. Private Diamond's indomitable
. spirit. constant disregard of danger, and eagerness to assist his comrades wm
ever remain a symbol of selflessness and heroic sacrifice to- those for whom he
gavl' his life.

On 30 May, Company 11 C" of the lst Battalion, reinf0rced, moved out
from hlampangi to seize and secure Bayabas. Small reconnaissance patrols
operating in this area several days previous had rerortcd considerable enemy activity. This company encountered strong resistance 2000 yards west
of Mampangi; The resistance was broken, during which, two machine-gun positions were silenced. 20mm automatic fire from well dug-in positions in
their flank again halted this advance. A flanking attack was made during
the night, resulting in the capture of Bayabas. The following day bypassed
enemy positions were eliminated, opening the road to Bayabas. Enemy entrenchments in this area were elaborate. Many pillboxes were destroyed.
11 K11 Company of the 3rd Battalion attacked northwest toward Alambre.
Enemy contact was made at (19.5-54.7). After breaking this resistance, Alambre
was captured and secured. In the meantime, Company 11 1 11 moved northwest on
Mulig. Nearing the town, fire was received from road junction at (19.3-56.1).
The road junction was taken and fire from four ~~chine-guns was received from
the company's right rear. Artillery and SPM fire silenced these positions.

The 1st Battalion attacked toward Tankelan
Company north from Bayabas and "B" Company west
pillboxes were encountered in this drive. With
pany contacted and eliminated ari enemy position
bre.

(13.2-57.3) by sending "A"
from Alambre. Eighteen enemy
Tankelan secured, 11 B11 Com1000 yards northwest of Alam-

The 2nd Battalion advancing north from Alambre pushed "G" Company west
and seized Manambulail while Companies '1E11 and "F'' pushed .north and seized
Shangkee. Companies 11 E" and "F" secured Naming and ''E" Comp~y then moved
west taking Monterey. 11 G11 Company at Manambulan pushed northwest against
scattered resistance to Monterey. Patrols working east from Naming in an
effort to contact the 34th Infantry at Tugbok, encountered an enemy strongpoint killing 20 Japanese.
The 1st Battalion launched an attack north from Monterey toward Tagakpan. Reaching the south bank of the river, which flows through Taga.kpan,
strong resistance was met. 11 A" Company moved up the river approximately
500 yards, made a crossing and moved north to the road, followed by "C"
Company. Meanwhile, frontal pressure was maintained on the enemy .by 11 B11
Company. This crossing was mad~ undetected. A road block was set up at the
road junction (13.7-63.9). The following day, a force holding the river line
in front of the 1st Battalion, was destroyed.
The regiment continued its drive toward Nangan on a three Battalion front.
Sixty-six enemy dead were counted after the crossing of the river running
through Tagakpan. The 1st Battalion on the left flank pushed to the road junction at (13.3-65.5), when machine-gun fire was encountered. 3rd Battalion
reached road junction at (16.1-65.9). Scattered sniper fire was encountered
in this move. The 2nd Battalion on the regiment's right flaok pushed northwest and secured the ro~d junction at (17.3-66.1). The Japs fought a delaying action along the road as the battalion advanced. The heavy abaca growth
along both sides of the road favored these delaying actions • .
Patrols sent to Wangan encountered heavy resistance and were forced to
return to their units for the night. Gallant Captain Theodore Crouch, Commander of 11 B11 Company, was killed here. His loss was keenly felt by the
Regiment. The following day "A" Company secured the road junction at (14.966.7) and established an effective road block to ambush Japs fleeing north-
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wes t frorn .ia.ngan. The 2nd and Jrd Battalions then attacked and seized
;;J.ngan. The 3rd Battalion was now commanded by Ma jor Francis R. Dice,
a veteran of every single regimental action in th e Philippines. The 2nd
Batt alion pushed on, supported by tanks, secured ground north of the river
in vicinity (17.4-67.5). Four attempts were made to force a bridgehead
while sut j ected to heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. During an air. ~trike,
l eading elements of t he battalion crossed the rivar, while the Japs were
still in a dazed condition. The lst Battalion crossed the Talomo River
assisted by fire from the Jrd Battalion. Lat er "I" and 1K" Companies re;..
lieved the lst Battalion of its bridgehead. To effect this relief units
had to fight their way in and out of positions, accounting for 23 Jape
killed.
The Jrd Battalion in its attack northwest of i'langan encountered very
strong l'esistance at (14. 8-66.8). This position was attacked twice during
the day after heavy artillery concentrations ha d been placed on the enemy.
Both attacks met heavy mortar and rrachine-gun fire. At the c1ose of the day
only slight gains had ' been made. The 2nd Battalion supported by tanks met
heavy resistance at (17.2-67.5).
·
'Agressive combat patrols eliminated enemy pockets to the regiment's
front, permitting an advance toward Calinan. Stubborn enemy resistance
along the way made this advance slow and l1ard. After meeting determined
resistance at the Talomo River, _a bridgehead was made. Patrols from the
2nd Battalion pushed north into Calinan, contacting elements of the Jrd
Battalions, 16Jrd Infantry. On 18 June the 3rd Battalion pushed north and
northeast toward Calinan against diminishing opposition and joined the 2nd
Battalion at road junction (16.8-70.3). The following day the regiment was
relieved by the 34th Infantry.
During this offensive of th'e 21st Infantry on Libby Airdrome and its
-subsequent dirve north and west it was faced by five Independent Infantry
Battalions, all part of the Japanese lOOth Infantry Division, plus two airfield battalions which had been converted to Infantry when the airfield were
put out of commission. For the most part, these troops had occupied and
trained i~ this immediate area for three years. Their thorough knowledge of
the terrain enabled them to perfect the intricate defense system found there.
They made maximum use of their weapons, their kno\'Jledge of the terrain and
their commanding position throughout the campaign. Only by dogged determination, excellently coordinated air and ground attacks, and the skillful employment of all weapons, was the destruction of this force completed.
On 9 July, four Filipinos who escaped from t he Japanes e north of Tamogan,
reported that 1,000 soldiers and more than 5,000 enemy civilians were living
in the forests without food or medicines; that U. S. artillery· had destroyed.
the last Japanese food stores in the Tamogan area; that Japanese enlisted men
and civiliar.3 were willing to surrender, bu t that Japanese officers killed all
suspected of planning to escape; and, fir~lly, that the Japanese had taken to
the practice of killing their own wounded for lack uf medical supplies and
surgical facilities.
On 12 July, patrols following up a report found a secret Japanese town
hidden in the forests. There were many bu ildings, barracY~, officers' quarters, a large sawmill and other equipment. Offal found on the spot indicated
that the Japs had been living on jungle roots, fruit and foliage. But the
beaten denizens of this comnrunity had already pulled farther into the mountains.

In the Battle for Davao, the Tvventy-Fourth Infantry iJivision pc:.id a
heavy price. In the gorges of the Tolomo River, on the blasted precipices of Hill 550, and in the jungle-like abaca fileds between Libby Drome,
Mintal and tn.a, the division's teams had paid in blood for the grim satisfaction of vanquishing some of the most fanatical Japs fighting over the
toughest fighting terrain on earth.
The Japs' most murderous weapons in the abaca expanses bordering Libby
Drome were anti-aircraft cannon laid for level trajectory. Their shells
would skim the abaca and burst in mid-air, while the riflemen weathering
this holocaust could barely see beyond their sights. In aJdition, it was
no rare occurrence that in an already decimated company twenty soldiers
collapsed from heat exhaustion in the course of a single day. The 21st
RCT lost two battalion commanders and twelve company commanders killed or
wounded in abaca fighting.
Japanese fortifications, dug long ago, had been overgrown with ra tural
vegetation to an extent which made them virtually invisible. The characterizations of these pillboxes by one infantry sergeant states the problem in
a nutshell: "l could have walked past three pillboxes every day for a whole
year and I would not have noticed them unless some Jap shot at me."
Characteristic also is the experience of a tank soldier who was blown
out of hjs tank by a mine. He fell into an abaca thicket, and a following
tank subjected him to point-blank fire, taking him for a Jap.
Japanese tunnel positions on the bank of the Tolomo River at Mintal
were the most intricate every met by veteran fighting men of this division.
Opening in the hillside which suggested the presence of a small cave were
actually entrances to complicated tunnel systems with many openings. These
tunnel mouths were often completely hidden by natural vegetation. Illustrative is the fact that one soldier, intending to flush three Japs from a
c~ve, hurled a satchel charge which set off a tunneled ammunition dump and
all but blew up the entire hill.
The Japanese who defended Davao were as fanatical a crew as ever fought
a tropical war. Suicide banzai charges and night infiltration of kamikaze
demolition units harassed all forward perimeters and lines of communication
throughout the campaign. Japs invaded artillery and quartermaster peri~meters,
and even the division command post, with mines strapped to their bellies.
Close combat night fighting with enemy suicide detachments was frequent. One
soldier killed a Jap in the Tolomo River by pushing his assilant 1 s head under
water with his foot. Another pounded a Jap to death with his helmet. An officer leaning against a banana tree was impaled upon it when a Jap bayoneted
him from the rear. Japs were killed with pocket knives and with bare fists.
Japanese crawled to within three feet of anti-tank cannon and then jumped up
to rush.
The Japs introduced two tricks, which were more effective then they
would be elsewhere because the abaca fields gave them such perfect concealment for their purpose. One was for individual Japs to lie concealed in a
ditch on the edge of an abaca field and slip a bangalore torpedo under the
sheels of a vehicle as it passed. The other---and the hardest to stop--was to bury or c0nceal 500 pound aerial bombs to which pull type igniters
were attached. Then attach a rope or heavy twine to the igniter and lie
concealed in a spider hole some 50 to 75 feet away-~-and pull the rope,

55

exploding the bomb wr.en a remunerative target was nearby. These caused us
an appreciable number of casualties, one such bomb killing 5 and seriousiy
~ounding 6 of our men.
The counter measure was new type point consisting
of small patrols on either side of the road some thirty or forty yards from
the forward point of the advance guard on the road and 10 to 15 yards off
the road. They could locate the rope, cut it---and kill the Jap in the
spider hole.
An interesting situation developed near the end of the campaign when
the bulk of the Japs had been driven into the hills. While in the relatively flat areas with their heavy vegetation, nearly all artillery observation on targets of opportunity was necessar ily by cub plane. The Japs
became accustomed to moving about in the open or on the roads when cubs
were not airborne. Shortly after arrival in the higher terrain, an excelground OP (equipped with high powered Jap scope) was located covering an
irr.po~t ant section of a main track.
Time and again, Jap working parties
were caught here with VT fire with heavy casualties inflicted. The enemy
apparently failed to recognize the altered OP situation.
The Japs were beaten. In seventy-four days of fighting the 24th Infantry Division had completely shattered the lOOth Japanese Division and
numerous auxiliary air and naval units. The enemy had joined the fight
with the largest concentration of artillery which the Twenty-Fourth had
encountered in four campaigns. In the course of the Davao battle 173
Japanese artillery pieces were captured or destroyed, and a great number
of automatic dual purpose weapons.
Victory in Davao was the final chapter in the Philippine Liberation
Campaign.
There was one more more anticlimax however. On 10 July 1945 the regiment, less the 1st Battalion, again moved up the Tamogan Trail to work
over enemy rem~nents who were still in the field.
On the 16th of July the lst Battalion, still commanded by Major Sloan,
sailed for the final amphibious landing of the war. This was made against
scattered enemy un:i.ts holding Sarangani Bay. A protracted and difficult
campaign of bushwacking destroyed the effectiveness of the enemy in this
area to the south of the Davao Bay Region.
Just before the sailing of the lst Battalion for Sarangani a former
lst Battalion officer, Captain William M. Langford, now Commander of M
Compar.y, was killed by enemy raiders who made a suicide rush into our rear
areas. Langford was killed on the night before he was to return to the
U.s. for his high point score.
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HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANTRY

Office of the Regimental Commander.
APO # 24,
20 June 1945.

SUBJECT:

Commendation.

TO

Officers and Enlisted Men of the 21st Infantry.

:

On the 19th June 1945, the 21st Infantry was withdrawn from
combat and moved to a reserve area. The 18th June 1945 marked the
sixty-third ( 63) day of continuous combat against a stubborn and
well trained ene~.
During practically the entire period this regiment was attacking. Fighting in terrain which favored the ene~ in defense and in
hemp and cogan grass where the heat of day WGS radiated to an unbearable degree, you never once failed to take an assigned objective.
The 21st Infantry counted 2133 Japanese dead and captured 14
prisoners. The total for the 24th Division was 5149 enemy casualties.
fhis regiment, therefore, accounted for 42% of the division total.
It is difficult for me to find words to express to you the admiration and respect in which I hold you. You and your dead comrades,,
and those of you who were wounded in action, have kindled in me an
intense pride in commanding such an organization.

W. J. VERBECK,
Colonel, 21st Infantry,
Comrranding.
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*

JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE, DAVAO CAMPAIGN
Elements of lOOth Japanese Division

Estimated
Strength

76th lnfantry Brigade
l67th Independent Infantry Battalion

450

l68th Independent Infantry Battalion

750

352nd Independent Infantry Battalion

750

353rd

Indep~ndent

Infantry Battalion

750

75th Infantry Brigade
l63rd Independent Infantry Battalion
Division Service Troops
Division Headquarters Troops

600
1750
250

Elements of Division Artillery
Elements of 30th Division Artillery

450

12th Airfield Battalion

300

14th Airfield Battalion

300

l26th Airfield Construction Unit

150

.,, Only those u!'lits operating in the 21st Infantry's
zone of action.

Three Platoon Leader of Company "C", 21st Infantry.
Lieut. Robert H, Malone **
Lieut. Jack Wright *
Lieut. Charles R. Counts
Standing near scene where first casualties of the 21st
Infantry were incurred at Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea.',
April 1944.

*

Killed irr action - Leyte
Leyte and Mindanao

** Wbunded

Major Francis R. Dic.e-

Lt.Colonel Arthur H. Henderson
Colonel William J. Verbeck
Captain Julius Berkowitz
At Toril' Mindanao, May 1945.

HEADQUARTERS X COF?.PS .
Office of the Com:randing C'reneral
APO 310
GENERAL CRDERS
NUMBER

7 July 1945
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The following commendation was received by the X Corps from the
General, Eighth Army:

Corr~nding

C01i!l.ffiNDATION
X CORPS
MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN C. SIBERT, COM1:ANDING
It affords me sincere pleasure to extend to the officers and
men of the X Corps and its attached units my deepest gratification
and appreciation of their achievement in the successful operations
on MINDANAO. The unswerving efforts of all commands to accomplish
their missions were highlighted by the historic march of Major General
Noodruff 's 24th Infantry Division from Parang to Davao City, the aggressive drive of Major General }Jartin's 31st Infantry Division from
Kabacan to Malaybala;>', and the difficult advance of Brigadier General
Shoe 1 s l08th Regimental Combat Team from Macajlar Bay to Impalutao.
These vigorous actions disrupted and shattered the enemy, drove him
into untenable positions and rendered him incapable of any further
offensive action.
I especially wish to praise the officers and enlisted men in
the smaller infantry units who overcame almost insurmountable obstacles to drive the stubbornly resisting enemy from his long
established positions. Much praise is due also the members of unit
staffs who planned and coordinated these arduou; operations. This
campaign has once again demonstrated the splendid fighting spirit
of the Americ;an soldier.
/s/
/ t/

R. L. Eichelberger
R. L. EICHELBERGER
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SIBERT:
PETER SATHER, JR
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/
/t/

F. Nowakowski
F. NO'NAKONS KI

Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
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Written upon news of Japan's surrender request.
August 14, 1945.
.

New York City,

Some are not cheering in Times Square today
Some who never again will be gay
People forget them as they sing and they dance
They're unable to be here; they haven't the chance.
Jungles of Guinea~ guard well your dead
Cogon on Leyte where heros once bled
Churchyard in Lubang, hear you these cheers?
Sleep there in silence; on through the years.
Crosses on Breakneck V-day is here
Hemp fields at Davao, graveyard austere
/That think you of tickertape dropped from the sky?
Do laughing and shouting, your lives glorify?
Clifford and Langford, Crouch and Bruce Hill
Do sirens and whistles give you a thrill?
Far from the shining cities gay whirl
Lie Eddleston, Davis, Diamond and Earle.
On a day in November, out there in the rain,
In mud caked fury of the Ormoc campaign
_No laughing and joking lightened the scene
Sure, forget all the hardship but remember the sheen.
Revellers on Broadway what know you of grief?
Have you seen tired soldiers awaiting relief?
Have you seen all their faces when once more they move out?
Have you read in their glances that feeling of doubt?
VH1at know you of companies of sixty or less?
Whose men never ask for help or redress
Are their lives to be forfeit if you make mistake?
Can you smile when your vitals are crushed for their sake?
Listen you reveller blowing your horn
-Nalk up to Mi¢al with me in the morn
Look over the river and see there our dead
Or would ynu prefer to shout "Victory" instead?
So we who are living, forget not this day
The sacrifice of heros who miss all this play
They cannot rejoin us; their duty is done
Pray for them now that victory is won.
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THINGS TO RafFllBER
Condition Red Alertl
Jungle boots~
Aussie beer.
Swimming pool in Hollandia.
Jungle foot.
Christmas in Barugo.
"C" Company guarding the WACs in Tacloban.
Bridge guards along the highways.
Mud at Daro.
Mubuhay! Veectorie1
TUba. Please bring the bottle back.
Ten in One.
General Quarters on the L.C.I.l
Carabaos.
The Carometa and Pony.
Wading ashore from the L.S.T.
Dance in the park at Calipan.
Feat at Boak.
Ambush at Gusay.
Dust in Mindoro.
Rats in San Jose.
General Cramer's inspections.
Chinese welcome in Calipan•
Jap flags for the Navy. How much?
Victory party at Lubang.
Coconuts.
Gimlet's grove.
Bongabong, Pinamalayan, Bananas and corn.
Warm canned beer.
.
Christmas mail in March. All smashed and wet.
The bridge over the Bugasanga River at Mindoro.
The A-20s taking off over camp.
The G.I.s
Old Soldiers Never Die.
Hello Bill - Hello Bill - This is Pappy.
The Moros and their betelnut.
Jap invasion money.
Coins in the ground at Mintal.
Red Beach.
The woodpeckers.
The hemp and the heat •
.Paypayas and limes.
Rest and rehabilitation (3 days).
General. Woodruff and his M-1.
Hello Nick, Hello Nick - give me a long count.
VF.
The beach at Dalio.
Lavanderas at Toril.
Diamond White six. This is Diamond six.
Hey Dice1 .
The Old Monk from Priory Hall.

NO MEMBEU OF THE 21ST INFANTRY /lAS CAPTURED OR ..VAS LISTED
AS MISSING IN ACTION. ALL OUR DEAD -NERE RE:COVERED AND BURIED
/liTH OUR OWN.

Your devotion to duty.
Your unqying courage.
Your sacrifices; the hardships you underwent.
The elan which marked you as proud men.
Your spirit of comradeship; your cheerfulness.
The lives you lost.
The wounds you bear.
Your honor.
This shall be passed to future soldiers of
the Twenty-first Infantry.
This shall be given to new generations of
your countrymen.

W.J .V.
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21ST INFANTRY DECORATIONS
The following is a list of Decorations published in General Orders, 24th
Division between June 1944 and December 1945. This list only contains Silver
Star (SS), Bronze Star (BS), Purple Heart (PH) and Oak Leaf Cluster (C) indicating more than one award. The majority of Purple Hearts awarded to members of Infantry units are awarded in hospitals and hence do not appear in
division orders. The Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service
Cross and the Legion of Merit are not published in. division orders and therefore none are listed hereon.
ORGANIZATION:

NAME':

Aitken, Malcom D.
Ashe, Rob 1t. w.
Byryus, Edward A.
Able, Sothoron K.
Adams, Wm. J.
Anderson, Francis w.
Adams, Roy B.
Allen, Shelton P.
Adam, James
Baden, Albert H. Jr.
Birkhard, Leo J.
Brannen, Ed.
Banker, . Charles H.
Blair, Oather
Bracknell, Artie
Browning, Newton F.
Bezich, Peter N.
Brock, Reinhardt w.
Babick, Peter 0.
Baker, Wm. E.
Benton, Chas. I.
Bresnahan, John T,
Bakonyi, Leslie A.
Beeghly, Harold R. ·
Brodine, Glenn w.
Bates, Stanley G.
Bradshaw, Marvin M.
Baker, La Verne E.
Berry, Joy C.
Baughman, Joe H.
Bardick, LeGrande S.
Bush, Rob't. C.
Burton, Charles D.
Burnett, Eugene
Brown, Rob 1t. S.
Blaney, Kermit B.
Berguch, Raymond c.
Busse~, Frank T.
Boyd, Orvil
Bell, Donald B.
Clifford, Thom. E.
Childs, John A.
Counts, Charles R.
Cox, Kenneth E.

1st Lt.
S/Sgt.
T/5
Capt.
Sgt.
PFC
Pvt.
Maj.
PFC
Capt.
Pvt.
S/Sgt.
M/Sgt.
1st Lt.
Pvt.
Capt.
PFC
S/Sgt.
1st Lt.
S/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
PFC
1st Sgt.
2nd Lt.
PFC
PFC
S/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
Tech/Sgt.
PFC
Sgt.
Pvt.
T/4
T/5
Capt.
Capt.
Pvt.
Maj.
PFC
S/Sgt.
Lt.Col.
Capt.
1st Lt.
$/Sgt.

Hq., 1st Bn.

RMD
RMD

I Co.
A Co.
E Co.

A.Co.
S-4
L Co.
MC
G Co.
Hq.

Sv.
AT
C Co.
S-1

RMD

C Co.
1st Bn. Hq.
C Co.
B Co.
D Co.
F Co.
E Co.
K Co.
B Co.
E Co.
K Co.
G Co.
B Co.
I Co.
A Co.
D Co.
RMD
Hq.
L Co.
3rd Hq.
Hq.

RMD
C Co.

1st Bn. Hq.
C Co.
C Co.
B Co.

IECORA TIONS:
BS
BS
PH
BS & BSC
BS
BS

BS
BS & BSC
Soldiers Medal
SS, BS

ss

BS
BS
BS

ss

BS

ss
ss

BS
BS

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss
ss

BS
BS
BS

NAME:
Campbell, Thorn. R.
Castle, Jamice B.
Coers, Burt W.
Cornfeild, Paul D.
Cameron, Jefferson w.
Camborn, Robert J.
Cheatwood, Wm. L.·
Coker, Clarence E.
Castro, Dominic.R.
Clemmen, Chas. E.
Castaneda, Francisco
Champage, Fran=is
Choly, John N.
Cooper, Glee s.
Casey, Jos. R.
Cantanzro, Anthony
Carmody, Rob•t. J.
Childs, John A.
Coolidge, Stanley J.
Distasi, Nicholas A.
De.~r.aree, Elmer E.
Diehl, George H.
Dougherty, Wm. J.
Dantzler, Le Roy
Dice, Francis R.
Devoursney, Martin T.
Erickson, Carol G.
Elliot, Idua W.
Eakin, Creas E •
Ethridge, Fredrick 0.
Ender, Robert R. ·
Farmer, Edward s.
Frantz, Ralph
Francis, Lester E.
Furnian, Jack
Francher, William F.
Feebach, Charles w.
Fiew, James E.
Foster, Clyde A.
Falcon, Keith A.
Gill, Thomas P.
Gasmmill, Morris L.
Gregoric, George A.
Garmer, Loyd P.
. Gomez, Jose A.
Groteluschen, Roland
Gardner, Joaquin R.
Garza, Jose
Graham, Wilbur C.
Goeb, Lawerence L.
Garrison, James_E.
Girardeau, John H., Jr.
Galac, John T.
Haddock, Eugene
Hauskins, Archie J.
Hudson, Roger W.

ORGANIZATION:

~

2nd Lt.
Pvt.
Maj.
Sgt.
PFC
S/Sgt.
Sgt.
S/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
Pvt.
PFC
Pvt.
S/Sgt.
2nd Lt.
S/Sgt.
T/Sgt.
2nd Lt.
Capt.
Cpl.
S/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
T/Sgt.
lst Lt.
Maj.
Sgt..
S/Sgt.
1st Sgt.
Cpl.
S/Sgt.
Capt.
lat Lt.PFC
PFC
PFC
S/Sgt.
PFC
Sgt.
PFC
T/3
T/Sgt.
PFC
- PFC
S/Sgt.
S/Sgt •
S/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
T/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
Major
1st Sgt.
Sgt.
Pvt.
2nd Lt.

C Co.
F Co.

SS,BS
BS

RMD

BS

C Co.
A Co.
L Co.
K Co.

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

c

Co.

ss
ss
ss

K Co.
K Co.
F Co.
F Co.
F Co.

.

ss

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

----I Co.

en.
A Co.
C Co.
M Co.
C Co.
C Co.
A Co.
I Co.
AT
Hq.
I Co.
lat Bn.
C Co.
M Co.
I Co.
H Co.
1st Bn.
C Co.
M Co.
F Co.
K Co.
C Co.
C Co.
3rd Bn.
Med.
M Co.
Med.
Med.
A Co.
K Co.
K Co.
B Co.
F Co.
1st Bn.
I Co.
L Co.
Hq. Co.
1st Bn.
C Co.
Med.
Hq. Co.
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DECORATIONS:

ss

Hq.

Hq.

BS, SS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

Bs
ss

BS
BS

ss
Hq.

BS
BS
BS
BS
SS, BS
BS
BS

ss

Hq.

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss

Hq.

BS
BS

ss
ss

BS

NAME:

~

ORGANIZATION:

Hughes, William c.
Hiber, Clarence C.
Hull, William R.
Howery, Arthur L.
Halderson, Llewellyn D.
Huggins, James
Henderson, Arthur H.
Hasket, Woodrow W.
Heinig, Robert J.
Howard, Enos L.
Hartman, Robert H.
Hood, William E.
Hall, Claude H.
Hamrick, J.D.
Hartman, William H.
Hampton, Calvin E.
Hembrey, Charley J.
Hodgin, John V.
Hughes, Carline!
Hendrickson, Luther v.
Hair, Palmas J.
Hammack, Charles V.
Haas, Arthur C•
Higgins, Paul M.
Irons, Philip S. III
Johnson, William Jr.
Jullie, Lawerence A.
Jankowski, Chester G.
Jasuikiewiez, Anthony J.
Jester, George L.
Ja~eson, Charles R.
Johnson, Dale E.
Jackowski, John
Jones, Erner
Kaljian, Ara
Kimbrell, James P.
Kilgo, Robert L.
Kranz, Clifford T.
Keating, William A.
Kufhal, Wilbert E.
Kenne:iy, John T.
Kelly, Marvin H.
Kepler, Louis G.
Kaden, Earl E.
Kuehster, John E.
Kelley, Jack H.
Long, William N.
Lester, Norman R.
Lyman, · Charles B.
Little, Laman w.
Madison, Seymour F; .
Langford, William M.
Lacy, John R.
Lemkuhl, Merle E.
Letzring, Frank C.

1st Lt.
Sgt.
PFC
S/Sgt • .
1st Lt.
PFC
Lt.Col.
Pvt.
1st Sgt.
PFC
PFC
Pvt.
lst Lt.
S/Sgt.
2nd Lt.

A Co.
I Co.
Med.
C Co.
E Co.
B Co.
Regt.Ex. Officer
E Co.
D Co.
C Co.
G Co.
B Co.
2nd Bn. Hq.
F Co.

Pvt.

F Co.
I Co.
1st Bn. Hq.
3rd Bn. Hq.
Hq. Co.

PFC
S/Sgt.
T/Sgt.
PFQ
fFC
2nd Lt.
1st Lt.
Sgt.
1st Lt.
S/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
S/Sgt.
PFC
Capt.
lst Lt.
PFC
Capt.
Pvt.
PFC
Capt.
PFC
S/Sgt.
PFC
Sgt.
S/Sgt.
s/sgt.
2nd Lt.
PFC
Major
S/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
Col.
Major
Lt.Col.
1st Lt.
T/Sgt.
Pvt.
PFC

MD

H Co.
1st Bn. Hq.
1st Bp. Hq.
E Co.
Hq. Co.
B Co.
K Co.
A Co.
F Co.
C Co.
Med.
D Co.
1st Bn. Hq.
E Co.
A Co.
0 Co.
Med.
I Co.
A Co.
G Co.
B Co.
I Co.
2nd Bn. Hq.
F Co.
Hq. Co.
Hq. Co.
2nd Bn. Hq.
2nd Bn. Hq.
D-Co.
G Co.
Med. Det.
F Co.
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DECORATIONS:
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS-lst BSC- 2nd BSC
ss
BS
BS
ss
BS
ss
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS ·
BS
BS
BS
BSC
BS
BS
SS-BS-BSC
Soldiers Medal
BS
BS

ss

BS
SS-BS
ss
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss

BS
BS

BS
ss
BS
ss
SS-BS
BS
BS
Soldiers Medal
BS

ss
BS
BS
BS
Bs
ss
BS

~

~

ORGANIZATION:

Liby, Chester D.
Lee, Robert E.
Lockhart, Gerald L.
Lwrun, Marvin E.
Luria, Sidney B.
Luke, Carl K.
Lem;, Hilmar w.
Light, Andrew J.
Moye, Franklin w.
Mauriello, Angelo v.
Mumper, David F.
Millirons, James L.
Meyer, Jacob
Marlett, Leal M.
Mashek, John R. ,
Mosteiro, Francisco
Miller, Robert B.
Mott, John
Marcy, Roy w.
Miller, George J.
McGee, Monroe A.
McLean, Ardell G.
McClelland, John W.
McGuire, Clarence R.
McNamara, Warren M.
McKeon., Robert G.
Nixon, De Wayne A.
Nava, Jesse D.
Norman, Donald B.
Owen, Boyce
O'Brien, Eugene J.
Olivers, John P.
Polock, Henry
Prestas, Andrew E.
Pietrowsky, Alex. T.
Pursley, Homer
Payne, Elva F.
Phipps, Wm.
Pepe, Antonia
Panting, Farrell
Poppa, Alvin L.
Pope, Harry D.
Powell, James E., Jr.
Peha, Charles w.
'
Parent, James M.
Prodnit, Walter U.
Riley, Jacob L., Jr.
Ross, John M.
Ramee, Eric P.
Reese, Claude A.
Rhoda, Sanford S.
Reid, Niel P.
Rockstadt, Walter E.
Rogers, Nolan E.
Rogers, Morgan I.

PFC
PFC
Major
PFC
Capt.
PFC
2nd Lt.
T/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
T/5
S/Sgt.
1st Sgt.
S/Sgt.
PFC
T/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
Pvt.
Lt .col.
Capt.
Pvt.
1st Lt.
S/Sgt.
s/sgt.
Capt.
1st Lt.
Pvt.
PFC
Pvt. .
PFC
S/Sgt.
Sgt.
1st Sgt.
T/Sgt.
1st Sgt.
S/Sgt.
T/4
Pvt.
S/Sgt.
Pvt.
PFC
PFC
PFC
PFC
·capt.
S/Sgt.
Capt.
S/Sgt.
Lt.Col.
1st Lt.
P.FD
Capt.
T/Sgt.
Pvt.
Capt.

F Co.
Med. Det.
Hq. S-J
3rd Bn. Hq.
Med.
Med.

---L Co.

G Co.
Hq. Co.
B Co.
M Co.
M Co.
Yed.
K Co.
K Co.
K Co.
D Co.
Hq.Co.
I Co.
C Co.
2nd Bn~
F Co.
H Co.
D Co.
2nd Bn.
D Co.
C Co.
C Co.
F Co.
1st Bn.
I Co.
AT Co.
M Co.
I Co.
K Co.
C Co.
F Co.
M Co.
C Co.
C Co.
AT Co.
C Co.
M Co.
2nd Bn.
Cn. Co.
I Co.
G Co.
Jrd Bn.
Hq.
B Co.
M Co.
I Co.

c

Co.

----
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Hq.

Hq.

Hq.

DECORATIONS:
BS
BS
BS
BS
SS-BS
BS
BS
ss
ss
BS
BS
BS
.BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
- BS
ss
BS
SS-BS
ss
ss
BS
BS
BS
-BS
BS, BSC
BS
BS
BS
ss
BS
ss
BS
BS
BS
ss

ss

Hq.

BS
BS
ss
BS, BSC
ss
BS
BS

ss

Hq.

ss
SS, BS
BS
BS
ss
PH
BS
BS

~

Romack, Lester R.
Rosenblatt, Benjamin
RhodA, Donald B.
Richard, L~wis
Ralston, Everett J.
Riffey, Richard G.
Rose, Homer K.
Ryan, !)!. vid D.
Roepke, William ·F.
Rink, Eugene J.
Russell, Crawford C.
Rochelle, Boyd L.
Rennaker, Evert D.
Shapiro, Edward E.
Suber, Tom W.
Short, Clarence E.
Sloan, Nicholas E.
Scott, John
Shannon, Ernest w.
Smith, Vinson s.
Schneeweis, Earl P.
Shipley, Vernon E.
Smith, Orville W.
Shaw, Frank G.
Simmons, Truman w.
Sinsel, Alvin
Sutterby, George C.
Satangelo, Car~ c.
Schappert, .Josepb H.
Skrobu.ton, Ray.roond J.
Smith, Hershel L.
Smoot, Lee R.
Stewart, Alvin E.
Stimson:, Arthur E.
Stockert, Christ P~
Sayers, Fred P.
Scrapper, William, Jr.
Slaski, Alvin c.
S}'e'ro, Frank
Shook, Willard E.
Souza, Frank T.
Sundquist, Raymond M.
Smith, Cec~l R.
Smith, Norman K.
Stein, Leonard I.
Stanford, Don D.
Suber, Tom W.
Seyde, Frank W.
Spencer, Clarence v.
Taylor, Leon W.
Tonelli, Raymond J.
Thompson, James H.
Thomas, James A.
Taylor, Melvin L.
Terrell, Millard C.

RANK:

ORGANIZATION:

PFC
1st Lt.
PFC
PFC
PFC
T/Sgt.
. PFC
PFC
PFC
T/Sgt.
Cpl.
S/Sgt.
1st Lt.
Capt.
· Capt.
Major
1st Lt.-Capt.
P\rt.
PFC
1st Lt.
Pvt.
S/Sgt.
T/5
PFC
PFC .
1st Sgt.
· PFC .
T/4 ..
S/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
S/Sgt.
1st Lt.
1st Lt.
PFC
T/4
T/Sgt.
PFC
PFC
PFC
Pvt.
1st Lt.
Pvt.
S/Sgt.
2nd Lt.
Major
Lt.Col.
Capt.
T/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
PFC
Capt.
Pvt.
Pvt.
S/Sgt.

IJECORATI ONS:

L Co.

BS

·Bs
E Co.
M Co.
C Co.
D Co.
B Co.
1st Bn. Hq.
F Co.
AT

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss

ss
ss
ss
ss
ss
BS

~ed.

I Co.
L Co.
Mea. Corp.
3rd Bn. Hq.
Hq. Co.
Hq. Co~
C Co.
B Co.
Sv. Co.
C Co.
D Co.
B Co.
G Co.
L Co.
A Co.
L Co • .
K Co. ·
I Co.
AT Co.
·A Co.
C Co.

BS, SS
BS
BS-lst BSC -2nd BSC
BS
BS
BS-BSC
BS-BSC
BS

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

3rd Bn. Hq.
A Co.
Med. Det.
D Co.
I Co.
I Co.
C ·Co.
D Co.
Hq. Co.
AT Co.
Jrd Bn. Hq.
I Co.
Jrd Bn. Hq.
Jrd Bn. Hq.
Hq. Co.
M Co.
M Co.
B Co.

ss
ss
ss
ss
BS
. ss

BS
BS

ss

BS
BS
BSC

BS
BS
BS
BS
BS

ss
ss

Mea. net.
M Co.
C Co.

BS
\
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NAME:

Mt!1ll

Trissel, Arthur J.
Topia, Joaquin R. ·
Torres, Andres
Teets, Kenneth C.
Trammell, Alonzo K.
Thompson, James H.
Underwood, Richard E.
Verbeck, William Y•
Vinyard, James
Vienneau, Ernest L.
Vaughn, Robert D.
Weber, Frederick R.
Woodville, John S,
Whitney, Howard H.
Wolf, John H.
Whitney, John S.
Witte, Frank L.
Wright, Albert J.
Wingertsman, John C.
Weber, Bartholomew
Welch, Francis H.
Wiggins, William W.
Wilhe, Thomas w., Jr.
Woodie, Donovan K.
Wisor, Robert L.
Wicker, Gle~ese
Wilson, Milton E.
Williams, Jay B.
Youngblood, Orlan.
Yarbrough, Winston
Zines, Francis J.

2nd Lt.
Pvt.
Cpl.
S/Sgt,
1st Lt.
Major
PFC
Col.
T/Sgt,
Capt.
1st Sgt.
Lt.Col.
Major
2nd Lt.
Pvt.
Pvt.
PFC
1st Lt.
PFC
S/Sgt.
Sgt.
S/Sgt.
T/Sgt.
PFC
1st Lt.
Capt.
Capt.
Capt.
T/Sgt.
S/Sgt.
PFC

ORGANIZATION:
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D Co,
B Co.
M Co.
K Co.
H Co.
Jrd Bn. Hq.
1st Bn. Hq.
Hq. Co.--Regt.Comd.
A Co.
K Co.
M Co,
Hq. Co.
Serv. Co. S-4
K Co,
L Co,
B Co,
C Co •.
C Co.
D Co.
A Co,
L Co.
D Co.
C Co.
. Med, Det ....
D Co.
2nd Bn. Hq.
K Co.
Jrd Bn, Hq.
L Co.
lied.
L Co.
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